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Abstract 
This dissertation examines three different aspects of corporate intangibles or misconduct 
and their impact on firms. The first essay examines the impact of employee flexibility on firm 
value, the second essay examines whether the SEC can deter financial misconduct through its 
enforcement, and the third essay examines the impact of mandating risk disclosure on firm 
innovation. 
In the first essay, I hypothesize that employee flexibility enhances firm value because a 
flexible and empowered workforce helps the firm to respond to exogenous shocks. I estimate 
employee flexibility scores through textual analysis of online job reviews and I find that a high 
employee flexibility score leads to superior stock returns, especially for firms with high exposure 
to exogenous risk.  
In the second essay, I examine whether the Securities and Exchange Commission’s 
(SEC) enforcement actions, and who these actions target, deter future financial misconduct. An 
enforcement action reduces the incidence of misconduct in other firms in the same industry and 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) in the future. Furthermore, an enforcement that punishes a 
guilty company has a larger deterrence effect on future misconduct than punishing an officer, 
auditor, attorney, or other entity.  
Finally, in the third essay, I test whether mandatory risk disclosure reduces firm 
innovation. Based on text analysis of risk disclosure in 10-K filings for over 44,000 firm-years, I 
find that an increase in disclosed risk is linked to a decline in research and development, patents 
filed, and citation-weighted value of patents. Furthermore, by exploiting two natural experiments 
and a regression discontinuity design, I am able to show that mandatory disclosure of risk in the 
10-K exacerbates the effect. The mechanism for this negative association with innovation 
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appears to be linked to firms’ financial constraints; firms with financial constraints experience 
even larger declines in innovation when risk disclosure is high than other firms. These results 
show that increased disclosure requirements can have a negative impact on some firms. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this dissertation, I investigate three aspects of corporate intangibles and ethics. While not 
measured on a firm’s financial statements, intangibles are a critical portion of firm value. For 
example, emerging studies have shown the importance of corporate culture on firm value and 
performance, the importance of integrity and financial misconduct on improving or damaging 
firm reputation, the effect of qualitative risk disclosures on traditional measures of firm risk, and 
the impact of innovation on helping the economy grow and firms to thrive.  
However, due to the insubstantial nature of intangibles, they are difficult to measure and 
study—there are no inventories to count nor are there any factories to visit. This dissertation 
attempts to bridge that gap by using the emerging technique of text analysis. Text analysis can 
glean qualitative information from thousands of firms over many years—an impossible task by 
hand—allowing the incorporation of data previously unavailable to researchers. By using text 
analysis, I am able to measure intangibles on a large cross-sectional sample of firms over time 
and empirically test for the impact of these intangibles with a sample size impossible with hand 
coded responses. 
Chapter 2 uses this textual analysis technique to analyze the impact of employee 
empowerment or flexibility on firm performance when exposed to risk. Chapter 4, in turn, 
examines the interplay of two different intangibles by identifying the relationship between risk 
disclosed by a firm and the amount of innovation the firm produces. Finally, Chapter 3, though it 
does not use text analysis, looks at an important intangible, integrity and reputation, by 
examining whether the SEC can deter financial misconduct.  
 
 2 
 
Chapter 2 of this dissertation examines the impact of a specific aspect of the corporate 
culture intangible, employee empowerment/flexibility, and its impact on firm value. Corporate 
executives consider corporate culture to be very important for firms (Graham, Harvey, Popadak, 
and Rajgopal 2016a) and other academic research has shown that corporate culture has a large 
impact on firm performance (Guiso and Zingales 2015). This chapter considers the value 
relevance of psychological empowerment—employee flexibility, defined as employees’ ability 
to accelerate intended changes and to respond to unexpected situations (Bahrami 1992).  
According to the theoretical models by Kreps (1990) and Hermalin (2001), employee 
flexibility acts as an informal contracting mechanism that helps boost firm value, particularly 
when the firm faces risk or uncertainty. Employee flexibility overcomes incomplete contracting 
in that flexible employees are able to rapidly react to unforeseen or ex-ante improbable 
circumstances. Consequently, we expect to see these firms outperform when exogenous risk is 
higher. 
Traditionally, an intangible like employee flexibility is estimated through primary research 
with firm employees; however, this method is impractical for a large sample of firms over time. 
To overcome this, I use job reviews published by employees on a career intelligence site as a 
primary source—I use over 690,000 reviews drawn from 2011-2016 from S&P1500 firms. To 
analyze this vast quantity of data, I use text analysis to identify words related to empowerment or 
flexibility in the reviews. I then average the review-level scores by firm and year to obtain a 
firm-level annual measure of employee flexibility, known as “flex” score. 
I find that employee flexibility improves firm value, particularly among firms sensitive to 
risk or exposed to economic uncertainty. I form a long-short portfolio of high- and low-flex firms 
and measure hedge profits; high-flex portfolios cumulatively outperform the low-flex portfolios 
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by 25.8% for the value-weighted portfolio. Furthermore, these abnormal returns remain even 
after controlling for known risk factors: a flexibility-based value-weighted hedge portfolio earns 
an alpha of 3.9% (annualized) after controlling for the Fama and French (2015) five factors.  
Consistent with the theoretical model, employee flexibility matters most to firms with higher 
exposure to exogenous risk—among firms with high CAPM beta or during periods of economic 
uncertainty. When I split the flex regressions into firms with above- and below-median beta, we 
find the high-beta subsample exhibits significant annualized risk-adjusted high-low flex hedge 
profits while low-beta firms show no alpha. In addition, flexible firms also only demonstrate 
abnormal returns after an exogenous increase to economic risk—an increase in economic policy 
uncertainty using the Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). Alpha is only apparent following high-
uncertainty months.  
The results also remain robust after controlling for firm characteristics in a Fama-Macbeth 
cross-sectional regression. The abnormal returns remain even after examining employee morale, 
organizational capital (a proxy for management effectiveness and training), and unionization. 
The third chapter of the dissertation examines whether the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) can deter future financial misconduct through its enforcement actions. 
Misconduct is a large problem for financial markets as it discourages outsiders from 
participating, leads to market manipulation, and broker-agency conflicts (Bhattacharya and 
Daouk 2002; Beny 2005; and Cumming, Johan, Li 2011). Consequently, reducing financial 
misconduct is critical to ensuring trust in the financial system.  
A main part of ensuring this trust in the financial system is the prosecution of financial 
malfeasance. This prosecution reduces misconduct in two ways: First the guilty individuals are 
incapacitated (jailed, excluded from industry, etc.) and unable to commit future misconduct. 
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Second, and more importantly, these prosecutions deter financial misconduct as future criminals 
fear identification and punishment. In this chapter, I focus on the latter effect as deterrence has 
been shown to have a much larger effect on reducing other forms of crime (Ehrlich 1996). 
In addition, I also examine which target for prosecutions is the best for deterring future 
financial misconduct. When prosecuting a case, the SEC can target any combination of officers 
of the company, the company itself, or other groups, such as an auditor or lawyer. By knowing 
which target of prosecution reduce financial misconduct in the future, the SEC can select cases 
which will have the maximum deterrence impact. 
To test whether enforcement deters future misconduct, I run a logit regression analyzing 
the probability of misconduct in the years following an enforcement action by the SEC. The 
results show that an enforcement action in the past two years reduces misconduct in the same 
industry and MSA. For example, in 2004, the SEC officially sanctioned Worldcom (now known 
as MCI) for its financial misconduct. In the following year, the regression results predict that the 
rate of financial misconduct will be 19.2% and 32.4% lower in the industry and MSA, 
respectively, than if there was no enforcement. The results are robust to the usage of alternative 
metrics of financial misconduct. The results are similar if self-reported restatements or Fscore, a 
measure that predicts financial misconduct, are used instead of actual misconduct. 
In addition, I examined what target of punishment would be best for reducing future 
misconduct. I subdivided the enforcement actions into whether they targeted officers of the 
company, the company itself, other groups, or combinations of the previous three. The results 
show that enforcements against a company have the largest deterrence on misconduct in the 
same industry and MSA. On the other hand, targeting the officer and other entities has lower or 
no statistically measurable effect on financial misconduct rates in the industry or MSA.  
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These results will be useful in the ongoing debate over how to deter future financial 
misconduct. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has reached record settlements with banks 
involved in the financial crisis; however, it has failed to successfully pursue any of the bank 
CEOs or other officers.  
The fourth chapter of this dissertation examines the impact of mandatory corporate 
disclosure on another intangible--firm innovation. Innovation is important to macroeconomic 
growth and on a microeconomic level, innovation can help firms withstand competition and 
improve their firm performance. Corporate disclosure reduces information asymmetry, improves 
capital market efficiency, and other benefits, and regulatory agencies across the world have 
steadily increased disclosure requirements. However, increased disclosure may not bring uniform 
benefits to firms Two theoretical models have hypothesized that improved disclosure does not 
benefit all firms. The first shows that less disclosure is desirable when the manager cannot easily 
report the benefits of investments (Kanodia, Singh, and Spero 2013). The second shows that 
improved disclosure causes a “crowding-out” of investments among firms with riskier 
investments (Zhang 2013). 
To estimate the amount of disclosed risks, I download all the 10-K filings from 1993 to 2013 
and use the ratio of risk keywords scaled by the total number of words in the 10-K filing to 
measure corporate risk disclosure. I then use this data to determine the baseline relationship 
between disclosed risk and innovation. An increase in disclosed risk in a 10-K is associated with 
a significant decrease in R&D, number of patents, citation-weighted number of patents.  
I then use two exogenous shocks and a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to examine 
the impact of making the disclosure mandatory on firm innovation. In the 2005 shock, firms 
were required by the SEC to include a risk disclosure section called the Item 1A. This meant that 
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all firms were required to have a discussion of risks that was easily identifiable and 
comprehensive. Furthermore, in 2008, the SEC exempted smaller reporting companies from 
having to include an Item 1A risk disclosure section in their 10-K filings. Thus, these companies’ 
risk disclosure was optional. 
By examining the 2005 exogenous shock, I find that the mandatory disclosure of risk in the 
10-K filings further reduces the amount of innovation—after the mandatory inclusion of the Item 
1A, the negative impact of risk disclosure on innovation almost doubles. Furthermore, the 2008 
exemption for smaller reporting companies enabled a difference-in-difference (DiD) and RDD 
test to examine the impact of removing the mandatory disclosure requirement. After 2008, 
smaller reporting companies showed an increase in innovation after the risk disclosure 
requirement was removed for them in 2008. The RDD further identifies the mandatory risk 
disclosure effect, showing that firms just above the threshold for mandatory Item 1A experience 
lower levels of innovation than firms just below the threshold. 
The channel for this relationship appears to be due to financial constraints. I examined the 
interaction of external financing constraints on the risk disclosure-innovation relationship and 
found that the effect of risk disclosure was magnified among firms with financial constraints. 
Consequently, the mechanism appears to be that the market is unwilling to provide additional 
funds to these firms for fear of the risks these firms may face, similar to what the model in Zhang 
2013 predicted. 
I ran a variety of robustness checks to ensure the results were valid. Including testing if the 
results are related to information asymmetry reduction, traditional risk measures (beta and 
idiosyncratic volatility), and the textual dictionary used. The results stand in all cases. 
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The fifth and final chapter includes a summary of the results and implications for future 
research as well as practitioners.  
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Chapter 2: Employee Flexibility, Exogenous Risk, and Firm Value 
2.1 Introduction 
The psychological empowerment of employees is crucial to the well-being of a firm and 
affects a broad range of employee features such as job satisfaction, organizational commitment, 
and task performance (Seibert, Wang, and Courtright 2011). One form of worker empowerment, 
employee satisfaction, is shown to boost firm value in markets with low hiring and firing 
constraints (Edmans 2011, 2012; Edmans, Li, and Zhang 2017). In this paper, we consider the 
value relevance of a related but distinct form of psychological empowerment—employee 
flexibility, defined as employees’ ability to accelerate intended changes and to respond to 
unexpected situations (Bahrami 1992). In line with the theoretical framework of Kreps (1990) 
and Hermalin (2001), we hypothesize that employee flexibility acts as an informal contracting 
mechanism that helps the firm react to exogenous shocks, and we examine whether employee 
flexibility enhances firm value.  
We expect employee flexibility to improve firm value by increasing the firm’s ability to 
cope with exogenous shocks. Since employee flexibility can supplement incomplete contracts by 
enabling coordinated employee actions in response to unforeseen or ex-ante improbable 
circumstances, the ability of employees to react to novel situations should be positively related to 
firm value.  
However, just as maintaining employee satisfaction entails costs (Edmans 2011; Edmans, 
Li, and Zhang 2017), firms face a trade-off in developing and maintaining flexibility. First, 
creating flexibility requires investments such as hiring and training employees with multiple 
skillsets, reorganizing work, and building an information infrastructure suitable for a flexible 
working environment. Moreover, firms need to maintain flexibility even during periods of low 
 9 
 
uncertainty, thereby bearing heavy sunk costs. We therefore expect that the net benefits of 
employee flexibility will be large enough only when firms have high exposure to exogenous risk, 
because these are precisely situations where incomplete contracting is more likely and costly. 
Appendix A.1 presents an airline case study to illustrate how employee flexibility may improve 
firm value.   
We use stock returns as the main metric of firm value creation (following Edmans (2011, 
2012) and Edmans, Li, and Zhang (2017)). Endogeneity issues of reverse causality, omitted 
variable and selection biases, and measurement error are challenges inherent to corporate finance 
tests when ratio-based metrics such as Tobin’s Q and ROA are used to assess firm value or 
performance. Stock returns, by contrast, are free of these endogeneity concerns because public 
information, including employee flexibility, is not expected to predict future returns in a 
sufficiently efficient market. In addition, examining future returns tends to give conservative 
estimates of the value effect of intangibles because measurement error of employee flexibility 
will lead to weakened return predictability.1  
Employee flexibility, or employees’ ability to respond to contingencies (Bahrami 1992), is 
clearly intangible and difficult to quantify. Traditionally, corporate culture constructs are 
estimated through in-depth interviews with selected firm employees (e.g. Hofstede, 1984). This 
method is however impractical for our purposes because we aim to measure employee flexibility 
for a large sample of firms. Instead, we turn to the job reviews published by employees on a 
career intelligence website as a surrogate for interviews.2,3 Our goal is to quantify, for each job 
                                                 
1  We provide further identification of causal effects by using an exogenous shock, as measured by levels of 
economic policy uncertainty, to examine how flexible and non-flexible firms perform in periods of high and low 
uncertainty. 
2  Executives interviewed by Graham, Harvey, Popadak, and Rajgopal (2016b) recommend employee opinions 
published on external websites as one of the primary data sources to estimate corporate intangibles such as employee 
flexibility or corporate culture. 
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review, the most salient features related to employee flexibility. We use an increasingly popular 
technique to extract information from text documents—textual analysis, in which we construct a 
list of key words (lexical field) pertinent to flexibility, and compute the frequency of these key 
words in each job review.4  
Specifically, we retrieve job reviews from a career intelligence website that aggregates 
company reviews from current and former employees of more than 8,000 companies. We collect 
approximately 690,000 reviews, published between 2011 and 2016, for S&P 1500 firms and their 
subsidiaries, and we perform textual analysis of the free-form component of the reviews, 
computing the relative frequency of words associated with flexibility for each review. To 
minimize concerns of ex post data fitting, we use Fiordelisi and Ricci’s (2014) lexical field 
related to creativity, but to capture employee flexibility, we expand their lexical field using 
WordNet’s thesaurus to incorporate additional words pertaining to flexibility.5 We average the 
review-level scores by firm and year to obtain a firm-level annual measure of employee 
flexibility, which we refer to as the “flex” score.  
Of course, any text-based measure of an intangible asset contains noise and may be 
measured with error. First for external validation, we compare our flex scores with an external 
list, FlexJob’s “Most Flexible Companies” and find that 84% of firms on their list had above-
                                                                                                                                                             
3 A related aspect of work flexibility is the employer’s flexibility to hire and fire employees or change work hours. 
Both employee flexibility and employer flexibility should enhance the firm’s ability to respond to external shocks. 
Our flex score is based on textual analysis of employee’s job reviews and therefore should primarily reflect 
flexibility from the perspective of employees. 
4 Since the work of Tetlock (2007), textual analysis has been employed to study a range of finance and accounting 
topics; see the survey of Loughran and McDonald (2016). Dougal, Engelberg, Garcia, and Parsons (2012) find that 
journalists associated with more pessimistic column tone are linked to negative short-run market returns. Cohen, 
Malloy, and Nguyen (2016) use textual analysis of 10-K forms to detect changes in reporting practices, which they 
link to financial performance. Tremblay (2018) uses textual analysis of 10-K forms to construct measures of 
corporate culture differences between acquirers and targets in mergers. We follow this emerging strand of the textual 
analysis literature to provide a measure of corporate intangible asset.  
5 In the original Competing Values Framework of Cameron, DeGraff, Quinn, and Thakor (2006) which Fiordelisi 
and Ricci (2014) use, flexibility is closest to the creativity dimension. Section 3.1 motivates our choice of flexibility 
words by describing the theoretical relations between creativity and employee flexibility.  
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median flex scores in 2016.6 More importantly, we verify the validity of our employee flexibility 
score by its ability in predicting stock returns in a large cross-section of firms. If market 
participants fail to fully value intangibles such as employee flexibility, and if our flex score 
adequately captures what it is designed to measure, the flex score should predict risk-adjusted 
returns in ways predicted by our hypothesis—a feature extremely difficult to accomplish if the 
flex score contains mostly noise. Furthermore, if there is an error-in-variables problem and 
flexibility is measured with error, this would result in an underestimate of the regression 
coefficients of flexibility (Griliches and Hausman 1986). Consequently the flex coefficients 
noted in this paper are more likely to be an underestimate of the true effect.   
We find that our measure of employee flexibility has a major impact on firm value. Each 
year, we sort firms into high- and low-flex portfolios at the end of June, using the firm-level 
flexibility scores for the year immediately preceding the sorting month. We form a long-short 
portfolio of high- and low-flex firms and measure hedge profits. During our sample period from 
July 2011 to December 2016, high-flex portfolios cumulatively outperform the low-flex 
portfolios by 19.2% and 25.8% for equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios, respectively. 
Furthermore, these differential returns remain even after controlling for risk: the flexibility-based 
hedge portfolio earns annualized alphas of 3.2% (t = 3.12) and 3.9% (t = 1.72) for equal-
weighted and value-weighted portfolios, respectively, after controlling for the Fama and French 
(2015) five factors.  
Consistent with our hypothesis, the impact of employee flexibility on stock returns 
concentrates among firms with higher exposure to exogenous risk—among firms with high 
CAPM beta or during periods of economic uncertainty. When we split the sample into firms with 
above- and below-median beta, we find the high-beta subsample exhibits annualized risk-
                                                 
6 Appendix A.5 has the list of 39 most flexible and popular firms published on the FlexJobs website. 
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adjusted high-low flex hedge profits of 5.4% (t = 3.34) and 8.2% (t = 2.55), for equal-weighted 
and value-weighted hedge portfolios, respectively. In contrast, low-beta firms have alphas that 
are statistically indistinguishable from zero.  
To further identify the results, we use an exogenous shock—increases in the Economic 
Policy Uncertainty (EPU) index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016)—to see if flexible firms 
perform better during periods of high risk. Accordingly, we find significant high-low flex alphas 
only in periods immediately following high-uncertainty months. The annualized five-factor alpha 
during high-uncertainty periods are 5.2% and 9.5% (p = 0.001 for both) for the equal-weighted 
and value-weighted hedge portfolios, respectively.  
We provide further evidence on earnings announcement returns (EARs). A key advantage of 
EARs is that they are measured over a very short window and are unlikely to be driven by risk 
and hence will not be subject to any omitted variables that may be driving firm risk. We find that 
among high-beta firms, high-flex firms experience excess EARs while low-flex firms do not. 
This result suggests that employee flexibility is valuable to firms sensitive to exogenous risk, but 
investors do not fully account for the flexibility intangible in their valuation, consistent with 
Edmans’ (2011, 2012) argument that the market is slow in reflecting information in intangibles. 
However, the positive effects of employee flexibility on EARs exist only when the exogenous 
risk is high; in fact, among low-beta firms, high-flex firms experience negative EARs—
suggesting that maintaining a flexible workforce entails costs.  
Our results are confirmed by Fama-MacBeth monthly return regressions. We find that high-
flex firms earn higher monthly returns after controlling for firm size, value, momentum, and 
industry, and this effect concentrates in firms with higher betas. These results are also robust to 
different specifications. For example, the results remain qualitatively similar if we adjust the 
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cultural scores to account for the negation of flexibility words in the reviews, trim cultural 
scores, or include only firms with more than five reviews.7 In addition, the flexibility effect 
remains if we control for the quality of employee treatment (Bae, Kang, and Wang 2011), 
organizational capital (Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2013), management quality, employee morale 
(Edmans 2011; Edmans, Li and Zhang 2017), and unionization (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003), 
highlighting the empirical as well as theoretical differences between our flex score and these 
measures.  
Finally, we estimate panel regressions of gross profitability on the flex score, and find that 
high-flex firms earn higher gross profits than low-flex firms. In line with Novy-Marx (2013) who 
finds that firms with higher gross profitability are associated with excess future stock returns, we 
consider the positive relation between gross profitability and employee flexibility to be further 
evidence that employee flexibility improves firm value.  
Even though data availability restricts our sample to the period 2011-2016, the employee 
flexibility effect we document is comparable in magnitude to past studies on the value of 
corporate intangibles. 8  Additionally, our text-based employee flex score is subject to noise, 
which weakens the power of our flex score to predict returns. Therefore, our estimates likely 
represent a lower bound on the true wealth effects of employee flexibility in firms sensitive to 
exogenous risk.9  
                                                 
7 Results remain qualitatively similar if we use stricter filters. Section 4.4 discusses the alternative thresholds we 
use. 
8 For example, Edmans (2011) finds the list of “100 Best Companies to Work for in America” leads to a value-
weighted four-factor annual alpha of 3.5%; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) documents another form of 
intangibles, organizational capital, generates an equal-weighted annual abnormal return of 4.6%.  
9 One might conjecture that firms with financial flexibility (i.e., with less financial constraints) have a similar 
advantage to firms with a high flex score in dealing with exogenous uncertainties. In unreported tests, we find that 
financial constraints are unrelated to stock returns during our sample period (or even during a longer period of 2000-
2015); we measure financial constraints using the Kaplan-Zingales (1997) index (the 4-variable definition excluding 
Tobin’s Q as in Baker, Stein, and Wurgler (2003)) or the Whited-Wu (2006) index. In addition, the flex score 
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Our paper contributes to the literature on the value of human capital and intangible assets. 
Consistent with other studies that document market underreaction to the value of intangibles 
(e.g., Edmans 2009; Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou 2013; Li, Qiu, and Shen 2016), we find that 
market participants do not fully account for the value of employee flexibility. Our paper is 
closely related to Edmans (2011) and Edmans, Li, and Zhang (2017) who document that firms on 
the list of “Best Companies to Work For” earn higher abnormal future returns, supporting the 
notion that investors do not fully value employee satisfaction.  
Our paper differs from those two papers in several ways. First, we focus on employee 
flexibility, which is related to, but different from, employee satisfaction (Denison and Mishra 
1995); in fact, the Best Companies list no longer possesses return predictability in the U.S. 
market during our sample period. Presumably, the market has learned to react to the information 
in the highly publicized list of Best Companies to Work For, but is still unable to react to the 
more abstract and hard-to-measure information of workforce flexibility. Second, we examine the 
interaction of flexibility and exogenous risk and find the benefits of employee flexibility 
concentrate among firms with high exposure to exogenous risk, which strengthens the economic 
underpinning of the flexibility effect. Lastly, while the Best Companies list only identifies a 
relatively small number of top employee satisfaction firms, our measure of employee flexibility 
sorts a broader sample of firms into high and low-flex portfolios, allowing for better 
identification of firms with poor employee flexibility.  
To the extent that employee flexibility captures a dimension of corporate culture, our paper 
also contributes to the literature on corporate culture and finance. The survey of executives by 
Graham, Harvey, Popadak, and Rajgopal (2016a) confirms the pervasiveness of corporate culture 
                                                                                                                                                             
remains significant after controlling for financial constraints. This result indicates that the employee flexibility effect 
on stock performance is different from any effect related to financial constraints.  
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effects in corporate policies; in particular, adaptability (defined as willingness to experiment, 
being fast-moving, quick to take advantage of opportunities and taking initiative) is found to be a 
critical element of firm culture. More specifically, our paper contributes to the literature on the 
relation between corporate culture and firm performance. For example, Sørensen (2002) uses 
surveys to examine the influence of managers on operating cash flow and return on investment, 
and Moniz (2016) uses textual analysis of social media postings to find a link between employee 
performance-orientation and firms’ Tobin’s Q and earnings surprises. Several studies find that 
employee satisfaction is related to firm performance measures such as ROA, ROE and operating 
margin (e.g., Fauver, McDonald, and Taboada 2015; Huang, Li, Meschke, and Guthrie 2015; 
Melián-González, Bulchand-Gidumal, and González López-Valcárcel 2015). Our paper differs 
from the others in that we estimate a measure of employee flexibility that reflects the opinions of 
employees at different corporate levels among thousands of firms over time, and we measure 
firm performance with stock returns rather than accounting ratios that are prone to endogeneity 
concerns.  
2.2 Hypothesis Development  
Prior literature already documents the impact of financial and operating flexibility on 
investment policy and firm value. For example, financial flexibility allows firms to invest even 
during the financial crisis (Campello, Graham, and Harvey 2010; Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy 
2010). Furthermore, operational flexibility increases firms’ ability to adjust to changing 
circumstances, which in turn relates positively to firm value (Chen, Kacperczyk, and Ortiz-
Molina 2011; Donangelo 2014). In this paper, we extend the research on financial and operating 
flexibility and focus on employee flexibility, because it should be instrumental to firms’ 
operational performance (Denison and Mishra 1995; Bhattacharya, Gibson, and Doty 2005). 
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Firms that value employee flexibility acknowledge the value of human capital and recognize the 
importance of employee empowerment for the firm’s responsiveness in competitive 
environments (Spreitzer 1996). Large experimental evidence also confirms the value of 
empowering employees (e.g., Bloom, Liang, Roberts, and Ying 2015). 
We adopt Bahrami’s (1992, p. 36) definition of flexibility: “the ability to precipitate 
intentional changes, to continuously respond to unanticipated changes, and to adjust to the 
unexpected consequences of predictable changes.” This definition is similar to the one offered by 
Wright and Snell (1998, p.761): “the extent to which the firm’s human resources possess skills 
and behavioral repertoires that can give a firm options for pursuing strategic alternatives in the 
firm’s competitive environment,” or VandenBos (2015, p.48): the “capacity to make appropriate 
responses to changed or changing situations; the ability to modify or adjust ones behavior in 
meeting different circumstances or different people.” Employee flexibility also relates to the 
psychological empowerment concept of Seibert, Wang, and Courtright (2011), as defined in their 
integrated framework, where job satisfaction and turnover intentions are associates of employee 
flexibility. This empowerment can have large impacts on firm productivity—Bloom, Liang, 
Roberts, and Ying (2015) find that employees in flexible work environments increase 
productivity by 13%. 
Therefore, our concept of employee flexibility captures employees’ traits such as 
adaptability, flexibility, openness, pro-activeness, and resilience, but is different from creativity, 
job satisfaction, employee turnover, work design characteristics (including part- and full-time 
employment), or management leadership. It is also different from, for example, Gopalan, 
Milbourn, and Song’s (2010) ‘strategic flexibility’, which they equate with prospects for firm 
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and industry growth. Employee flexibility is a possible outcome of firms with a culture of 
adaptability, and can therefore be considered as one aspect of corporate culture.10 
Theory suggests that corporate culture affects firm value. According to Kreps (1990) and 
Hermalin (2001), corporate culture acts as an informal contracting mechanism that supplements 
formal contracts.11 For example, employees of a strong-culture firm tacitly and rapidly reach an 
agreement as to which equilibrium to play, either because the strong corporate values supersede 
personal preferences, or because strong culture makes coordination easier (Hermalin 2001). 
Similarly, a strong culture can address contingencies by defining ex ante what the employees 
consider as cooperative behavior, which is necessary given the repeated nature of business 
interactions. In turn, peer pressure among employees serves as an effective monitoring 
mechanism to reduce deviations from implicitly agreed-upon norms.12 
As per the models of Kreps (1990) and Hermalin (2001), if widely agreed upon, even tacitly, 
these norms within the corporation become especially valuable when the firm faces unforeseen 
events or when employees must select an equilibrium to play from a set of several equilibria 
(O’Reilly 1989; Kreps 1990), that is, precisely in instances where incomplete contracting is more 
likely and costly.  
We believe that employee flexibility is especially beneficial in the highly uncertain 
environments considered by Kreps (1990) and Hermalin (2001). First, profitable opportunities 
                                                 
10  We use the term “employee flexibility” to refer to the flexibility that employees have in their daily tasks. 
However, employee flexibility encompasses more than flexible work options, such as an employee developing a 
product that the company never contracts them to do. For example, the ubiquitous Post-It note was developed 
accidentally by Spencer Silver and Art Fry at 3M even though the firm had tasked Silver to create a completely 
different product. 
11 Kreps’ (1990) model rests on five elements: formal contracts are costly and ineffective in many situations; firms 
and their employees are repeat players; it may be easier and cheaper to induce collaboration through repeated play; 
there may be multiple equilibria and players jointly select which equilibrium they work towards; and there may be 
unforeseen events. Culture enters the model mainly through the last two elements. 
12 Giannetti and Yu (2017) find that short-horizon investors may impose a similar impact on firm policy and make 
the firm more readily react to radical changes.  
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are dynamic and difficult to anticipate; in these environments, flexible workers are better able to 
identify such opportunities in a timely manner. Second, because of the dynamic nature of the 
equilibria set, the firm’s principals are unlikely to be able to formally design contracts ex ante to 
ensure all future contingencies are fully anticipated. In fact, inflexible and binding contracts 
could impede employees’ value-creating efforts; the airlines case study of Appendix A.1 
illustrates such a case. Alternatively, firms with a flexible workforce could respond to a changing 
set of equilibria by playing various equilibria simultaneously or in rapid succession, abandoning 
the unpromising ones. Additionally, employee flexibility supplements formal contracting with 
social forces, such as peer monitoring (Zammuto, Gifford, and Goodman 2000), that make 
behavioral cohesion easier to obtain.  
Third, in uncertain environments, new ventures’ parameters are often estimated with error; a 
firm that advocates employee flexibility would be more valuable in uncertain environments than 
a firm that focuses on the efficient use of its scarce resources (Cameron et al. 2006). Examples of 
such instances where flexibility may be valuable include firms facing periods where rapid 
product or industry-wide changes are likely, yet unknown (Aghion and Tirole 1994). In addition, 
periods of economic policy uncertainty impedes information processing, which makes it more 
difficult for firms’ top managers to understand the value of new ventures. This in turn will 
encourage managers to depend more heavily on a motivated and flexible work force.13 
For employee flexibility to affect firm value, consistent flexible behavior needs to be 
widespread within the firm. Unlike the KLD data and similar datasets that record the existence of 
corporate policies but not their intensity, our dataset allows us to measure the degree of 
                                                 
13 We do not make any claim on what causes employee flexibility; we simply examine whether firms with high 
employee flexibility outperform those with low flexibility. 
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employee flexibility in a firm. We can therefore test whether a high degree of firm-level 
employee flexibility leads to greater value creation.  
The literature on intangibles shows that the market tends to underreact to intangibles (e.g. 
Chan, Lakonishok and Sougiannis, 2001; Edmans, 2001), because market participants with 
limited attention tend to slowly adjust to the information in intangibles. Therefore, our first 
hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms with a high degree of employee flexibility earn excess returns 
compared to firms with low employee flexibility. 
As noted above, maintaining a flexible workforce is costly for the firm, and the benefits of a 
flexible workforce should outweigh the costs only when the firm has high exposure to exogenous 
risk, because these are the firms who have the highest marginal benefit of employee flexibility. A 
corollary of our first hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of employee flexibility on stock returns is stronger for firms 
with high exposure to exogenous risk.  
We measure exogenous risk in two ways. First, we use the CAPM beta to measure firms’ 
sensitivity to systematic risk. We use systematic risk rather than idiosyncratic risk to characterize 
the type of risk pertinent to employee flexibility because systematic risk is exogenous to firm 
decision making. Because firms are capable of partially managing their idiosyncratic risk (for 
example, through hedging, selecting product mix, or pricing strategy), systematic risk is a better 
measure of unexpected shocks. The exogeneity of systemic risk, relative to idiosyncratic risk, 
eases the interpretation of results and eliminates a source of endogeneity. Second, we use 
changes in the EPU index (Baker et al. 2016) to identify exogenous increases to systematic 
risk—an individual firm has almost no influence on economic policy uncertainty.  The EPU 
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index captures uncertainty about currency, fiscal, monetary, regulation, health care, national 
security, sovereign debt, and trade policies; it is used as a measure of market-wide exogenous 
shocks in other studies (e.g., Starks and Sun 2016). 
Finally, we investigate whether the abnormal returns of the high-flex firms are associated 
with improved accounting performance. We expect that the shareholder value creation brought 
about by a flexible workforce should be manifested in accounting profitability, which in turn is 
shown to lead to abnormal returns (Novy-Marx 2013; Fama and French 2015). Employees in a 
flexible firm are better able to choose optimal projects; selecting value-maximizing projects 
should lead to improved profitability. Therefore, we have the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Firms with high employee flexibility generate superior gross profitability. 
We examine gross profitability (GP) because workers at all hierarchical levels of the firm 
are better able to affect gross profitability than items farther down the income statement, such as 
overhead (SGA), depreciation, or other accruals, which partially reflects quasi-static accounting 
charges. Furthermore, if high-flex firms need higher selling, general and administrative expenses 
to maintain their employee flexibility, the higher expenses will distort operating profitability, net 
income, earnings before interest and taxes, or return on assets. Consequently, GP is the best 
metric for measuring the impact of employee flexibility on firm profitability. 
 
2.3 Data 
2.3.1 Sample Description 
Our measure of employee flexibility comes from the textual analysis of approximately 
690,000 unique job reviews of S&P 1500 firms. As mentioned earlier, because conducting in-
depth interviews of employees for each S&P 1500 firm for every year is impractical, the online 
job reviews are used as a substitute for employee interviews. An additional benefit of using 
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publicly available, crowd-sourced job reviews is that firms do not self-select to be evaluated— 
the anonymous job reviews are posted whether firms give permission or not, but are cross-
checked for inconsistencies by the data provider. In line with Popadak (2013), we retrieve 
reviews from a career intelligence website, where users can review their current or former 
employment experience. Each review contains the following information: company name, date 
of publication, reviewer’s position (job title), reviewer’s status (current or former employee)14, 
reviewer’s location, and a free-form review. Users optionally can identify the pros and cons of 
their work experience and rate their employer (on a 1 to 5 scale) on the following categories: 
job/work life balance, compensation benefits, job satisfaction, management, and job culture.15 
Star rating is the mean rating across all five categories. Our sample period is limited by review 
availability; on our source website, the earliest reviews were published in 2011. Appendix A.3 
shows examples of reviews. 
While the career website contains reviews for thousands of firms, we limit our sample to 
publicly traded firms listed on CRSP, and that are included in the S&P 1500 index during at least 
one year between 2011 and 2016. The stock return data is from CRSP and financial data and 
index constituents are from Compustat. To be included in the sample, each firm-year needs non-
negative total assets (AT) and common equity (CEQ). Furthermore, firms need to be listed on the 
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ and have common equity (share code 10 or 11).  
We limit the sample to S&P 1500 firms to ensure that on average, there is a sufficient 
number of employee reviews for the firm and to ensure that the effect is not driven by very small 
                                                 
14 A large proportion of the reviews are from former employees and removing them will reduce sample size 
significantly. Therefore we include reviews from both former and current employees.  
15 In robustness tests, we substitute our text-based measure with the firm-level averages of job culture ratings. We 
find no relation between the rating-based culture measure and stock returns. We attribute this result to noise in the 
rating-based measure: in fact, as per our theoretical framework, the aspect of corporate culture most related to stock 
returns should be employee flexibility and not a measure of overall corporate culture.  
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firms with few published reviews.16 In addition, we also retrieve reviews for the subsidiaries of 
these firms and incorporate them under the parent company.17 Firm subsidiaries were identified 
through the career intelligence site (which attempts to consolidate reviews), firms’ websites, and 
firms’ 10-K documents and annual reports.  
We perform textual analysis on the lemmatized and parsed free-form component of the 
reviews.18,19 Specifically, we first develop a list of words, or lexical field, that are associated with 
flexibility/adaptability. In developing the lexical field, we start from Fiordelisi and Ricci´s 
(2014) list of Create words, because it is publicly available and theoretical frameworks maintain 
that flexibility is an element pertaining to creativity (e.g. Torrance 1965; Kerr and Gagliardi 
2003). Out of the four dimensions in Cameron et al.’s (2006) Competing Values Framework, the 
Create dimension is designed to reflect a flexible working environment conducive to creative 
and innovative activities; this motivates our focus on a modified version of the Create dimension 
as an operationalization of employee flexibility. We extend Fiordelisi and Ricci’s (2014) lexical 
field to flexibility using WordNet’s thesaurus.20 Appendix A.6 presents our complete lexical 
field.  
                                                 
16 Unlike the restaurant review site Yelp, the job reviews do not appear to have a sampling bias towards very 
satisfied or dissatisfied reviewers. The distribution of satisfaction among our sample employee reviews is roughly 
normal, indicating our sample has no bias towards very satisfied or dissatisfied reviewers. Regardless, in the 
robustness section we trim the top and bottom 5% of reviews based on satisfaction and find the results are largely 
similar. 
17 When retrieving reviews, we account for spelling mistakes and alternative company names. For example, when 
retrieving reviews for Consolidated Edison Inc., we search for reviews of “Consolidated Edison” and “Con Edison”.  
18 In parsing the reviews, we follow Tetlock (2007) and strip the reviews of the common English stop words and 
then lemmatize the reviews. We exclude negation words (no, not, neither, none, nobody, nowhere, nor, never) from 
stop words in order to make the identification of negative loadings on the employee flexibility variable possible. 
Appendix A.2 gives more details about our parsing procedure. 
19 Using the free-form portion of the review minimizes the possibility of response bias introduced by prompted 
questions. 
20 To the extent that theoretical frameworks of creative thinking either overlap with flexibility (e.g. Schwartz 1999; 
Kasof et al. 2007) or require flexibility as a necessary element of creative thinking (e.g. Guilford 1962; Torrance 
1965; Kerr and Gagliardi 2003), our measure of flexibility could partially capture corporate creativity. Also, the 
survey evidence of Graham et al. (2016a) indicates creativity is positively related to the cultural value of 
adaptability. However, our flex lexical field is substantially different from word lists associated with creativity (e.g. 
Gough, 1960; Fiordelisi and Ricci, 2014).  
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The firm-level flexibility score, Flex, is calculated in two steps. First, for each review, we 
compute the frequency of each of the words in our lexical field. The review-level flexibility word 
count is thus calculated by adding +1 each time a word from the review matches a word or 
expression from the lexical field.21 We obtain the review-level flex ratio (Flex_rev) by scaling 
the flexibility word count by the number of words in the parsed review to account for variability 
in the length of the reviews. Second, we compute the yearly firm-level flexibility score, Flex, as 
the average of a firm’s review-level flex ratio, for reviews published between July (t-1) to June 
(t) for end of June stock portfolio formations,22 or beginning of financial year to end of financial 
year for financial ratio regressions. We winsorize Flex at the 1%/99% level to reduce the impact 
of outliers. 
We also compute a flexibility score, Flex_net, that accounts for negation by computing a 
“net” review-level flexibility word count that subtracts one from the flexibility word count each 
time a flexibility word in the review is in the vicinity (three words before or after) of a negation 
word.23 The occurrence of negated flexibility words is less than 5% of total flexibility words. 
This frequency is comparable with the negation frequency in the English language reported by 
Tottie (1991). There is thus little concern that the flex score is contaminated by undetected 
negative meanings.  
Finally, we also retrieve data on employee treatment and employee morale. The ETKLD 
variable was developed from the MSCI KLD dataset by summing the scores over three 
categories of employee relations: union relations, cash profit-sharing, and employee involvement 
                                                 
21 The simple count method has some caveats, among which the possibility that we misinterpret the sense of a 
sentence. However, more sophisticated methods that attempt to interpret texts are only partially successful, among 
others because of the prevalence of polysemes in English.  
22 For 2011, the first year of our stock return sample, we use reviews published from January 2011 through June 
2011 to calculate Flex for the formation of portfolios at the end of June 2011.  
23 Our negation words list includes the following: no, not, neither, none, nobody, nowhere, nor, never. 
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in stock options plans24. The BC variable was developed from the “100 Best Companies to Work 
for” list, which we manually collect from the Forbes website. The earnings announcement data is 
drawn from I/B/E/S and incorporate all earnings announcements from July 2011 to December 
2016. We also use the EPU index from Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), which measures policy 
uncertainty by aggregating three components: The first component uses newspaper coverage of 
economic uncertainty, the second incorporates federal tax code provisions that will expire in the 
future, and the final uses disagreement among economic forecasters. Finally, we use Ken 
French’s data for the risk-free rate and pricing factor data.25 
2.3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 2.1, Panel A, presents review-level descriptive statistics of the sample. In total, the 
career intelligence website provides nearly 19 million parsed words to identify culture trends 
both in the cross-section of firms and time-series. There is within-sample heterogeneity in the 
review-level flex score (Flex_rev): reviews on average have 1.65% flexibility words, but range 
from a minimum of zero to fifty percent of the words in the review.26 Examination of the sample 
also reveals within-industry heterogeneity in Flex_rev.  
Panel B of Table 2.1 shows the firm-year employee flexibility statistics. The firm-year mean 
values are similar to the review-level values. Furthermore, the number of reviews for each firm-
year is reasonably high given the breadth of the firms—each firm-year has a mean and median of 
                                                 
24 Two of the indicators in the original ETKLD index, retirement benefits and employee health and safety, were 
discontinued before the sample period began and thus cannot be included in the ETKLD index. 
25 Retrieved from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  
26 The high maximum flex values arise because we remove stop words, making shorter reviews even shorter. Such 
high values are also observed in a subsample of outlier reviews; the 99th flex percentile is 14.3%, considerably lower 
than 50%.  
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110.3 and 13 reviews, respectively—indicating that the results are not driven by firm-level 
observations with very few reviews.27 
Nonetheless, as with any survey or questionnaire data, our dataset could potentially be 
subject to active response bias which arises when respondents have motivations to skew their 
answers, either by making them overly optimistic, pessimistic, or uninformative. Our robustness 
tests find no evidence that the voluntary reviews are biased in a way that would favor our 
results.28  
Panels A and B of Table 2.1 also report descriptive statistics for the negation-adjusted flex 
scores at the review-level (Flex_net_rev) and firm-level (Flex_net). Unlike Flex_rev, 
Flex_net_rev is not bounded at zero; the minimum review-level Flex_net_rev score is in fact 
negative (corresponding to a review where the negated flexibility words outnumber the non-
negated ones). Consistent with linguistics studies that document a low frequency of negation in 
written English, Panel B show that Flex_net is very similar to Flex.29 We thus use Flex for our 
tests, but results are robust to using Flex_net instead (see Section 4.4). 
Consistent with Sørensen (2002) who documents higher behavioral cohesion in strong-
culture firms, our main tests contrast the effects of having a high-flex workforce versus having a 
low-flex one. Each year, we thus split the sample into high- and low-flex subsamples along the 
yearly Flex median. Portfolios are formed at the end of June (or beginning of year for financial 
ratios) and rebalanced annually. Panel C of Table 2.1 presents statistics of firm characteristics as 
                                                 
27 To ensure that firms with small number of reviews are not driving the results, we run robustness tests in Section 
4.4 which exclude firms with 5 or fewer reviews. Our results remain if we restrict the sample to firms with at least 
10, 20 or 30 reviews (results untabulated). In fact, in spite of the much reduced sample size, most of our results 
remain qualitatively similar when the sample is limited to firms with at least 100 reviews. In addition, our sample 
includes 1,723 of the 1,932 firms listed in the S&P 1500 over our sample period, for a coverage rate of 89.2%.  
28 Specifically, we find that our results are not driven by overly optimistic or pessimistic reviews, or by firms with 
less than five published reviews. Tables 10 and 11 provide further details. 
29 Tottie (1991) finds that negation (all types) accounts for 1.28% of words in written English, contrasted with 
2.67% in speech. Therefore, even if written negation is affixal (e.g. unnecessary, inadequate, etc.) and thus not 
detected by our algorithm, the low frequency of negation makes this non-detection nonconsequential.  
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well as the results of t-tests for the differences in means between the subsamples. High-flex firms 
are significantly larger in terms of both market capitalization ($19.4 billion versus $11.1 billion 
at portfolio formation) and book assets ($39.4 billion versus $18.9 billion),30 but are similar to 
low-flex firms with respect to their B/M ratio and beta. Untabulated tests indicate that the selling, 
general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses are statistically higher for high-flex firms after 
controlling for other firm attributes, suggesting that maintaining employee flexibility increases 
costs. 
The literature has established that larger size, lower B/M, and lower beta firms tend to have 
lower stock returns. However, as Panel D of Table 2.1 reports, high-flex firms earn higher 
returns than low-flex firms, in spite of their larger market capitalization, lower B/M ratios and 
lower beta. The high-flex portfolio generates monthly returns approximately 14 basis points 
more than the low-flex portfolio. While momentum (Return-12,-2) is higher for high-flex firms, 
the positive excess returns of high-flex firms remain after controlling for this and other factors, 
as shown in Section 2.4.1.  
Panels A and B of Figure 2.1 graphically present the stock performance of high- and low-
flex firms. It shows the cumulative return of the high-flex and low-flex portfolios that are formed 
at the end of June 2011, rebalanced at the end of each June, and held to December 2016. Over 
our sample period, the equal-weighted (value-weighted) high flex portfolio has cumulative 
returns that are 19.2% (25.8%) higher than the low flex portfolio (untabulated). These univariate 
results provide preliminary evidence for our first hypothesis: high-flex firms earn higher excess 
returns.  
                                                 
30 The mean book assets figure may be high compared to some other corporate finance papers because we include in 
our sample financial firms which tend to have high asset values compared to market values.  
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Before considering multivariate tests, we validate our measure of employee flexibility by 
estimating Pearson correlation coefficients between Flex or HiFlex (an indicator variable equal 
to 1 if the firm’s flex score is above median) and firm characteristics that might be determinants 
of a highly flexible corporate environment. The results, reported in Table 2.2, tend to conform to 
intuition. For instance, HiFlex and Flex are negatively correlated with rigid and regulated 
environments, which we proxy by the percentage of unionized employees in the same state as the 
firm’s headquarters (UnionMemb, as in Hirsch and Macpherson (2003)).31 Also, as expected, 
HiFlex is positively correlated with employee satisfaction (measured by an indicator for being on 
the “Best Companies to Work for” list, BC), or an indicator of high KLD score of employee 
treatment (HiETKLD), and intangibles such as R&D (RDA) and organizational capital (OK). 
However, the low correlation coefficients highlight fundamental differences between employee 
flexibility and its related concepts, namely employee satisfaction and intangibles (Denison and 
Mishra 1995).  
To provide further evidence that our flex score captures relevant information about 
employee flexibility, we compare the flex scores in our sample to a publicly available source—
the “Most Flexible and Popular Companies” list compiled by FlexJobs. FlexJobs ranks firms 
based on job popularity data from LinkedIn and their own company database to determine which 
companies offer flexible work options. Appendix A.5 shows the list of 39 most flexible and 
popular firms. Such a list does not span a sufficiently long period for an in-depth analysis on the 
relation between job flexibility and firm performance. In addition, as discussed in Section 2, our 
flex score captures more than flexible work options. However, the flex score correlates strongly 
to FlexJob’s “Most Flexible Companies”—over 84% of firms on their list had above-median flex 
scores in 2016, lending credence to our flex score measurement.  
                                                 
31 UnionMemb is available from http://www.unionstats.com.  
 28 
 
 
2.4 Results 
2.4.1 Employee Flexibility and Excess Returns 
To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate regressions of monthly returns for high flex, low flex, and 
high-low flex portfolios. We use both the Carhart (1997) 4-factor (FF4) and Fama and French 
(2015) 5-factor (FF5) regressions: 
Rit = α + βMKT (MKT-RFt) + βSMB SMBt + βHML HMLt + βMOM MOMt + εit   (1) 
Rit = α + βMKT (MKT-RFt) + βSMB SMBt + βHML HMLt + βRMW RMWt + βCMA CMAt + εit,    (2) 
where Rit is the return over the risk-free rate from portfolio i at time t; for the high-low flex 
hedge portfolio, the risk-free rate is not subtracted from the hedge return. Rit is regressed on the 
market premium (MKT-RFt), and SMBt, HMLt, MOMt, RMWt, and CMAt factors. Alpha (α) is the 
intercept that captures the abnormal monthly returns of the portfolio after controlling for the 4 or 
5 risk factors. We also run similar regressions for industry or characteristics-adjusted portfolio 
returns.  
Table 2.3 shows the results from these regressions. Consistent with our hypothesis that high-flex 
firms earn higher excess returns, the alphas for the high-low flex portfolio is positive and 
significant for both the Fama-French 5-factor and Carhart 4-factor risk-adjustment and for both 
equal-weighted and value-weighted portfolios. For equal-weighted excess returns, the high-low 
flex portfolios earn a five-factor monthly alpha of 0.269% (t = 3.12), or an annualized alpha of 
3.2%. We also note that most alphas are greater for value-weighed portfolios than for equal-
weighted ones, suggesting that the effect of employee flexibility in forecasting returns is stronger 
among large firms. For example, for value-weighted portfolios, the five-factor alpha is 0.327% (t 
= 1.72), or an annual alpha of 3.9%. 
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In addition, we examine the results by industry to see if the effect is isolated to only a 
handful of industries. We calculate the high-flex and low-flex portfolio returns (results 
untabulated) for each FF12 industry and find that in ¾ of the industries the high-flex portfolio 
outperforms the low-flex portfolio. This is true in industries as diverse as manufacturing, energy, 
business equipment, and finance, which all benefited from high-flex employees. This result 
confirms that the flex effect is not driven by a very small number of industries.  
2.4.2 Employee Flexibility, Exogenous Risk, and Excess Returns 
Employee flexibility should matter most to firms sensitive to exogenous shocks, proxied 
here by market risk or uncertainty. In these cases, formal contracting is unlikely to be able to 
cover all the contingencies and firm employees have to rely more on informal mechanisms, such 
as those offered by employee flexibility, to optimize their decisions. To test Hypothesis 2, we use 
two proxies: Beta, the firm’s exposure to systematic risk; and HiUncert, which captures market-
wide policy uncertainty and derives from the EPU index. Extending Kreps’ (1990) and 
Hermalin’s (2001) arguments, the flexibility effects should concentrate in firms with 
comparatively high sensitivity to risk. 
Figure 2.1, Panel C, D, E, and F graphically presents the stock performance of high- and 
low-flex firms in above-median and below-median beta subsamples. As can be seen in Panels C 
and D, high-flex firms in the high-beta subsample clearly outperform low-flex firms on both an 
equal-weighted and value-weighted basis. Furthermore, Panels E and F show that in the low-beta 
subsample, high-flex and low-flex portfolio returns are very similar, particularly on an equal-
weighted basis. We conduct two types of regression tests to show statistical relationships 
between flex scores and future returns: the time-series regressions of monthly returns on risk 
factors, and the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly returns on firm and risk 
characteristics.  
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In the time-series regressions, we split the sample into firms with above- and below-full-
sample median Beta at portfolio formation each year and run the FF4 and FF5 regressions for the 
high beta and low beta subsamples. Table 2.3 presents the results. Despite the reduced number of 
observations and associated reduction in test power, the high-low flex hedge portfolio exhibits 
substantial profit but only in the high beta subsample. The annualized 5-factor alpha for the 
equal-weighted and value-weighted flex hedge portfolios are 5.3% (t = 3.34) and 8.2% (t = 2.55), 
respectively. In untabulated portfolio tests we find that our results are robust to using raw returns 
instead of alpha to measure firm performance. 
In the high-beta subsample, even though the high-low flex hedge portfolio is significant, the 
hedge profit is driven by the poor performance of the low-flex firms rather than the high 
abnormal returns of the high-flex firms. This suggests that when systematic risk is high, it is 
extremely costly if the firm does not have a flexible workforce to respond to the changing 
environment. Importantly, this finding is consistent with the interpretation that investors 
underreact to information in the flex score: investors do not fully appreciate the value of 
employee flexibility and overvalue low-flex and high-beta firms at the portfolio formation time, 
and the market gradually corrects this misvaluation in subsequent periods, delivering lower 
returns for those firms. On the other hand, in the low-beta subsample, even the low-flex firms 
earn positive alphas, possibly because not having to ensure employee flexibility is cost-efficient 
for firms with little exposure to exogenous risk. The Fama-MacBeth regressions shown in Table 
2.5 control for firm characteristics and show that high-flex firms actually underperform unless 
they have a high beta.  
To further identify the results of Hypothesis 2, we test whether high-flex firms outperform 
low-flex firms during periods of high exogenous uncertainty. We use the EPU index as a 
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measure of systematic risk and we define HiUncert as an indicator variable that equals one 
during high-risk months when EPU values are above the 10-year rolling median uncertainty 
index value, and zero otherwise—firms will have no control over whether EPU is higher or 
lower in a period. We include the lagged HiUncert indicator variable into the FF4 and FF5 
regressions as shown in the regression equations below: 
Rit = α + αH HiUncertt-1 + βMKT (MKT-RFt) + βSMB SMBt + βHML HMLt + βMOM MOMt + εit. (3) 
Rit = α + αH HiUncertt-1 + βMKT (MKT-RFt) + βSMB SMBt + βHML HMLt + βRMW RMWt +  
 βCMA CMAt + εit,  (4) 
Table 2.4 shows that alpha is insignificant for the high-low flex portfolio in both FF4 and 
FF5 specifications. However, the coefficient of HiUncert (αH) is statistically significant in all the 
specifications: 0.298% (t = 1.78) for equal-weighted portfolio and 0.833% (t = 3.66) for value-
weighted portfolio based on the FF5 regressions. Therefore, the abnormal returns only occur in 
high uncertainty months. The annualized 5-factor combined alpha (the sum of α + αH ) is 5.2% (p 
= 0.001) for the equal-weighed portfolio and 9.5% (p = 0.001) for the value-weighted portfolio 
in high uncertain periods. In short, Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 show that alphas of high-low flex 
portfolios are only generated in periods of high economic uncertainty or among firms with high 
systematic risk, consistent with Hypothesis 2. 
To further examine the interaction with risk sensitivity and employee flexibility, we run 
Fama-MacBeth tests, with Beta and a HiFlex*Beta interaction term included in the regression. 
As noted earlier, firms with higher sensitivity to risk should receive higher flexibility benefits 
than other firms. We use Beta instead of the uncertainty index because the former provides cross-
sectional variation, and we estimate the following equation: 
Rit = a0 + a1 HiFlexit-1 + a2HiFlexit*Betait-1 + a3Betait-1 + a4 Xit-1 + εit,  (5) 
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where Rit is firm i's monthly return for month t, HiFlex is an indicator variable equal to 1 if firm i 
in month t-1 is above median flex score for that year, Betait-1 is a firm i’s Beta in month t-1 
estimated over the previous 60 months and HiFLex*Beta is an interaction variable between the 
two. Xit-1 is a vector of control variables for firm i observable in month t-1, including LogBM, 
LogMEjun, and various momentum measures such as the cumulative return from the previous 
month (Return -1 ,1), previous year (Return-12, -2), and previous three years (Return-36,-13).   
Table 2.5 reports the results. Consistent with Table 2.3, high-flex firms are associated with 
higher returns (Column 1). However, we find that the inclusion of the HiFlex*Beta interaction 
flips the sign on the HiFlex indicator variable, while the HiFlex*Beta interaction is significantly 
positive. These two values show that employee flexibility is not valuable in itself, and employee 
flexibility matters most when a firm is most likely to need it—i.e. when it is sensitive to risk. In 
fact, among low-beta firms, having a high flexibility workforce is overly costly and hurts firm 
value. This result is not simply the impact of Beta on firm returns. When the Fama-MacBeth 
regression is run with Beta but without HiFlex or the HiFlex*Beta interaction (untabulated), Beta 
has no statistically positive impact on returns. 
 
4.2.1 Earnings Announcement Returns  
In line with Edmans (2011), we also examine earnings announcement returns (EARs) as 
supplementary evidence on whether market participants value the flexible workforce intangible. 
Since EARs are measured in a short window, they are much less sensitive to the specific models 
used to measure abnormal returns and will avoid any problems with omitted risk factors that 
could cause abnormal returns. 
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We calculate EAR by subtracting the market return from a firm’s stock returns for the three-
day window centered on the earnings announcement (-1, +1).32 We estimate panel regressions of 
the following form to determine the effect of HiFlex on EARs: 
EARitq = b0 + b1 HiFlexit-1 + b2 HiFlexit-1*Betait-1 + b3 Betait-1 + b4 Xit-1 + εitq,  (6) 
where EARitq is the EAR for firm i in year t for quarterly announcement q. HiFlext-1 is an 
indicator variable set to 1 if a firm is above median Flex in the previous year and X is a vector of 
control variables including LogBM, LogMEfyr,  and year and industry fixed effects. Finally, we 
add our risk sensitivity proxy, Beta, to the earnings announcement return regressions to test 
whether the effect of employee flexibility on stock returns depends on market risk exposure.  
Table 2.6 reports the results. Columns 1 and 2 show that high-flex firms earn similar EARs 
to low-flex firms. As noted in our hypothesis, HiFlex matters most when firms are exposed to 
risk. However, when Beta is included in the regression (Column 3), HiFlex has a negative effect 
on EAR (-0.251%; t = -2.76) and the interaction between HiFlex and Beta is significantly 
positive (0.219%; t = 2.26), showing that the market is only positively surprised in firms that 
have both flexible employees and high sensitivity to market risk. 
A common theme emerging from the Fama-MacBeth monthly return regressions of Table 
2.5 and the earnings announcement return regressions of Table 2.6 is that, when HiFlex is 
interacted with exogenous risk (Beta), HiFlex itself has a negative effect on returns. This result 
again indicates that employee flexibility benefits firms only if the firm has high exposure to 
external risk. For firms with low risk exposure, maintaining employee flexibility is costly and 
may even hurt firm performance. This also helps explain why not all firms maintain high levels 
                                                 
32 In unreported robustness tests, we measure abnormal returns using a market model with beta and the results are 
qualitatively similar.  
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of employee flexibility—among firms with low exogenous risk, employee flexibility at best does 
not enhance performance, and could even be detrimental to firm value. 
2.4.3 Employee Flexibility and Profitability 
To test the hypothesis that high-flex firms have high gross profitability (Hypothesis 3), we 
estimate panel regressions of the following form: 
GPit = b0 + b1 HiFlexit-1 + b2 Xit-1 + εit,                                                                                       (8) 
where GPit is the gross profitability for firm i in year t, scaled by year t-1 total assets and 
multiplied by 100, HiFlext-1 is an indicator variable that equals 1 for firm-years where the flex 
score is above the full-sample, year t-1 median flex value, and Xit-1 is a vector of control variables 
for firm i at time t-1. These controls include log of total assets (logAT), book-to-market ratio 
(BM), debt/assets (DA), cash scaled by assets (Cash), and firm age (Age). To deal with potential 
endogeneity issues, the regression uses Flexit-1, the flexibility score in the previous financial year, 
to forecast financial ratios in year t.  
For these tests, we adjust the time windows over which we estimate Flex to match the firms’ 
fiscal years. The Flex metric for financial year t is measured over the previous financial year (for 
example, January to December for a firm with a December financial year end.) This ensures that 
every firm receives consistent measurement of their flex score regardless of their financial year 
end. 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.7 show that a high-flex workforce in the previous year enhances 
profitability in the current year, in line with Hypothesis 3. A high-flex firm in year t-1 is more 
likely to have improved gross profitability (GP) in year t than a low-flex firm. These results hold, 
even when controlling for size, B/M, leverage, cash levels, firm age, and year and industry fixed 
effects.  
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Even though the relationship between employee flexibility and accounting profitability does 
not clearly indicate causality (we use stock returns as the main measure of firm value to reduce 
the concern of reverse causality), the finding that high-flex firms have higher gross profitability 
helps illustrate why the market values high-flex firms more. Employee flexibility leads to more 
profitable projects that make better usage of assets, which in turn leads to better profitability. 
When investors do not fully incorporate the employee flexibility intangible into their valuation, 
the higher profitability of high-flex firms translates into greater future returns.  
2.4.4 Robustness 
We run a variety of robustness tests to confirm that a high degree of employee flexibility 
leads to excess stock returns. In Table 2.8, we repeat the tests in Table 2.3 using various 
robustness subsamples. In columns 1-2 we require firms to have more than 5 total reviews to be 
included in the sample; the significant abnormal long-short returns show that scarcely reviewed 
firms are not driving the results. Further tests reveal that our results remain if we impose stricter 
filters of at least 10, 20, 30 or 50 reviews (results untabulated), and many results remain if we 
restrict the sample to firms with at least 100 reviews. In columns 3-4, we repeat the tests using 
the negation-adjusted flexibility score, Flex_net, instead of Flex. The results remain, highlighting 
that negated flexibility words in the reviews are a minor concern and are not biasing the results. 
In columns 5 and 6 we drop subsidiary reviews from the dataset (for example, Old Navy reviews 
are excluded from Gap Inc.’s flex metric). Considering only the parent company reflects a trade-
off: on the one hand, the smaller sample may reduce the power of tests. On the other hand, 
because subsidiaries and parents may have different levels of employee flexibility, the parent-
only flex measure is a purer metric of the listed firm’s employee flexibility. We find that our 
results remain qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 2.3.  
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In addition, we trim reviewers that are extremely satisfied or dissatisfied with the firm, to 
control for the possibility that extremely positive or negative reviews are written by employees 
with distorted incentives. For example, the owner of a small firm may publish fake positive 
reviews to attract job-seekers. Alternatively, a fired employee may seek revenge by posting 
extremely negative reviews. We proxy employee satisfaction by using review star rating (which 
is the average of the five numerical ratings on job/life work-balance, compensation benefits, job 
satisfaction, management, and job culture categories) included with most reviews. Using this 
satisfaction proxy, we trim reviewers that are above the 1%/99% level (Columns 7 and 8) or the 
5%/95% level (Columns 9 and 10). The flexibility effect remains regardless of whether these 
outlier reviews are included. Finally, as an additional robustness test (untabulated), we remove 
very short reviews (less than 6 parsed words, or the shortest 1% of the reviews) from the analysis 
and the main alpha and Fama-MacBeth tests show similar results.  
Table 2.9, Panel A, performs Fama-MacBeth monthly return regressions by imposing 
various restrictions on the sample. We report the results of the tests where firms have more than 
5 total reviews (Column 1), the Flex_Net score is used (Column 2), no subsidiary reviews are 
included (Column 3), or extremely low and high star ratings are trimmed at the 1%/99% and 
5%/95% levels (Columns 4 and 5), respectively. The interaction term HiFlex*Beta maintains its 
positive relationship with returns in all cases, while HiFlex generally has a negative effect on 
returns with marginal statistical significance. These results confirm the robustness of the 
employee flexibility effect.  
To further address the omitted variable bias, we test other firm characteristics that may be 
correlated with employee flexibility. Table 2.9, Panel B, reports the results of Fama-MacBeth 
regressions that test the robustness of the HiFlex*Beta interaction effect after controlling for 
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related pricing effects such as employee morale, organizational capital, R&D, and unionization. 
Edmans (2011) shows that employee morale is an intangible corporate resource that enhances 
future returns. As employee flexibility and employee morale may be intertwined with one 
another, we test two different aspects of employee morale to determine if the flexibility effect 
stands on its own. In Column 1 we create an indicator variable for whether the firm is on the 
“100 Best Companies to Work for” (BC) list for that year. In Column 2, we use the KLD-based 
employee treatment index developed in Bae, Kang, Wang (2011) to define HiETKLD, which is 
equal to one for firms with above-median employee treatment KLD score (ETKLD) in that year, 
and zero otherwise.33 Columns 1 and 2 show that the positive HiFlex*Beta effect persists even 
after controlling for these employee morale variables.34  
Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) show that organizational capital (OK) has a positive effect 
on returns in the cross-section: firms that invest in marketing and staff reap superior returns over 
the next year. As employee flexibility may be related to organizational capital, we verify the 
incremental value of employee flexibility by incorporating OK into our Fama-MacBeth tests. 
Column 3 shows that after including organizational capital (OK) as a control, HiFlex*Beta 
continues to positively affect returns. Furthermore, to ensure that the results are not related to 
management quality, we include CEOtenure, the length of tenure of the CEO, as a proxy for 
management quality. As can be seen in Column 4, after controlling for management quality, the 
results are qualitatively similar to before. 
In column 5, we use R&D expenditures scaled by lagged assets (RDA) as a proxy for the 
innovativeness of the company, and we examine whether flexibility is related to firm innovation. 
                                                 
33 Specifically, for each firm-year, we compute an employee treatment score by summing the scores over three 
categories of employee relations: union relations, cash profit-sharing and employee involvement in stock options 
plans. The total Employee Treatment index ranges between zero and three. 
34 When using ETKLD, our sample size decreases significantly, which possibly explains the decrease in statistical 
significance of the HiFlex interaction term.  
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We find that HiFlex*Beta interaction effect continues to be significantly positive, suggesting that 
results are applicable to more than just innovative firms. In addition, Columns 6 and 7 control for 
the effect of unionization: Column 6 uses UnionMemb, which is the unionization rate in a firm’s 
headquarter state (a proxy for the unionization at the firm), whereas Column 7 uses 
Unionreviews, which counts mentions of union-related words in the employee reviews.35 In both 
cases, the result for HiFlex*Beta remains similar. 
Finally, column 8 shows that the excess returns for high-flex firms remain even after 
controlling for BC, HiETKLD, OK, CEOtenure, RDA, UnionMemb, and Unionreviews 
altogether, suggesting that the employee flexibility effect is distinct from the major identified 
employee morale factors that affect stock returns. 
One might also expect that employee flexibility is related to managerial agency issues. On 
the other hand, these effects may operate separately because employee flexibility primarily 
influences employee behavior and corporate governance mainly controls executive agency 
issues. In unreported tests we include proxies for agency related variables in the Fama-MacBeth 
monthly return regressions. We use two agency-related control variables that are known to be 
positively related to firm value: the Democracy variable of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), 
and the E_0 variable of Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). We use the 2006 values for both 
variables since both measures are only publicly available until that year. We find that Democracy 
is unrelated to returns in our sample, and while E_0 has a marginal positive effect on returns, 
HiFlex*Beta remains significant after controlling for E_0. Consequently, corporate governance 
does not appear to explain the employee flexibility effect.  
                                                 
35 Specifically, we compute the frequency of the following expressions (and their declinations): union, unionized, 
unionization.  
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Finally, we test in the Fama-Macbeth regressions whether state-level or industry-level 
measures of the ability to fire employees (labour flexibility) affect the HiFlex returns (results 
untabulated). As the ability to fire may be related to employee flexibility, we control for state-
level factors such as good faith employment laws, wrongful dismissal laws, unemployment 
benefits, and labour mobility and find the HiFlex-Beta effect on stock returns remains. In 
addition, we control for layoff-separation rates by industry and find that our employee flexibility 
effect remains. Consequently, the employee flexibility is distinct from the ability to fire 
employees. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper studies the importance of employee flexibility to firm value. Using textual 
analysis of company reviews, we construct a novel measure of employee flexibility, and relate it 
to future stock returns. This paper shows that firms with a flexible workforce tend to outperform 
those that do not—a high degree of employee flexibility results in high risk-adjusted stock 
returns. Furthermore, the benefits of a flexible workforce concentrate in firms exposed to 
exogenous risk—the impact of employee flexibility on returns is evident only among firms with 
high betas or during periods of economic uncertainty. Finally, we find evidence that investors 
and analysts do not fully incorporate employee flexibility into their valuation.  
Our evidence has major implications for corporate executives, investors, and researchers. 
For corporate executives, it shows the importance of building and maintaining a culture that 
encourages employee flexibility, as flexibility is positively associated to firm value, profitability, 
and resilience in the face of uncertainty. Relatedly, investors can design a hedge strategy based 
on firms’ employee flexibility, and such a strategy would be especially profitable among high-
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beta stocks or during uncertain periods. More generally, our paper provides a methodology to 
measure employee flexibility over a large sample of firms. This measure is admittedly an 
imperfect representation of the true workforce flexibility, but even with such a measure, our 
evidence indicates that employee flexibility matters for firm value in ways predicted by theory. 
Further research to improve measures of employee flexibility and other corporate intangibles 
may offer new insights into the impact of workplace environment on firm performance.   
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Figure 2.1 Cumulative Portfolio Returns 
 
This figure shows the cumulative portfolio returns over the sample period for a high-flexibility (HiFlex) and low-flexibility portfolio 
(LoFlex) and for a subsample of firms with above-median beta (high-beta) or below-median beta (low-beta). Portfolios are formed at 
the end of June 2011, rebalanced in June of each year, and then held to December 2016. The solid (dashed) line plots the long (short). 
The starting value of each portfolio is normalized to be 100. Panel A shows the equal-weighted results and Panel B the value-weighted 
results for the full portfolio. Panels C and D shows the equal-weighted and value-weighted results for the high-beta portfolio while 
Panels E and F show the equal-weighted and value-weighted results for the low-beta portfolio. 
 
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Returns, All Firms  Panel B: Value-Weighted Returns, All Firms 
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Figure 2.1 (Continued). Cumulative Portfolio Returns 
 
Panel C: Cumulative EW Returns, High-Beta Firms Panel D: Cumulative VW Returns, High-Beta Firms  
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Figure 2.1 (Continued). Cumulative Portfolio Returns 
 
Panel E: Cumulative EW Returns, Low-Beta Firms Panel F: Cumulative VW Returns, Low- Beta Firms 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A. Review-Level Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Flex_rev (%) 688,647 1.65 0 3.35 0 50 
Flex_net_rev (%) 688,647 1.58 0 3.30 -12.5 50 
Len_review 688,647 27.34 19 24.71 1 648 
Star rating 609,390 3.43 3.6 1.13 1 5 
# Unique firms 1,723      
 
Panel B. Firm-Year Employee Flexibility Statistics 
Variable N Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Flex (%) 5,945 1.67 1.50 1.80 0 28.6 
Flex_net (%) 5,945 1.60 1.43 1.77 0 15.4 
Len_review 5,945 26.76 26.11 11.29 4 146.0 
Star rating 5,853 3.43 3.45 0.58 1 5.0 
# Reviews in 
firm-year 5,945 110.30 13.00 431.75 1 10805.0 
 
Panel C. Firm-Year Means 
 Full Sample HiFlex LoFlex  t-stat (Difference) 
Flex (%) 1.67 2.67 0.68 50.28 
MEjun (Billions $) 15.20 19.41 11.05 8.20 
BM 0.52 0.51 0.53 -1.93 
AT (Billions $) 29.07 39.41 18.85 5.35 
GP (%) 32.97 34.08 31.87 3.55 
Beta (End of June) 1.20 1.20 1.21 -0.06 
N 5,925 2,944 2,981   
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Table 2.1 (Continued). Descriptive Statistics 
Panel D. Firm-Month Mean Returns (%) 
 Full Sample HiFlex LoFlex t-stat (Difference) 
Ex_ret 1.34 1.41 1.27 1.96 
Mkt_rf 1.12 1.13 1.11 0.60 
Return-12, -2 11.61 11.96 11.29 2.49 
N 62,875 30,289 32,586   
This table provides summary statistics for Flex and related variables, at the review, firm-year, 
and firm-month levels. Panel A reports statistics at the review level and Panel B reports statistics 
for Flex at the firm-year level. Panels C and D show, respectively, annual and monthly mean 
statistics for high and low flexibility firm-years (firm-months). HiFlex (LoFlex) are the firm-
years with Flex above (below) the same-year median Flex value. The last column reports the 
results of t-tests for the differences in means between the HiFlex and LoFlex subsamples. Total 
assets and market value of equity are in 2016 dollars.  
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Table 2.2 Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
 
Variable Flex HiFlex 
Union
Memb 
Union 
Reviews BC 
HiETK
LD 
Star 
rating OK RDA KZ AT BM INV GP 
Flex 1              
HiFlex 0.56 1             
UnionMemb -0.009 -0.032 1            
UnionReviews -0.020 -0.011 0.202 1           
BC 0.009 0.056 -0.072 -0.016 1          
HiETKLD 0.021 0.055 0.041 0.007 0.067 1         
Star rating 0.026 0.024 0.042 -0.036 0.078 0.039 1        
OK 0.001 0.045 -0.224 -0.056 0.027 -0.052 -0.067 1       
RDA 0.057 0.008 -0.197 -0.041 0.076 0.049 0.058 0.227 1      
KZ -0.001 -0.021 0.123 0.017 -0.059 -0.029 0.010 -0.261 -0.123 1     
AT -0.009 0.074 -0.035 -0.007 0.044 0.087 0.044 -0.128 -0.066 0.042 1    
BM -0.007 -0.021 0.028 0.004 -0.065 -0.028 -0.005 -0.243 -0.198 0.247 0.173 1   
INV 0.000 -0.029 -0.037 -0.013 0.010 -0.024 -0.019 0.023 0.139 0.031 -0.033 -0.121 1  
GP 0.000 0.042 -0.206 -0.059 0.062 -0.052 -0.075 0.835 0.260 -0.368 -0.158 -0.419 0.201 1 
This table reports Pearson correlations of selected variables from 2011 to 2016. INV is (ATt-1 /ATt-2 -1). UnionMemb is the percentage of unionized 
employees in the firm’s state. UnionReviews is the firm-level average frequency of union-related words (“union”, “unionized”, “unionization”) in the free-
form reviews. RDA is R&D expenditures scaled by total assets and KZ is the Kaplan Zingales index of financial constraints. All other variables are defined 
in Appendix A.4. Bold values are significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 2.3 Risk-Adjusted Returns 
Panel A: Equal-Weighted 
All High Beta Firms Low Beta Firms 
FF4 FF5 FF4 FF5 FF4 FF5 
LoFlex Alpha 0.110 0.038 -0.168 -0.322** 0.376** 0.379*** 
(1.48) (0.45) (-1.59) (-2.28) (2.43) (3.67) 
HiFlex Alpha 0.343*** 0.307*** 0.205 0.124 0.427*** 0.436*** 
(2.92) (3.21) (1.47) (0.72) (3.43) (5.05) 
Hi-Lo Flex Alpha 0.234** 0.269*** 0.373** 0.446*** 0.051 0.057 
(2.48) (3.12) (2.24) (3.34) (0.69) (0.65) 
  
Panel B: Value-Weighted 
All High Beta Firms Low Beta Firms 
FF4 FF5 FF4 FF5 FF4 FF5 
LoFlex Alpha -0.039 -0.045 -0.537*** -0.586*** 0.246 0.251** 
(-0.49) (-0.58) (-2.64) (-4.91) (1.62) (2.46) 
HiFlex Alpha 0.294* 0.282** 0.133 0.098 0.367** 0.354*** 
(1.70) (2.09) (0.62) (0.40) (2.15) (3.31) 
Hi-Lo Flex Alpha 0.334 0.327* 0.670** 0.684** 0.121 0.103 
 (1.51) (1.72) (2.01) (2.55) (0.66) (0.65) 
This table reports the alphas from regressions of monthly returns of a portfolio of low flex (LoFlex) firms, 
high flex (HiFlex) firms, and a long-short portfolio of high and low flex (Hi-Lo Flex) firms, respectively. 
The returns are regressed on the Carhart 4 factors and the Fama-French 5 factors and (MKT, HML, SMB, 
MOM, INV, and OP). The high and low flex portfolio returns are the excess over the risk-free rate. Low 
beta (high beta) firms are firms with below (above) median Beta for that year. Panel A shows equal-
weighted returns and Panel B shows value-weighted returns. T-statistics are in parentheses and use 
Newey-West standard errors. The sample returns are from July 2011 to December 2016. 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2.4 Risk-Adjusted Returns and Policy Uncertainty  
Panel A: Equal-Weighted 
FF4 FF5  
Alpha HiUncert(t-1) Alpha HiUncert(t-1) 
LoFlex  0.129* -0.041 0.063 -0.056 
(1.84) (-0.28) (0.78) (-0.29) 
HiFlex  0.189** 0.334** 0.199*** 0.241 
(2.06) (2.10) (2.74) (1.48) 
Hi-Lo Flex  0.060 0.375** 0.136 0.298* 
(0.76) (2.38) (1.43) (1.78) 
  
Panel B: Value-Weighted 
FF4 FF5  
Alpha HiUncert(t-1) Alpha HiUncert(t-1) 
LoFlex  0.073 -0.242** 0.091* -0.304*** 
(1.17) (-1.97) (1.81) (-2.61) 
HiFlex  -0.009 0.655*** 0.046 0.529*** 
(-0.09) (2.83) (0.56) (3.17) 
Hi-Lo Flex  -0.082 0.897*** -0.045 0.833*** 
(-0.63) (3.18) (-0.40) (3.66) 
 
This table reports the intercept (alpha) and coefficient on an indicator variable for high uncertainty 
(HiUncertt-1) of regressions of monthly returns of a portfolio of low flex (LoFlex) firms, high flex 
(HiFlex) firms, and a long-short portfolio of high and low flex (Hi-Lo Flex) firms, respectively. The 
returns are regressed on the Carhart 4 factors or the Fama-French 5 factors (MKT, HML, SMB, MOM, OP, 
and INV) and lagged indicator variable for high economic policy uncertainty (HiUncertt-1); see equations 
(3) and (4) in the text. The HiUncert dummy is set to 1 if the month t-1 Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Index is above the 10-year rolling median, and zero otherwise. Panel A shows equal-weighted returns and 
Panel B shows value-weighted returns. T-statistics are in parentheses and use Newey-West standard 
errors. The sample returns are from July 2011 to December 2016. 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2.5 Fama-MacBeth Cross-Sectional Return Regressions 
(1) (2) 
HiFlex 0.186** -0.366* 
(2.09) (-1.88) 
HiFlex*Beta  0.473** 
 (2.65) 
Beta  -0.587** 
 (-2.25) 
LogBM 0.007 0.027 
(0.05) (0.22) 
LogMEjun 0.017 -0.004 
(0.23) (-0.06) 
Return -1,-1 -0.023 -0.025* 
(-1.45) (-1.72) 
Return -12,-2 0.003 0.002 
(0.47) (0.29) 
Return -36,-13 0.000 0.001 
(0.10) (0.40) 
     
N 56,948 56,827 
Months 66 66 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth (1973) regressions of monthly stock returns on a high flex 
score indicator (HiFlex) and other control variables. In column 1, HiFlex is tested for abnormal 
returns and Column 2 includes an interaction of HiFlex with Beta. All variables are defined in 
Appendix A.4. T-statistics are in parentheses and use Newey-West standard errors. The sample 
period is July 2011 to December 2016. 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2.6 Earnings Announcement Returns 
(1) (2) (3) 
HiFlex -0.001 0.003 -0.251*** 
(-0.01) (0.03) (-2.76) 
HiFlex*Beta   0.219** 
   (2.26) 
Beta   0.190** 
   (2.53) 
LogBM  0.022 -0.009 
 (0.24) (-0.09) 
LogMEfyr  -0.032 -0.013 
 (-0.92) (-0.37) 
    
N 19,413 19,413 19,329 
R-Squared 0.000 0.001 0.002 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
This table reports results of the panel regressions of abnormal earning announcement returns on 
an indicator variable HiFlex. Abnormal returns are calculated over a three-day window centered 
on the earnings announcement date (-1, +1) as the daily firm return in excess of the market 
return. Returns are in percentages. All variables are defined in Appendix A.4. The regressions 
include year and industry fixed effects and an intercept, which are not reported for brevity. T-
statistics in parentheses use standard errors clustered by firm and year. 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2.7 Gross Profitability Regressions 
 GP GP 
 (1) (2) 
HiFlex 3.417*** 2.174*** 
(3.77) (2.71) 
LogAT -4.660*** -2.745*** 
(-13.97) (-8.30) 
BM -26.453*** -19.035*** 
(-6.21) (-5.51) 
DA -0.240*** -0.284*** 
(-4.39) (-7.03) 
Cash 0.085** 0.140*** 
(2.07) (3.82) 
Age -0.013 -0.005 
(-0.48) (-0.17) 
  
N 4,295 4,295 
R-Squared 0.396 0.541 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE No Yes 
This table reports the results of panel regressions of gross profit (GP) on the HiFlex indicator variable and 
controls. GP is measured from year t. The independent variables are measured using data from financial 
year t-1. All variables are described in Appendix A.4. Columns 1 and 2 show the panel regression results 
without and with industry fixed effects, respectively. All values are in percentages. The intercept is not 
shown for brevity. T-statistics in parentheses use standard errors clustered by firm and year.  
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2.8 Robustness: Risk-Adjusted Returns 
Panel A: Equal-Weighted 
 More than 5 Reviews Flex_net No subsidiaries Trim 1/99 Trim 5/95 
 Full Hi Beta Full Hi Beta Full Hi Beta Full Hi Beta Full Hi Beta 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
LoFlex Alpha 0.046 -0.300** 0.076 -0.322** 0.050 -0.291* 0.035 -0.322** 0.038 -0.321** 
(0.55) (-2.25) (0.88) (-2.28) (0.57) (-1.83) (0.42) (-2.28) (0.46) (-2.31) 
HiFlex Alpha 0.317*** 0.141 0.278*** 0.124 0.348*** 0.177 0.309*** 0.123 0.305*** 0.121 
(3.39) (0.84) (3.31) (0.72) (2.77) (0.79) (3.18) (0.71) (3.13) (0.69) 
Hi-Lo Flex Alpha 0.270*** 0.441*** 0.202** 0.446*** 0.298*** 0.468*** 0.274*** 0.445*** 0.267*** 0.442*** 
(3.01) (3.21) (2.43) (3.34) (2.71) (2.72) (3.17) (3.31) (3.13) (3.38) 
       
Panel B: Value-Weighted 
 More than 5 Reviews Flex_net No subsidiaries Trim 1/99 Trim 5/95 
 Full Hi Beta Full Hi Beta Full Hi Beta Full Hi Beta Full Hi Beta 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
LoFlex Alpha -0.041 -0.573*** -0.010 -0.586*** -0.106 -0.600*** -0.060 -0.597*** -0.048 -0.557*** 
(-0.53) (-5.21) (-0.12) (-4.91) (-1.30) (-4.94) (-0.93) (-5.11) (-0.75) (-4.75) 
HiFlex Alpha 0.281** 0.101 0.258* 0.098 0.300** 0.109 0.289** 0.103 0.285** 0.079 
(2.10) (0.40) (1.86) (0.40) (2.31) (0.44) (2.33) (0.42) (2.33) (0.32) 
Hi-Lo Flex Alpha 0.322* 0.674** 0.269 0.684** 0.406** 0.709*** 0.349** 0.700*** 0.333** 0.636** 
 (1.70) (2.44) (1.30) (2.55) (2.20) (2.65) (2.17) (2.67) (2.12) (2.35) 
This table reports the alphas from monthly risk-adjusted regressions of returns on a long-short portfolio of high flex firms and low flex firms for 
the full sample and the high beta subsample. The returns are regressed on the Fama-French 5 factors (MKT, HML, SMB, RMW, and CMA). The 
portfolio returns are the excess over the risk-free rate. Panel A presents results for equal-weighted returns and Panel B shows results for value-
weighted returns. Columns 1 and 2 include firms that have more than 5 published reviews. In Columns 3 and 4, HiFlex is defined using Flex_net 
instead of Flex and includes firms that have a total of more than five reviews. Columns 5 and 6 excludes reviews of the firm’s subsidiaries. 
Column 7 and 8 (9 and 10) excludes reviews with Star ratings above the 99th (95th) percentile, or below the 1st (5th) percentile of the full-sample 
distribution of Star ratings. T-statistics in parentheses use Newey-West standard errors. 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 2.9 Robustness: Fama-MacBeth Return Regressions 
Panel A: Additional restrictions on sample or alternative flex measure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
HiFlex -0.363* -0.442* -0.425* -0.331 -0.344 
 (-1.72) (-1.86) (-1.90) (-1.62) (-1.66) 
HiFlex * Beta 0.473** 0.517** 0.550** 0.453** 0.462** 
 (2.51) (2.51) (2.51) (2.44) (2.44) 
Beta -0.590** -0.616** -0.580** -0.573** -0.578** 
 (-2.30) (-2.33) (-2.36) (-2.20) (-2.22) 
N 54,375 54,375 52,954 56,827 56,750 
Months 66 66 66 66 66 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Panel B: Additional controls that correlate with employee flexibility 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
HiFlex -0.256 -0.241 -0.252 -0.273 -0.335 -0.309 -0.298 -0.348 
 (-1.29) (-1.20) (-1.29) (-1.31) (-1.63) (-1.56) (-1.47) (-1.46) 
HiFlex *Beta 0.308* 0.296 0.298* 0.357* 0.348* 0.308* 0.333* 0.398* 
 (1.74) (1.67) (1.74) (1.79) (1.94) (1.77) (1.88) (1.82) 
BC -0.056       -0.165 
 (-0.26)       (-0.74) 
HiETKLD  0.066      0.057 
  (0.46)      (0.43) 
OK   0.049     0.092 
   (0.70)     (1.16) 
CEOTenure    0.013    0.013 
    (1.51)    (1.66) 
RDA     0.002   -0.010 
     (0.08)   (-0.34) 
UnionMemb      0.010  0.010 
      (0.59)  (0.60) 
UnionReviews       0.101 0.138 
       (0.33) (0.45) 
N 53,111 53,111 53,111 51691 
 
53,395 53,138 53,313 51646 
Months 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Table 2.9 (Continued). Robustness: Fama-MacBeth Return Regression 
This table reports Fama-MacBeth regressions of monthly returns on HiFlex and Hiflex*Beta interaction, variables that correlate with Flex, and control variables 
comprising LogBM, LogMeJun, ret (-1,-1), ret(-12,-2), and ret(-36,-13). The dependent variable is the firm’s monthly stock return. Panel A shows the results 
after imposing additional restrictions on the dataset.  Column 1 limits the sample to firms with more than five published reviews. Column 2 requires more than 
five reviews per firm and uses Flex_net instead of Flex. Column 3 excludes reviews of subsidiaries; Columns 4 and 5 exclude reviews with Star ratings above the 
99th (95th) percentile, or below the 1st (5th) percentile of the full-sample distribution of Star ratings. Panel B  shows robustness tests of the HiFlex * Beta 
interaction with various controls related to job satisfaction, managerial talent (BC, HiETKLD, CEOtenure, OK, RDA), or unionization (UnionMemb, 
UnionReviews). Variables are defined in Appendix A.4. T-statistics are in parentheses and use Newey-West standard errors. 
* Significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Chapter 3: The Effectiveness of SEC Enforcement in Deterring Financial 
Misconduct 
We brought important cases against financial institutions, major companies and senior 
executives for violations relating to financial reporting violations, trading abuses, sales of 
complex financial instruments and Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations, among others—
Mary Jo White, former SEC chair, on her time at the SEC (Feb 15, 2017) 
 
We need to undo many regulations which have stifled investment in American businesses, 
and restore oversight of the financial industry in a way that does not harm American workers—
Donald Trump, President of the US, on his new SEC nominee, Walter "Jay" Clayton (Jan 4, 
2017) 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Following the financial crisis, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) took a 
position on pursuing and prosecuting financial misconduct in order to deter future wrongdoing. 
However, the media has speculated that the change in SEC chairs in 2017 is moving the agency 
away from enforcement to a more regulatory approach (Lynch 2017; Picker 2017). This paper 
seeks to understand whether the SEC’s prosecutions of financial misconduct reduces the 
likelihood of other companies from committing fraud in the future—i.e. what is the prosecution’s 
impact on deterring future fraud. Furthermore, this paper also investigates what target for 
prosecution is best for deterring future misconduct in other companies. The SEC can choose to 
prosecute officers, companies, or other entities (such as auditors or attorneys) and determining 
who to prosecute will help the SEC allocate resources and best determine how to deter future 
misconduct. 
Reducing financial misconduct is critical for ensuring a well-functioning financial 
system. Capital markets allow the flow of funds between savers and borrowers and trust smooths 
these flows. For example, insider trading tilts the market in favor of insiders and consequently 
discourages outsiders from participating--Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) find that the cost of 
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equity is lower in countries that have prosecuted at least one insider trading case. In addition, 
Beny (2005) and Cumming, Johan, and Li (2011) note that rules restricting market manipulation, 
such as “pump and dump” scams, and broker-agency conflicts, such as front running (where the 
broker trades before the client), lead to better liquidity. Finally, after a financial institution has 
been sanctioned for misconduct, it improves credit conditions to attract new borrowers (Roman 
2017).    
Part of ensuring trust in the financial system is by reducing the frequency of financial 
misconduct. Deterrence is more important than incapacitation (jailing guilty individuals or 
barring them from the financial industry) for reducing misconduct. Detecting, trying, and jailing 
a criminal is very expensive, but it can have a large multiplier effect by deterring future criminals 
from committing crime (Ehrlich 1996). For example, in a study of violent felonies, deterrence 
had a greater impact on reducing property crime than incapacitation (Levitt 1998). By 
determining what forms of punishment work best, legislators can create laws with effective 
deterrents, and regulators/prosecutors can apply these laws to maximum effect.  
Following the financial crisis, Dodd-Frank gave enhanced powers to many of the US 
agencies to improve the detection and punishment of financial misconduct. One agency that 
received a large expansion was the SEC. The SEC received enhanced powers, such as enhanced 
powers over investment advisors, an improved whistle-blower bounty program, oversight of 
executive compensation, and greater exemptions from the US Freedom of Information Act. 
These expanded powers make the SEC one of the most important agencies for ensuring the 
proper functioning of financial markets. However, the recent nomination of Walter “Jay” 
Clayton may indicate a shift away from enforcement. Consequently, understanding the impact of 
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the SEC’s enforcement actions on deterring misconduct will help inform whether the SEC 
should move away from enforcement or focus more heavily on enforcement. 
The results show that the SEC enforcement causes a significant decline in the probability 
of financial fraud in future years in the same industry and Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). 
To determine what impact enforcement has on future misconduct, I run a logit regression 
predicting financial misconduct and include an enforcement indicator variable set to 1 if there 
was an enforcement in the industry or MSA over the past 2 years. The results show that 
enforcement reduces misconduct in the future—the coefficient is -0.268 (t = -3.57) and -0.208 (t 
= -2.73) for an enforcement in the industry and MSA, respectively. For example, in 2004, the 
SEC officially sanctioned Worldcom (now known as MCI) for its financial misconduct. In the 
following year, the regression results predict that the rate of financial misconduct will be 19.2% 
and 32.4% lower in the industry and MSA, respectively, than if there was no enforcement.36  
Another contribution of this paper is examining whether the target of enforcement affects 
the deterrence rate of financial misconduct. An enforcement action typically targets an officer of 
the company, the company itself, other entity (such as an attorney or auditor) or some 
combination of the three. As the SEC’s resources are limited, focusing investigative and 
prosecution resources on a small group can help extend its reach. 
The results show that enforcement actions targeting a company has the largest deterrence 
on misconduct in the same industry and MSA. Targeting a company reduces financial 
misconduct in the same industry (-0.125; t = -2.14), while targeting the company significantly 
reduces financial misconduct in the same MSA (-0.292; t= -4.38). On the other hand, targeting 
                                                 
36 Probability = e(predicted value) / (1+e(predicted value). I use average firm values to calculate probabilities and 
then either set the enforcement indicator to 0 for no enforcement or 1 for enforcement. 
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the officer and other entities has lower or no statistically measurable effect on financial 
misconduct rates in the industry or MSA.  
The differences between targeting an officer and other groups may be the result of a few 
factors. Officers and other groups are typically no longer associated with the firm by the time the 
SEC prosecutes the case. As a result these, “bad apples” may no longer be viewed to be part of 
the same industry or MSA. In addition, companies are invariably better known than their officers 
or support staff, consequently, competitors in the industry and MSA are more likely to be aware 
of SEC actions focused on a company than on an officer or support staff.  
The results are robust to the usage of alternative metrics of financial misconduct. When 
company restatements are used in lieu of actual misconduct in the logit regressions, firms 
evidenced a reduced incidence of restatements following an enforcement action in the same 
industry. In addition, when Fscore, a measure predicting financial misconduct (Dechow, Ge, 
Larson, & Sloan 2011), is used the panel regressions show that an enforcement in the same 
industry reduces the Fscore for firms. This provides further evidence that firms are responding to 
regulatory actions and curtailing their misconduct rates. 
These results will be useful in the ongoing debate over how to deter future financial 
misconduct. The Department of Justice (DOJ) has reached record settlements with banks 
involved in the financial crisis; however, it has failed to successfully pursue any of the bank 
CEOs or other officers. There has been a large amount of media criticism (Irwin 2013; Nocera 
2011; Weidner 2011) about how few bank executives that have been prosecuted for the financial 
crisis; however, my analysis gives credence to both sides of the argument: misconduct is reduced 
more in companies in the same industry when an officer is targeted, but more in the same 
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) when a company is targeted. Regardless, targeting other 
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entities, such as auditors, attorneys, or other firms/individuals, has no measurable effect on 
deterring future misconduct. 
3.2 Related Research and Hypothesis 
There is a large amount of research on financial misconduct; however, there has been 
scant analysis on what can deter future misconduct. For example, previous research shows that 
the market and regulators exact a large penalty on firms and managers that commit misconduct. 
On average, firms that are caught committing financial misconduct lose any gains from the 
misconduct plus more in fines and decreased market capitalization (Karpoff, Lee, & Martin 
2008a). Furthermore, managers that are caught face large chances of being fired, financial 
penalties, and even jail time (Karpoff, Lee, & Martin 2008b). The issuance of an AAER has a 
large immediate effect on the market capitalization of a firm when an SEC investigation is 
announced (Feroz, Park, & Pastena 1991) and the SEC eventually levies fines or other 
punishments (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney 1996). However, this research has not looked at how 
these market and regulator imposed punishments have affected the rates of future financial 
misconduct. 
In addition, while there has been a large amount of research in the area of financial 
misconduct, it primarily has focused on macro regulatory changes that affect the entire market. 
For example, several papers find that passage of insider trading laws reduces the incidence of 
insider trading (Bris 2005, and Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002). In addition, Cumming, Johan, & 
Li (2011) document that stricter stock exchange rules on insider trading and manipulation 
improves exchange liquidity, and greater enforcement power and resources leads to more 
misconduct detection.  Given these paper focus on large regulatory events, they primarily focus 
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on a handful of changes in the time-series or a cross-section of different markets across 
countries. 
This paper provides a view into the micro effect of regulatory enforcement on different 
segments of the market. By examining an array of SEC enforcements, the paper is able to 
analyze the effect of regulatory intervention in both the cross-section and time-series. Moreover, 
as the SEC focuses on the US market, the paper allows an analysis within the same market, 
which removes much of the noise from analyzing across different countries. Finally, the paper is 
able to look at specifics of who is punished in order to tease out the impact of enforcement on 
different groups. 
3.3 Hypothesis Development 
Firms in the same industry should be discouraged from misconduct if they see one of 
their peers punished for misconduct. Industry competitors pay close attention to one another’s 
activities and the revelation of fraud is no different. Goldman, Peyer, & Stefanescu (2012) find 
that in competitive industries, the revelation of fraud impacts the other firms in the industry. In 
addition, earnings management and the lack of enforcement can lead to contagion as other firms 
copy the fraudulent firm (Kedia, Koh, & Rajgopal 2015). Logically, the results should also flow 
in reverse so that enforcement on misconduct deters fraudulent behaviors of peer firms.  
Deterrence may also occur if firms see a geographically close firm punished. Kedia et al. 
(2015) find that earnings management can spread through firms both industry and geographic 
proximity. Furthermore, other studies have found that geographic proximity to other firms affects 
analyst accuracy and compensation (Malloy 2005; Kedia and Rajgopal 2009). Finally, Kedia and 
Rajgopal (2011) find that SEC enforcement is highly dependent on proximity to the SEC offices.  
Consequently, firms that are geographically close to one another, such as in the same 
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metropolitan statistical area (MSA), are likely to be aware of enforcement against its peers and 
thus perceive that enforcement is higher in their area.   
Furthermore, the deterrence effect should be more noticeable as misconduct typically 
clusters together over time—misconduct is not a rare event that happens sporadically. Previous 
research has shown that misconduct in an industry or MSA leads to greater misconduct as firms 
see rival firms’ improved results and then employ their own misconduct (Kedia, Koh, Rajgopal 
2015). Consequently, if there was no enforcement effect, the number of misconducts should rise 
over time rather than decline. 
My first hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 1: An enforcement will reduce the probability of fraud in other firms in the same 
industry and MSA. 
The exact entity who is punished in the enforcement will also affect the amount of future 
fraud in the industry. I test whether individual vs. corporate punishments work better at deterring 
misconduct.  These results are germane to regulatory bodies across the world as they are taking 
different approaches to prosecuting cases. For example, prosecutors in Iceland jailed bank CEOs 
for their role in the crisis, while the US Department of Justice (DOJ) won large settlements from 
investment banks for their misconduct during the financial crisis. Finally, this is particularly 
relevant following the financial crisis as more than half of the charges laid by the SEC have been 
against officers37. Consequently, this analysis will be able to analyze whether the SEC’s effort is 
well targeted. 
While individual punishments would increase the magnitude of the punishment, company 
punishments increase the probability a guilty party is punished at the cost of punishing innocent 
                                                 
37 http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml  
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shareholders, officer, or employees of the firm. On the other hand, severe regulatory actions can 
have powerful real effects on customers; consequently, the regulatory actions may need to be 
targeted to avoid “collateral” damage (Danisewicz, McGowan, Onali, & Schaek 2017). 
Furthermore, regulatory actions against financial institutions do not change the corporate culture 
in a firm (Fiordelsi, Raponi, & Rau 2015), leaving the possibility that future misconduct may 
occur. With officer punishments, the value of the potential punishment is very high on the 
individual officer and should have a negative impact on others’ likelihood to pursue crime.  
This argument may be tipped by several distinct reasons. First, given the difficulty 
regulatory authorities have in detecting financial misconduct (Dyck, Morse, & Zingales 2010), 
group punishment by targeting the firm will be more effective than individual punishment 
(Miceli & Segerson 2007). Second, individual punishments may be the equivalent of “closing the 
barn door after the horse has bolted.” Over 60% of individuals that are identified as having 
committed financial misconduct leave their firms on or before the initial investigation (Karpoff, 
Lee, & Martin 2008b). Consequently, these individuals have likely already left the industry and 
MSA and punishing them will not be as noticeable than if they were still within those networks.  
Furthermore, targeting a company will increase the awareness of the event. The 
awareness of companies is typically much greater than the awareness of the officers at those 
companies. Consequently, targeting companies will have a greater awareness than targeting an 
individual at those companies. Finally, a guilty officer or other entity may be simply viewed as a 
“bad apple” and that the punishment is due to that particular individual’s misconduct—
individuals are less likely to cheat when they see a member of an outsider group cheat (Gino, 
Ayal, & Ariely 2009). Regardless, by targeting a company, other companies will take notice to 
ensure that they do not suffer the same fate. 
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Hypothesis 2: Enforcement actions targeting a company will reduce misconduct in an industry 
and MSA. 
Finally, there is little reason to expect that prosecuting an auditor, attorney, or other entity 
will reduce future misconduct. These individuals are typically not part of the firm, can easily be 
replaced by the firm, and are not core to firm operations. Consequently, prosecuting these groups 
will have little to no effect on deterring future misconduct. This discussion motivates the third 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Enforcement actions punishing officer and other entities will have no measurable 
impact on deterring misconduct. 
By identifying whether assigning individual responsibility or corporate responsibility 
deters more misconduct will help regulators to magnify the power of their prosecutions. This is 
particularly important as the DOJ has won large sanctions against financial institutions arising 
from misconduct during the financial crisis, but has not won any cases against the top officers of 
those financial institutions.  
3.4 Data 
The Center for Financial Reporting and Management (CFRM) Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Releases (AAER) dataset is the main source of misconduct and enforcement 
actions. The CFRM AAER data was collected from the SEC website and with information 
supplemented from Lexis-Nexis searches and covers over 1,300 separate incidents (Dechow, Ge, 
Larson, & Sloan (2011)). This data includes the company targeted and whether an officer, firm, 
other entity, or some combination of the 3 was convicted. 
The CFRM AAER data are merged with financial data drawn from Compustat and stock 
return data are from CRSP. Financial and stock data are included for all firms from 1967 to 
 64 
 
2016. The first financial year identified as misconduct is 1971; however, data 4 years before are 
required to develop some of the lagged variables and graphs. Any firms without assets or 
negative equity are removed from the analysis. 
All firms are categorized into 2-digit SIC industries based on Compustat SIC code. In 
addition, all firm headquarter locations are identified from Compustat and used to identify the 
MSA of the firm headquarters. The final sample includes 225,319 firm-year observations. 
In addition to the CFRM AAER database financial misconduct data was also 
incorporated from the Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC) and Audit Analytics (AA) 
restatements. The former database captures securities class action lawsuits against firms and the 
latter captures restatements of financial statements by firms. These two databases will serve as 
controls for other identified sources of financial misconduct to ensure that the results are simply 
not an after effect of another form of misconduct. 
One concern with using SEC enforcement actions is that the SEC is often slow. I 
examined all the cases where AA restatements identified the same faulty financial statements as 
AAERs. In 95% of these cases, the announcement date of the restatement was before the AAER. 
Consequently, the misconduct has typically been identified before the actual enforcement action. 
Thus, to control for this early announcement, we need to use variables Restatement and SCA, 
which are indicator variables set to 1 if a restatement (according to Audit Analytics) or securities 
class action, respectively, has occurred in the same industry/MSA, as controls. 
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows the firm-year summary statistics of the total sample. The 
results show that firm-years with misconduct or restatements are uncommon. Panel B of Table 
3.1 shows the mean values for firm-years that have at least 1 enforcement action in the past 2 
years in the same industry/MSA versus those where no enforcement action has been taken in the 
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past 2 years. Columns 1 and show that firm-years in the same 2-digit SIC industry are different 
than other firm-years. Enforcement firm-years, regardless if the enforcement is in the same 2-
digit SIC industry or MSA, have lower BM (more growth firms), leverage, and ROA. 
Interestingly, these firms are also larger, have greater analyst coverage, and institutional 
ownership. These univariate results show that size and value and market awareness are related to 
enforcement action in the same industry and MSA. Consequently, the regressions will have to 
control for these variables to isolate the effect of the enforcement.  
Interestingly, enforcement firm-years are slightly more likely to have misconduct than 
non-enforcement firm-years. However, the difference is very small between the two groups and 
these univariate results do not control for other factors that may be associated with misconduct 
such as ROA. 
To provide a more intuitive view of misconduct before and after an enforcement action, 
Figure 3.1 shows the number of misconduct firm-years in an industry/MSA up to 4 years before 
and after an enforcement is announced. Panels A and B look at the number of misconduct firm-
years following an enforcement in the 2-digit SIC industry and MSA, respectively. As can be 
seen, the total number of misconducts begins to decline 4 years before the enforcement, but 
experiences a sharper dip after the enforcement action in year 0. In contrast, industries and MSA 
that do not experience an enforcement see rising misconduct rates over the same period. 
Consequently, it appears that the discovery and enforcement by the SEC has a strong deterrence 
effect on future misconduct. 
Table 3.2 shows the correlations of the main dependent and independent variables. 
Interestingly, misconduct is positively correlated with enforcement in both the industry and the 
MSA. This is unsurprising given that earnings management is found to lead to “contagion” in 
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other firms in the same industry (Kedia, Koh, & Rajgopal 2015) and misconduct may also lead to 
a similar contagion if it goes undetected and unpunished. Also, similar to what was found in the 
summary statistics, misconduct is also correlated to many key firm characteristics, such as size, 
value, leverage, analyst coverage, institutional ownership, return on assets, and industry 
concentration. Hence, these variables will be invaluable as control variables. 
3.5 Results 
To test the first hypothesis, I run the following panel logit regression to identify if 
enforcement in the industry in the past leads to a reduction in the probability of financial 
misconduct: 
Misconductjt = b0 + b1 Enforce_INDjt + b2 SCAjt + b3 Restatementjt + b4 Xjt + γt + δj +  εjt  (1) 
Misconductjt = b0 + b1 Enforce_MSAjt + b2 SCAjt + b3 Restatementjt + b4 Xjt + γt + δj + ρj+  εjt  (2) 
The dependent, Misconduct, is whether company j’s financial statement in financial year 
t has been identified as problematic by an SEC AAER38. Enforce_INDjt (Enforce_MSAjt) is an 
indicator variable that equals 1 if there is at least 1 AAER released in the past 2 years (t-1 to t) in 
company j’s industry (MSA)39. SCA and Restatement is an indicator variable set to 1 if there is at 
least 1 securities class action or restatement in the industry/MSA, respectively, in the past 2 
years, and set to 0 otherwise. Xjt is a vector of control variables including size (LogAT), book-to-
market (BM), leverage (DA), firm age (Firmage), analyst coverage (LogAnalyst), institutional 
ownership (IO), return on assets (ROA), and Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), for company j 
at time t. In addition, γt, δj and ρj control for the year, industry, and MSA fixed effects, 
respectively. Errors are clustered by firm and year as per Peterson (2009). 
                                                 
38 The misconduct is typically identified after it occurs. 
39 When KKLM 2016 data is available, this data will expand the list of enforcement actions by the SEC. 
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As shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.3, the presence of an enforcement action in the 
2-digit SIC industry (-0.268; t = -3.57) or MSA (-0.208; t = -2.73) in the past 2 years (t-1 to t) 
reduces the likelihood of misconduct from occurring at time t. Interestingly, the SCA and 
Restatement variable show no statistical significance—class actions and restatements do not 
seem to deter misconduct in the way that an SEC enforcement does.  
To test Hypothesis 2, enforcement targeted at a company is better at reducing future 
misconduct, and Hypothesis 3, that enforcement targeted at other entities will have no effect on 
future misconduct, I run the following two regressions:  
Misconductjt = b0 + b1 Enforce_IND_OFFjt + b2 Enforce_IND_COMjt  + b3 Enforce_IND_OTHjt  
 + b4 SCAjt + b5 Restatementjt + b6 Xjt + γt + δj +  εjt  (3) 
Misconductjt = b0 + b1 Enforce_MSA_OFFjt + b2 Enforce_MSA_COMjt  + b3 
Enforce_MSA_OTHjt + b4 SCAjt + b5 Restatementjt + b6 Xjt + γt + δj +  εjt  (4) 
where the _OFF, _COM, _OTH interactions indicate whether an officer, company, or other 
entity (such as auditor or lawyer) were charged during the enforcement in the past 2 years. All 
other variables are similar to equations (1) and (2) above.  
As shown in Table 3.4, the type of enforcement matters greatly in reducing misconduct in 
other firms in the same industry and MSA. Within two years of an AAER targeting a company, 
the incidence of misconduct falls in the same 2-digit SIC industry (-0.125; t = -2.14) and MSA (-
0.292; t=-4.38). Furthermore, targeting an officer in the same industry has no statistically 
measurable effect in the same MSA (-0.071; t=-0.79) and a small reduction in the same industry 
(-0.151; t=-1.92). Thus, this evidence supports hypotheses 2 that targeting a company causes a 
larger reduction in misconduct than targeting an officer. 
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These results may be due to the following 3 factors. First, guilty officers and other 
entities have often severed their relationships with the firm before the actual SEC enforcement is 
finalized—consequently, the guilty officer does not work in the same industry or MSA anymore 
and punishing them does not appear to have the same impact. Second, most officers and other 
entities are less well known than the company that they work for. Consequently, news of 
punishment targeting a company is more likely to spread than punishment targeting an officer. 
Third, a guilty officer or other entity may be simply viewed as a “bad apple” and that the 
punishment is due to that particular individual’s misconduct; however, by targeting a company, 
other companies will take notice to ensure that they do not suffer the same fate. 
Finally, the results support hypothesis 3 that targeting another entity has no effect on 
reducing misconduct. As can be seen in Table 3.4, targeting other entities has no statistically 
measureable effect in reducing misconduct in the industry or MSA.  
3.5.1 Robustness 
To ensure that the results are robust to alternative measures of misconduct, I use two 
additional proxies for misconduct. First, I use financial restatements from the Audit Analytics 
database. Though many of the restatements are errors rather than fraudulent behavior, by using 
this broad definition, I can test Hypothesis 1 in the most difficult of settings. Restatement is set to 
1 if a firm issues a restatement for that financial year (typically in the future), and 0 otherwise. In 
addition, I use the Dechow et al. (2011) Fscore as an another potential metric for misconduct. 
Fscore was developed to predict whether a firm’s statements are fraudulent and is thus a good 
alternative to estimating using actual misconduct. Note as Fscore is a continuous variable, the 
Fscore regressions were run as a standard pooled regression and not as a logit. 
As can be seen in Table 3.5, the results are similar for firms in the same industry using 
both the restatement and Fscore metrics. In column 1, an enforcement in the same industry leads 
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to reduced incidence of restatements (-0.074; t=-2.20) and a lower Fscore (-0.002; t = -1.81). 
Oddly, the results do not hold in the same MSA. Restatements show movement in the opposite 
direction and Fscore has no statistical significance. Regardless, these MSA results may be 
simply be the result of the added noise from using these alternative proxies of actual misconduct. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Financial misconduct creates large losses to investors and erodes public trust in the 
financial system. Consequently, it is very important to regulatory agencies to ensure as little 
financial misconduct as possible. However, with a new SEC chair and looming budgetary 
constraints (Robinson and Bain 2017), the SEC may not have the same ability to conduct 
enforcement actions. 
This gives arise to three main policy prescriptions. First, enforcement should remain a 
priority as deterrence is very important to the reduction of future misconduct. As this research 
shows, enforcement actions deter future misconduct in the same industry and MSA, extending 
the SEC’s enforcement resources. Second, regulatory agencies should be judicious in their target 
of prosecution; this is particularly important given the potential reductions in SEC budgets. 
Targeting a company will be more effective at deterring future misconduct in both the 
company’s industry and MSA. Targeting officers and other entities, on the other hand, has much 
less impact on future misconduct in the industry or MSA. Therefore, regulatory agencies should 
focus their limited prosecution efforts to targeting companies and avoid targeting officers, 
attorneys, auditors, and non-officer individuals. 
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Figure 3.1 Total Misconducts with and without enforcement 
Panel A: Total Misconducts in Industry with and without enforcement 
 
Panel B: Total frauds in MSA with and without enforcement 
 
   No Enforcement in industry/MSA 
   Enforcement in industry/MSA 
 
Panel A shows the total misconduct firm-years in SIC 2-digit industries 4 years before and 4 
years after an enforcement action (red dotted line) at t = 0 or if there is no enforcement in the 
industry (blue line) at t = 0. Panel B is similar to Panel A except that the graph shows the total 
misconduct firm-years in an MSA. The total misconduct firm-years are scaled by the number of 
total misconduct firm-years at t = -4. MSA refers to Metropolitan Statistical Area.  
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Table 3.1 Firm-Year Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Summary Statistics for Total Sample       
Variable n MEAN STD MIN MAX 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Misconduct 245,176 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.00 
Restatement 245,176 0.06 0.23 0.00 1.00 
FScore 107,409 0.11 0.09 0.00 12.81 
AT 245,176 5686.2 60046.8 0.0 3771199.9 
BM 231,286 0.83 0.81 0.01 11.96 
DA 243,433 22.85 19.77 0.00 84.29 
Firmage 245,176 14.37 12.15 1.00 66.00 
Loganalyst 245,176 0.72 0.99 0.00 3.50 
IO 243,730 20.70 28.69 0.00 100.00 
ROA 244,787 0.24 23.21 -355.37 82.55 
HHI 245,174 0.09 0.09 0.01 0.59 
 
Panel B: Variable means for firms with and without enforcements in the same industry/MSA 
in the past 2 years 
Variable 
No Enforce in 
Ind Enforce in Ind 
No Enforce in 
MSA 
Enforce in 
MSA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Misconduct 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Restatement 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.10 
FScore 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 
AT 4568.3 7506.7 5549.4 6112.9 
BM 0.91 0.70 0.87 0.73 
DA 25.37 18.74 23.49 20.85 
Firmage 14.21 14.63 14.15 15.07 
Loganalyst 0.62 0.87 0.66 0.91 
IO 16.50 27.56 17.79 29.82 
ROA 2.21 -2.97 0.90 -1.82 
HHI 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.08 
n 151,897 93,279 185,624 59,552 
Panel A shows the total sample statistics. Panel B shows the summary statistics for firm-years 
where there was no enforcement in the past 2 years in the industry/MSA. Panel B Column (1) 
2 shows the summary statistics for firm-years where there was (no) enforcement in the 2-digit 
SIC industry in the past 2 years (t-1 to t). Column (3) 4 shows when there was (no) 
enforcement in the MSA in the past 2 years. Misconduct = 1 if a firm-year has financial 
misconduct. Restatement = 1 if a firm-year has a restatement according to Audit Analytics. 
AT is total assets, BM is the company’s total book value of equity/ market capitalization at the 
end of the financial year. DA is the company’s debt-to-asset ratio and Firmage is the number 
of years the firm has been in Compustat. Loganalyst is the log of the number of analysts 
covering the firm, IO is the institutional ownership of the firm as a %, ROA is the return on 
assets, and HHI is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. All variables are measured in year t and 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1%/99% level (except for Firmage). Firms in MSA 
0 (not in a MSA) or missing MSA are excluded from the sample. 
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Table 3.2 Correlation Matrix 
Variable 
Enforce 
_IND 
Enforce 
_MSA Misconduct Restatement Fscore AT BM DA Firmage Loganalyst IO ROA HHI 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Enforce_IND 1 
Enforce_MSA 0.239 1 
Misconduct 0.028 0.028 1 
Restatement 0.109 0.107 0.133 1 
FScore 0.042 0.004 0.032 0.010 1 
AT 0.024 0.004 0.013 0.013 -0.035 1 
BM -0.126 -0.071 -0.021 -0.028 -0.010 0.004 1 
DA -0.163 -0.057 0.005 -0.005 -0.087 0.008 0.083 1 
Firmage 0.017 0.033 0.001 0.065 -0.077 0.083 -0.014 0.028 1 
Loganalyst 0.123 0.107 0.028 0.090 -0.050 0.077 -0.201 -0.061 0.307 1 
IO 0.187 0.180 0.030 0.157 -0.028 0.029 -0.179 -0.059 0.330 0.744 1 
ROA -0.108 -0.050 -0.004 -0.032 0.021 0.008 0.002 -0.001 0.111 0.093 0.082 1 
HHI -0.223 -0.043 -0.005 -0.022 0.043 -0.020 0.055 0.088 -0.052 -0.078 -0.069 0.053 1 
This table reports the Pearson correlations of the main variables in the sample. ENFORCE_IND (Enforce_MSA) is an indicator variable that = 1 if 
at least 1 AAER was issued in the firm’s 2-digit SIC industry (MSA) over the past 2 years (t-1 to t). All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1%/99% level each year except Firmage. Variables are defined in Table 3.1. Bold indicates significant at 5% level 
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Table 3.3 Financial Misconduct Deterrence 
Dependent Misconduct Misconduct 
Variable (1) (2) 
Enforce_IND -0.268*** 
 (-3.57) Enforce_MSA  -0.208*** 
  (-2.73) SCA 0.057 0.123 
 (0.36) (1.14) AA 0.183 -0.144 
 (0.94) (-1.11) LogAT 0.262*** 0.332*** 
 (5.45) (6.78) BM -0.407*** -0.447*** 
 (-3.56) (-3.29) DA 0.009*** 0.008*** 
 (2.99) (2.61) Firmage -0.018*** -0.027*** 
 (-3.33) (-4.77) Loganalyst -0.126* -0.098 
 (-1.87) (-1.35) IO 0.008*** 0.004 
 (2.79) (1.38) ROA 0.000 -0.001 
 (-0.23) (-0.61) HHI 0.294 0.719 
 (0.30) (0.69)    
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects No Yes 
N 229,504 192,149 
This table reports the results of logit regressions of the dependent on Enforce_Ind 
(Enforce_MSA). The dependent is an indicator variable, Misconduct, which measures whether 
that firm-year has financial misconduct. ENFORCE_IND (Enforce_MSA) is an indicator 
variable that = 1 if at least 1 AAER was issued in the firm’s 2-digit SIC industry (MSA) over 
the past 2 years (t-1 to t). SCA and Restate are indicator variables that are set to 1 if at least 1 
securities class action or restatement occurred in the past 2 years. LogAT is the log of the 
company’s total assets. All other variables are defined in Table 3.1. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year. Intercept excluded for brevity. Indicates * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.4 Financial Misconduct Deterrence, by Type of Punishment 
Dependent Misconduct Misconduct 
Variable (1) (2) 
Enforce_IND_Off -0.151* 
 (-1.92) Enforce_IND_Com -0.125** 
 (-2.14) Enforce_IND_Oth -0.037 
 (-0.37) Enforce_MSA_Off  -0.071 
  (-0.79) Enforce_MSA_Com  -0.292*** 
  (-4.38) Enforce_MSA_Oth  0.084    
Controls Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects No Yes 
N 229,376 192,149 
This table reports the results of logit regressions of the dependent on enforcement variables, 
depending on who was punished. Enforce_Off, Enforce _Com, and Enforce_Oth, is set to 1 if 
the enforcement in the 2-digit SIC industry/MSA over the past 2 years (t-1 to t) targeted the 
officer, company, or other entity, respectively. The dependents and controls are defined the 
same as in Table 3.3 above. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Intercept excluded 
for brevity. Indicates * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 3.5 Robustness Tests 
Dependent Restatement Restatement Fscore Fscore 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Enforce_IND -0.074** -0.002* 
 (-2.20) (-1.81) Enforce_MSA 0.045*  0.000 
 (1.92)  (-0.35) SCA 0.022 0.068* -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.40) (1.79) (-3.17) (-3.21) Restate 0.444*** 0.404*** 0.003 0.000 
 (3.42) (5.14) (1.36) (0.07) LogAT 0.036** 0.089*** 0.001 0.001 
 (2.36) (6.87) (0.87) (1.31) BM 0.021 0.020 -0.004*** -0.005*** 
 (0.93) (1.05) (-3.94) (-3.96) DA 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.000 
 (7.35) (7.24) (0.00) (0.00) Firmage -0.003 -0.006*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.64) (-4.29) (0.00) (0.00) Loganalyst -0.109*** -0.148*** -0.004*** -0.003*** 
 (-4.58) (-6.56) (-5.68) (-4.61) IO 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.000 0.000 
 (7.86) (7.43) (0.00) (0.00) ROA -0.002*** -0.002*** 0.000 0.000 
 (-3.21) (-3.50) (0.57) (0.24) HHI 0.077 0.206 0.001 0.003 
  (0.19) (0.81) (0.06) (0.21) 
     
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
MSA Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes 
N 229504 192220 106900 98234 
This table reports the results of logit and standard pooled regressions using alternative 
dependents, Restatement and Fscore, respectively. Restatement is an indicator variable set to 1 if 
a firm has to restate the results for that financial year and 0 otherwise. Fscore is a probability 
score developed by Dechow et al. (2011) to predict financial misconduct. The other variables are 
defined the same as in Table 3.3 above. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. Intercept 
excluded for brevity. Indicates * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Chapter 4: Too Much of a Good Thing? Mandatory Risk Disclosure and its 
Impact on Corporate Innovation 
4.1 Introduction 
Corporate disclosure affects the functioning of capital markets, affects firm performance, 
and reduces information asymmetry. Enhancing corporate disclosure has been a driving force for 
regulators since SOX and IFRS adoption and has been credited with reducing information 
asymmetry between firm managers and investors, and consequently, the cost of capital40. 
However, can there be too much of a good thing? That is, can regulators mandate so 
much disclosure that it negatively impacts firm performance? Two theoretical models have 
hypothesized that improved disclosure does not benefit all firms. For example, one model shows 
that less disclosure is desirable when the manager cannot easily report the benefits of 
investments. Another model shows that improved disclosure causes a “crowding-out” of 
investments among firms with riskier investments.41 
To test whether there can be too much disclosure, we examine whether mandatory 
disclosure of firm risk negatively impacted firm innovation. Mandatory risk disclosure has been 
shown to have real impacts on metrics of firm risk and firm value42. We focus our tests on a 
particular form of investment—innovation. Innovation fits the criteria for the theoretical models 
above quite well: First, the risks of innovation are easily identified, but the benefits of innovation 
are not easily reported as they are either uncertain or would reveal competitive secrets (Kanodia 
et al. 2005). Second, innovation is generally riskier, the exact types of projects that will be 
crowded out by increased disclosure (Zhang 2013). Consequently, the usage of innovation 
                                                 
40 See Benston 1973; Healy and Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 2001; Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006; 
and Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2007 
41 Kanodia, Singh, and Spero (2005) and Zhang (2013), respectively. 
42 See Kravet and Mulsu 2013; Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele 2014 
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enables the examination of these theories amongst firms most sensitive to increased mandatory 
disclosure.  
To answer whether mandatory risk disclosure impacted firm innovation, we ask two main 
questions: First, what is the relationship between risk disclosure and corporate innovation in 
general? Second, do the enhanced mandatory risk disclosure rules hamper innovation? Finally, 
we examine potential channels for this risk disclosure and innovation relationship.  
To identify the amount of disclosed risks, we use the ratio of risk keywords scaled by the 
total number of words in the10-K filing to measure corporate risk disclosure. First, we download 
all the 10-K filings from Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) EDGAR database and 
then, based on the lexical fields from Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014), use text 
analysis to classify risk disclosure in 10-K filings into four main categories: aggregate risk 
(Avgrisk), systematic (Syst), idiosyncratic (Idio), and other (Othrisk), which is the average of all 
non-systematic and non-idiosyncratic risks. The Idio lexical field includes many innovation 
related words and is more likely to reflect the status quo of a firm’s innovation activities.43 We 
thus use it as a control variable to capture the firm’s propensity to report risk, while the other risk 
scores are used to identify the amount of total, systematic and other risk a firm is disclosing in its 
10-K filing. 
To answer the first question, we regress risk disclosure on future innovation and show 
that an increase in the aggregate, systematic, or other risk disclosure is negatively related with 
future research and development (R&D), number of patents filed, and the number of patent 
citations. A 1% increase in aggregate risk (Avgrisk) in a 10-K is associated with a 23.822% (t = -
3.43) decrease in R&D scaled by assets (RD) and a decline in the log number of patents (Fnpats) 
                                                 
43 Campbell et al (2014)’s dictionary for idiosyncratic risk includes words like “innovation,” “intangible,” and 
“intellectual.” Consequently, idiosyncratic risk is highly related to firm innovation by construction. 
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and truncation-adjusted citation-weighted number of patents (TCW) by 3.236% (t = -2.74) and -
4.218% (t = -3.00), respectively. The direction and magnitude are similar when looking at 
systematic or other disclosed risk as well.  
To answer the second question on the impact of mandatory risk disclosure on innovation, 
we exploit two exogenous regulatory changes that the SEC imposed in 2005 and 2008. Prior to 
2005, firms were not required to have a risk disclosure section; hence, firms disclosed their risks 
in an inconsistent way, with some firms having a separate section while other included them in 
other areas such as in the management discussion and analysis or notes. Starting in 2005, 
however, the SEC mandated that firms to include a risk disclosure section called the Item 1A. 
This meant that all firms were required to have a discussion of risks that was easily identifiable 
and comprehensive. Furthermore, a second exogenous regulatory change occurred in 2008, when 
the SEC exempted smaller reporting companies44 from having to include an Item 1A risk 
disclosure section in their 10-K filings. Thus, smaller reporting companies were no longer 
required to include an Item 1A section and thus their risks are less identifiable. 
On one hand, the inclusion of a comprehensive risk disclosure section should lead to a 
better information environment and reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders—allowing firms to more readily access the financial market for additional capital 
and boost investment in innovation (Li, Moshirian, Tian, and Zhang 2017). On the other hand, 
while risks are easy to disclose, the benefits of innovation are not easily disclosed as they are 
uncertain and may be competitively sensitive information (Kanodia et al. 2005). Moreover, the 
model presented in Zhang (2013) shows that though improved disclosure lowers cost of capital 
                                                 
44 A firm with a public float of $75 million or revenues less than $50 million. See the following SEC link for the 
formal definition https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/src-cdinterps.htm.  
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on average, firms with riskier projects are “crowded out” as investment capital is redirected to 
less risky firms.  
Our results support the latter models. By examining the 2005 exogenous shock, we find 
that the mandatory disclosure of risk in the 10-K filings is negatively associated with innovation. 
After 2005, the negative impact of risk disclosure on the R&D, filed patents, and patent citations 
almost doubles. Furthermore, we used the 2008 exogenous shock to set up a difference-in-
difference (DiD) test to examine the impact of removing the mandatory disclosure requirement. 
Treated firms, smaller reporting companies, defined as firms with <$50 million in sales45, 
showed an increase in innovation output after the risk disclosure requirement was removed for 
them in 2008. In contrast, untreated firms (non-smaller reporting companies) did not experience 
a rebound in innovation after 2008, and in fact experienced a further decline. Consequently, this 
negative relationship with risk disclosure and innovation is unlikely to be the result of an 
unobservable variable. 
Finally, we use a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to further identify the mandatory 
risk disclosure effect. In this test, we exploit the discontinuity for the risk disclosure exemption 
after 2008—firms with >=$50 million in revenues have to incorporate an Item 1A risk section 
while smaller firms do not. Thus, firms with slightly less than $50 million in revenues and those 
with slightly more than $50 million in revenues should be similar to one another. However, the 
discontinuity analysis shows that firms just above $50 million in revenue (where they had to 
include a risk disclosure section) experienced statistically lower levels of filed patents and 
citation-weighted value of patents than firms with just below $50 million in revenue (which were 
                                                 
45 Firms with less than $75 million public float are also defined as smaller reporting companies; however, public 
float data is not available for the sample. The results are similar if firms with market capitalization less than $75 
million are included as smaller reporting companies as well—public float is always less than market capitalization. 
 80 
 
exempt from the risk disclosure section requirement). This further supports that mandatory risk 
disclosure is negatively associated with innovation. 
Given the tension that improved disclosure may both improve and reduce innovation, we 
examine the two channels related to this potential improvement and reduction—information 
asymmetry and external financing constraints. Several papers show that the adoption of 
consistent accounting standards reduces information asymmetry as measured by analyst forecasts 
and investment.46 Nevertheless, our tests showed that information asymmetry was unrelated to 
the risk disclosure-innovation relationship. In addition, we examined the effect of external 
financing constraints47 on the risk disclosure-innovation relationship and found that the effect of 
risk disclosure was magnified among firms with financial constraints. Consequently, the 
mechanism appears to be that the market is unwilling to provide additional funds to these firms 
for fear of the risks these firms may face, similar to what the model in Zhang 2013 predicted. 
Two alternate hypotheses are that managerial investment sensitivity or managerial 
learning are the channel for the risk disclosure-innovation relationship—that is after disclosing 
risks, managers see that investors are depressing the firm’s stock price and then reduce 
innovation or learn from the market about what shareholders want48. In both cases there is no 
measurable relationship between investment sensitivity and managerial learning with risk 
disclosure-innovation.   
We ran a variety of robustness checks to ensure the results were valid. First, we include 
traditional firm risk metrics, like Beta and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL), as controls. If it is a 
firm’s risk environment that is causing the negative relationship between risk disclosure and 
                                                 
46 See  Byard, Li, Yu 2011; Defond, Hu, Hung, Li 2011; and Horton, Serafeim and Serafeim (2013) 
47 Both Brown, Fazzari, and Peterson 2009 and Brown, Martinsson, and Peterson 2012 show that external 
financing constraints can impact firms’ R&D expenditures. 
48 See Loureiro and Taboada (2015)  
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innovation, then traditional metrics, such as Beta and idiosyncratic volatility should absorb the 
effect. The results are robust to the inclusion of the traditional risk measures of Beta and 
idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL).  
Furthermore, our results are robust to the usage of a more strict textual analysis that only 
counts risk words if it fell under two different risk dictionaries (Kravet and Muslu 2013 and 
Campbell et al. 2014). Consequently, these results are not due to text analysis misidentifying risk 
words in the 10-K filings. Finally, the results were robust to many other tests as well including, 
alternative methods of dealing with missing R&D values, orthogonalizing the risk to variables 
known to be associated with risk disclosure in 10-K filings, capitalizing R&D, and using future 
innovation output. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we discuss prior 
research and develop our main hypotheses. Section 3 describes sample and research design. 
Section 4 reports empirical analyses on the effect of mandatory risk disclosure on firm 
innovation, with robustness tests in section 4.4. Finally, we conclude in section 5 with a brief 
summary of the results and implications for practitioners, regulators, and future researchers. 
 
4.2 Literature and Hypothesis Development 
Our study contributes to the ongoing debate on whether firms should disclose more 
information about themselves. A number of studies (Benston 1973; Healy and Palepu 2001; 
Verrecchia 2001; Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 2006; and Lambert, Leuz, and 
Verrecchia 2007) suggest that there is an improvement to firms and capital markets from 
increased disclosure. However, a variety of newer models all points to the effects of enhanced 
mandatory disclosure to have uneven effects depending on the firm’s situation [Kanodia et al. 
(2005); Gao (2010); Zhang (2013); and Dutta and Nezlobin (2017)]. This study adds to the 
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literature by helping show that the latter argument has credence—more mandatory disclosure can 
hurt firm outcomes.  
Interestingly, the evidence from Li et al. (2017) supports the former theoretical models on 
information disclosure—the paper finds that a shift to IFRS allows firms to overcome external-
financing constraints and improve managerial learning. However, our paper differs in it only 
focuses on mandatory risk disclosure rather than enhanced comparability from the switch to 
IFRS. Mandatory risk disclosure allows us to explore the specific aspects of the theoretical 
models noted above. In Kanodia et al. (2005), the model shows that imprecision in accounting is 
superior when the drawbacks are clearly seen, but the benefits difficult to explain—mandatory 
risk disclosure definitely means that drawbacks are included with no corresponding increase in 
benefit discussions. Gao (2010) and Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) show that enhanced disclosure 
increases the volatility of the firm, which benefits future investors; however, current investors 
suffer as the value of their investment declines with the increase in volatility—mandatory risk 
disclosure is definitely linked to increased firm volatility (Kravet and Muslu 2013; Campbell et 
al. 2014). Finally, Zhang (2013) notes that enhanced disclosure may crowd out more risky 
projects, such as innovation, as better information leads investors to less risky projects. 
This paper also extends the examination of real effects of risk disclosure on firms. For 
example, Kravet and Muslu (2013) find that risk disclosures are informative as market volatility 
and analyst activity increases when the disclosures are individualized to the firm (i.e. not 
boilerplate). Campbell et al. (2014) find that how risk disclosures affect firm risk and value. 
Emerging research examines risk disclosures over time and how these vary appropriately with 
firms’ new and old risks (Gaulin 2017), examines the specificity of risks in the risk disclosure 
and market reaction with more specificity (Hope, Hu, and Lu 2016), and looks at risk and 
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important corporate policies, such as leverage, investment and R&D (Avramov, Li, and Wang 
2017). Finally, Gu and Li (2003) examine under what circumstances innovation is voluntarily 
disclosed. Overall, our paper extends the research noted by Kanodia and Sapra (2016) on how 
disclosure can have real effects on firms. 
Our paper extends the previous studies by examining the impact of risk disclosure on one 
of the most important real corporate activities, innovation. Innovation is important to economic 
growth—helping society become wealthier as a whole—and innovation can help firms withstand 
competition and improve their firm performance.49  In particular, we are able to measure risk 
disclosure’s impact on corporate innovations from both the input (R&D expenditure levels) and 
output (how many patents are produced) perspectives. We further use regulatory changes in risk 
reporting requirements as exogenous shocks to identify the relationship between the two. 
This research also extends the research into innovation and market scrutiny. For example, 
He and Tian (2013) find that increased analyst coverage leads to reduced innovation and 
Bernstein (2015) showed that after going public, which exposes a formerly private firm to 
market scrutiny, innovation output drops. On the other side, reduced market attention can 
improve innovation output. For example, higher antitakeover provisions results in both more 
patents and more cited patents (Chemmanur and Tian 2016) and declassifying boards (removing 
staggered boards) resulted in declines in firm value, particularly among firms focused on 
research and innovation (Cremers and Sepe 2017). Our research complements this by examining 
the effect of increased scrutiny—in this case risk disclosure—on innovation. 
 
                                                 
49 See, for example, Solow (1957); Porter (1991); Grossman and Helpman (1993); Eberhart, Maxwell, 
Siddique (2004); Hirshleifer, Hsu, and Li (2013); and Hombert and Matray (2015). 
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4.3 Hypotheses 
To set a baseline for our regression tests, we must first establish the relationship between 
risk disclosure and innovation. Innovation is an irreversible investment that has very uncertain 
outcomes and the effects are typically only seen in the long-term (Holmstrom 1989). 
Consequently, there will be a large real option value to delaying innovation, particularly when 
faced with increased short-term risk—if a firm is faced with greater risk, it becomes more 
valuable to delay or cancel investment in innovation until the risk has lessened (Bernanke 1983; 
Pindyck 1990). Hence, if a manager perceives increase in risks in the future and truthfully 
disclose them, innovation will likely be one of the first items that a risk-averse manager will cut 
back. This leads to the first hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 1: Risk disclosure in 10-K filings is negatively associated with corporate 
innovation. 
On one hand, mandatory risk disclosure should lead to a better information environment 
and reduce information asymmetry between managers and shareholders—allowing firms to more 
readily access the financial market for additional capital and boost investment in innovation (Li 
et al. 2017). On the other hand, while risks are easy to disclose, the benefits of innovation are not 
easily disclosed as they are uncertain and may be competitively sensitive information (Kanodia 
et al. 2005; Kanodia and Sapra 2016). In addition, the model presented in Zhang (2013) shows 
that though improved disclosure lowers cost of capital on average, firms with riskier projects are 
“crowded out” as investment capital is redirected to less risky firms. Consequently, this leads to 
the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2: Mandating enhanced risk disclosure 10-K filings will further reduce innovation  
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The mechanism for reducing innovation will be through reduced opportunities for 
financing. Financial constraints have been shown to cause a reduction in investment (Holmstrom 
and Tirole 1997; Fazzari, Petersen, Blinder, and Poterba 1988; Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy 
2010). Furthermore, access to external equity and financing constraints have been shown to 
affect younger firms’ R&D levels (Brown, Fazzari, and Peterson 2009; Brown, Martinsson, and 
Peterson 2012). Consequently, risk disclosure will have the greatest effect on firms that are 
financially constrained and unable to continue to invest in R&D without outside resources.  
 
4.4 Data 
4.4.1 Risk Disclosure Scores 
We use a text-based analysis of firm 10-K documents to measure the risk contained in the 
filings. The risk disclosure score was calculated and collected in several stages. First, all 10-Ks 
filed from January 1995 through March 2013 were downloaded from the SEC's Electronic Data 
Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database. The risk disclosure sample includes data 
from financial years 1994 through to 2013; however, we only use the data from 1994 through to 
2010 to match the patent data period (see next section). 
The paper then follows Campbell et. al. (2014) to construct the sample:  
1) Exclude 10-Ks with less than 1,000 words, and late fillings such as NT 10-K, NT 10-KA, and 
NTN 10-K under Rule 12b25 of inability or timely file all or part of the 10-Ks.  
2) EDGAR identifies firms that file 10-Ks using Central Index Key (CIK). the Wharton 
Research Data Services (WRDS) CIK-PERMNO file was used to match CIK and filing dates 
from 10-Ks with PERMNO and filing dates from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged data. All 
firms for which there was no match for CIK to GVKEYs and the filing dates were excluded.  
3) Firms which had no data in COMPUSTAT were excluded. 
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Textual analysis was then performed on the 10-K documents. Specifically, the analysis 
uses the lexical field from the Campbell et al. (2014), which lists the words for different kinds of 
risk: idiosyncratic (Idio), systematic (Syst) and several other types of risk. Other risks identified 
in Campbell et al. (2014), such as financial, legal and regulatory, and tax, are also categorized 
and then averaged into a variable Othrisk. To summarize the risk disclosure scores, we calculate 
an aggregate risk score, Avgrisk, which is the mean of all risk disclosure scores50. The 
development of these different scores allows me to identify if the results are driven by only one 
type of risk. 
To ensure that the textual analysis results are valid, a manual check was done on the top 
10 most commonly found risk words listed in the major risk categories. In the manual check 10 
sentences that contained each top word were randomly drawn from the text and then checked 
manually (approximately 500 checks in total) to see if the software identified risk properly. In 
the manual sample, 84.4% of the manually checked instances correctly identified risk. In 
addition, a robustness test in section 4.4.4 uses an even stricter word dictionary wherein a 
sentence must contain words from both the Campbell et al. 2014 and the Kravet & Muslu 2013 
dictionaries to be included. 
While a comprehensive risk disclosure section was not required by the SEC until 2005, 
the text analysis software combed through the entire 10-K document to identify risk. This means 
the risk score is independent of how risk is packaged in the 10-K. Thus, the risk score will be 
similar regardless of whether the risks are spread out or concentrated in an easy to find risk 
disclosure section, which will prove useful in testing Hypothesis 2. 
The yearly risk disclosure score for each category of risk is calculated in three steps. 
First, for each 10-K, we compute the frequency of each of the risk words in the entire 10-K 
                                                 
50 The results are similar if idiosyncratic risk is excluded from aggregate risk. 
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document in the Campbell et al. lexical field for the relevant risk. The raw risk score is then 
calculated by summing the total of times a word/expression from the 10-K matches a 
word/expression from the lexical field. Next, we scale the raw risk scores by the number of 
words in the 10-K to account for variability in the length of 10-Ks and multiply by 100 to turn 
the values into percentages. If there are multiple 10-K documents for the same financial year (for 
example there is an addendum), we average the risk scores and weight them based on document 
length. 
While there is some concern that risks in the 10-Ks may be “boilerplate” and not 
representative of the firm’s actual risk, other research has found that risks in the 10-K filings 
have real effects on firms. Research has found that that risk content in the 10-Ks affects 
information asymmetry, abnormal returns, trading volume, and firm volatility (Campbell et al. 
2014; Kravet and Muslu 2013; Hope, Hu, & Lu 2016). Consequently, we can be confident that 
the risk in the filings has an effect on firms. 
 
4.5 Innovation Inputs and Outputs 
Innovation is measured by three distinct measures, including RD, Fnpats, and TCW. To 
measure the inputs firms put into innovation, we use R&D expenditures scaled by lagged total 
assets (RD) from Compustat. If R&D expenditures are missing, often because many firms have 
no R&D or do not report it, we set the value to 0. To measure the innovation output of firms, we 
use the patent database provided by Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru and Stoffman (2017). This 
database covers patents per year from 1990 to 2010, inclusive, includes Fnpats, the log of the 
number of patents filed +1, and TCW, the log of the truncated-adjusted and citation-weighted 
number of patents filed + 1, for each year and firm (identified by permno). This data is then 
integrated with the risk disclosure scores above as well as data from Compustat to create the 
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panel data file. Finally, firms that do not file any patents or do not report R&D expense over the 
entire sample period are excluded from the analysis. This ensures the sample is limited to only 
firms that can reasonably be expected to innovate. 
Fnpats is useful for measuring the total innovation output of a firm; however, it does not 
measure the importance of the innovation—the innovations could be ground-breaking or simply 
iterative. To incorporate the importance of the patents, we use TCW which weights the patents 
based on the number of citations it receives in the future—more citations indicating that a patent 
is more influential. In addition, the TCW value adjusts for the fact that patents published later in 
the sample period have fewer years to accumulate citations. 
 
4.6 Other data 
The majority of the remaining data was drawn from Compustat or CRSP. To be included 
in the sample, each firm-year needs non-negative total assets (AT) and common equity (CEQ).  
All risk disclosure, innovation, and Compustat variables, except indicator variables and Firmage, 
are winsorized at the 1%/99% level each year to reduce the impact of outliers. Furthermore, only 
data from financial year 1994 to 2010 is included as 1994 is the lower limit of the risk data and 
2010 is the upper limit of the patent data. 
In addition, CRSP was used to calculate Beta and idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). These 
values are only calculated for firms that have > 0 shares, are traded on the NASDAQ, AMEX, or 
NYSE, and that have common shares. Beta and IVOL are both calculated using daily data over 
each financial year of the firm. Beta is calculated by regressing excess company returns (return – 
risk free rate) against excess market returns. IVOL is the residual after regressing the excess 
company returns against the Fama-French 3 factors, Rm-Rf, SMB, and HML. We annualize 
IVOL by multiplying by the square root of the number of trading days. Finally, to ensure firms 
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have an adequate trading history in the financial year, we set Beta and IVOL to missing if there 
are fewer than 125 trading days over the firm’s financial year. 
Finally, institutional ownership (IO) was calculated using Thomson 13F Institutional 
Holdings database and LogAnalyst, the log of the number of analysts covering each firm, was 
calculated using Thomson’s IBES database.  
4.7 Summary Statistics 
Table 4.1 shows the summary statistics for approximately 7,100 unique firms over more 
than 44,000 firm-years. Risk scores are small at less than 1% of the words in the 10-K for 
Avgrisk and less than 2% for Idio and Syst. As can be seen, Syst and Idio are more than 4 times 
higher than Othrisk, showing that these two risk scores are higher than any of the other risk 
disclosure categories.  
Fnpats0 and TCW0, the two measures of patents prior to the log transformation, are 
highly skewed with 50% of the firm-years in the sample having 0 patents—this is even after 
limiting the sample to only firms that have at least 1 patent or 1 reported R&D expense over the 
sample period. Consequently, to address this right-skew, we use Fnpats, which is the natural log 
of (Fnpats0 + 1), and TCW, which is the natural log of (TCW0 + 1). 
Table 4.2 shows the correlation of the various risk and patent variables. As can be seen in 
columns 1 and 2, both Fnpats0 and TCW0 are negatively correlated with the Avgrisk and Othrisk 
risk measures at the 1% level. Syst is negatively related with RD at the 1% level and is also 
negatively related to patent measures on a directional basis. This gives some preliminary 
evidence that innovation output is affected by risk disclosure in firms.  
To test the hypotheses, we will use the aggregate of all risks disclosed (Avgrisk), 
systematic risk disclosed (Syst), and an average of all other non-idiosyncratic, non-systemic risk 
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disclosure scores (Othrisk). We use idiosyncratic risk disclosure (Idio) as a control in the 
regressions because idiosyncratic risk is highly correlated with innovation as the word dictionary 
for Idio contains many innovation related words This is evidenced in Table 4.2 where the 
correlation between RD and Idio is positive—higher R&D expenditures (as a percentage of 
assets) is related to higher idiosyncratic risk. Firms may choose to increase their idiosyncratic 
risk by engaging in a high-risk innovation strategy—for example, Target, which pursues a 
relatively low-risk retail strategy with little innovation, had an average idiosyncratic risk 
disclosure score of 0.01 and RD of 0.00 from 2002–2010 while, Amazon, which pursues an 
online retail strategy with much innovation, had an Idio score of 0.10 and RD of 0.12, over the 
same period (results untabulated). Given this endogenous relationship, we will use Idio as a 
control rather than as one of the independent variables of interest.  
A second reason to use Idio as a control is to account for varying propensities of 
managers to disclose risk. Some managers may be overly cautious and disclose a great deal of 
risk in their firms’ 10-Ks while others may be overly optimistic and disclose little risk in their 
firms’ 10-Ks. By including Idio as a control variable, we also introduce a way of controlling for 
this propensity to disclose or not disclose risk.  
Other controls include LogAT, BM, DA, Firmage, HHI, HHI2, LogAnalyst, IO, CAPXA, 
Tang, ROA, and Length which are all related to RD, Fnpats, or TCW or are key firm 
characteristics. 
 
4.8 Research Design and Results 
In the baseline analysis, we ran the following panel regressions to examine the impact of 
risk on future innovation output. The first regression above will show the impact of risk on R&D 
scaled by assets, the major input into firm innovation. The second regression will show how risk 
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affects the number of patents filed in the following year after controlling for most of the major 
inputs into innovation. Finally, the third regression will examine how risk affects the quality of 
patents: 
RDit = α + β {Risk}it-1+ γ RDit-1 + δ Xit + ϕ Year FE+ ϖ Ind FE + ε  (1) 
Fnpatsit = α + β {Risk}it-1 + γ RDit + δ Xit + ϕ Year FE+ ϖ Ind FE + ε  (2) 
TCWit = α + β {Risk}it-1 + γ RDit + δ Xit + ϕ Year FE+ ϖ Ind FE + ε  (3) 
RD is R&D expenditures scaled by lagged total assets, Fnpats is the log of the number of 
patents filed and TCW is the log of the truncation-adjusted and citation-weighted number of 
patents for firm i at time t. {Risk}it-1 is a text based metric of risk, either Avgrisk, Syst, or Othrisk 
for firm i at time t-1. RDt-1 is used as a control in regression 1 and RDt is used as a control in 
regressions 2 and 3. Xit is a vector of control variables including Idioit-1, BMt-1, LogATt-1, DAt-1, 
Firmage, Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHIt), HHI2t, logAnalystt, IOt, CAPXAt, TANGt, ROAt, 
and LogLengtht. The lagged value of {Risk} and some control variables is used to reduce 
endogeneity by examining the relationship of future innovation against the previous year’s 
independent and control variables. ϕ and ϖ control for year and FF49 industry fixed effects, 
respectively. 
Idio is used as a control as it is endogenous with innovation and also controls for the 
firm’s amount of risk disclosure. BM, LogAT, DA, Firmage, TANG, and ROA control for major 
firm characteristics while HHI and HHI2 control for the effects of industry concentration. As 
firm innovation is known to be related to market scrutiny, LogAnalyst and IO are used as 
controls for this effect. Finally, firms that create difficult to read 10-K filings may have different 
methods of disclosing risk. Consequently, we include LogLength to control for the readability of 
the document as longer documents are more difficult for investors to understand (Li 2008)—the 
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results are similar if an alternative measure of readability, log of the 10-K file size (Loughran 
and McDonald 2014), is used instead. 
 
4.8.1 Hypothesis 1 Results 
Table 4.3 shows the baseline results for the relationship between risk disclosed in 10-K 
filings and innovation inputs and outputs. For innovation inputs, RD declines when the firm is 
exposed to higher aggregate total risk, systematic risk, or other risk; an increase in Avgrisk (col 
1), Syst (col 4) and Othrisk (col 7) are all associated with lower RD. This table also shows that 
aggregate, systematic, and other risk all affect innovation and not just 1 specific type of risk. The 
results are similar for innovation output, the number of patents filed, Fnpats, and truncated 
adjusted citation-weighted patent counts, TCW, even after controlling for the lower level of 
research and development that year. As shown in Table 4.3, the results show that innovation 
output falls if Avgrisk, Syst and Othrisk increase (col 2-3, 5-6, 8-9) even after controlling for the 
decline in R&D spending. These results illustrate that when faced with increased risk, firms have 
reduced innovation inputs and outputs. 
 
4.8.2 Hypothesis 2 Results 
Though Li et al (2017) and Kanodia et al. (2005) provide opposing views of what will 
happen after mandatory risk disclosure is imposed. The former shows that innovation improves 
after there is a mandatory shift to consistent IFRS standards, while the latter notes that mandating 
disclosure may actually decrease investment in difficult to explain projects, like innovation. To 
resolve this tension, we will exploit two natural experiments on how risk is included in 10-K 
filings. The first experiment involves the 2005 SEC requirement for a comprehensive Item 1A 
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risk disclosure section and the second involves the 2008 SEC elimination of this requirement for 
smaller reporting companies.51 
In the first exogenous shock, the SEC required firms to include a comprehensive Item 1A 
risk disclosure section in their 10-K filings starting in 2005—consequently, firm risk disclosure 
became mandatory in 2005 and afterwards.52 Thus, by examining the impact of risk disclosure 
before 2005 and after 2005, we will be able to see if mandatory risk disclosure benefits or hurts 
firm innovation. The regressions are run as in equations (1) to (3) except an interaction term of 
{Risk}it-1*Post2005 is included in each regression. This variable is an interaction of the risk 
disclosure variable and Post2005, an indicator variable set to 1 if the financial year is greater 
than 2005 and 0 otherwise53. The risk scores are measured in year t-1 so it will take 1 year after 
the implementation of the new rule change before the risk scores measure the new format. Note 
that the year fixed effects, ϕ, automatically obviate the need for a standalone Post2005 variable, 
as ϕ is a linear combination of Post2005.54 
As can be seen in Table 4.4, the results for the coefficient, β, for the risk without 
interaction are very similar to Table 4.3. For all the columns, the size, direction, and significance 
for β are nearly identical to one another—they are all significantly negative at the 1% level.  
On the other hand, the coefficient for the interaction of the {Risk}* Post2005 variable 
illustrates the effect of mandatory risk disclosure reporting has on innovation. Li et al. (2017) 
point to improved innovation after 2005 while Kanodia et al. (2005), Gao (2010), Zhang (2013) 
and Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) all point to a reduction in innovation after 2005. Furthermore, a 
                                                 
51 https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2008/01/04/E7-24965/smaller-reporting-company-regulatory-relief-
and-simplification 
52 In a hand check of 30 firms, none of the firms had an Item 1A before 2005. Some pre-2005 filings had a section 
on future risk but these were not as comprehensive as the Item 1A sections. 
53 The results are similar if post2005 is defined as >=2005 rather than >2005. 
54 The results are similar if a post2005 indicator variable is used instead of year fixed effects. 
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variety of research has shown that innovation is negatively impacted by increased exposure to 
market scrutiny (He and Tian 2013; Bernstein 2015; Chemmanur and Tian 2016). Given this, a 
comprehensive risk disclosure section would have a negative impact on innovation.  
This negative association between risk salience and innovation is borne out in the results. 
After 2005, increased Avgrisk, Syst, and Othrisk lead to even larger declines in Fnpats and TCW 
(Col 2-3, 5-6, 8-9) than prior to 2005. The coefficient for Avgrisk and Avgrisk *Post2005 is -
2.527 (t = -2.15) and -2.679 (t = -3.68), respectively, for Fnpats and -3.458 (t = -2.43) and -2.879 
(t = -3.29) for TCW. This shows that not only is aggregate risk negatively associated with filed 
patents and patent-citations, but that the implementation of the new risk disclosure section after 
2005 makes the negative relationship between risk and patents even larger. This effect is also 
similarly found when using Syst and Othrisk.  
Research development seems to be curtailed as well. The coefficients for 
Avgrisk*Post2005, Syst* Post2005, and Othrisk* Post2005 were both negative and significant at 
-17.041 (t = -1.97), -4.141 (t = -1.85) and -40.024 (t = -2.12), respectively, showing that, post-
risk disclosure requirement, firms reduce R&D even further when risk rises.  
Finally, it is unlikely that these results were driven by an increase in risk in 2005 or 
afterwards. The summary statistics in Table 4.1 panel B shows that the mean aggregate, 
systematic, and other risk scores actually decline in 2005 and remain below 2004 levels until the 
end of the sample period. 
These results support the theoretical models for Kanodia (2005) and Zhang (2013) that 
enhanced disclosure can negatively impact some forms of firm investment, such as innovation. 
Differences-in-Differences 
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While Table 4.4 helped identify that mandatory risk disclosure is associated with a drop 
in innovation output, there could be unobservable variables driving the results in 2005. Luckily, 
another exogenous regulatory shock occurred in 2008 that enables a further identification of this 
effect. In 2008, the SEC exempted smaller reporting companies from having to include an Item 
1A risk disclosure section in their 10-K filings. This second exogenous shock shows the impact 
of a removal of the disclosure in 2008 for smaller reporting companies, but no change in the 
requirements for all other firms. This shock provides a natural experiment where one class of 
firms (smaller reporting companies) does not have to report a risk disclosure section while other 
firms are unchanged. This provides a nice opportunity to analyze the results as a DiD regression-
-SM is equivalent to a “Treatment” indicator variable and Post2008 is equivalent to an “After” 
indicator variable.  
The variables in the regressions are similar to equations (1) to (3); however, four new 
interaction variables, {Risk}it-1*Post2008, {Risk}it-1*SM, {Risk}it-1* Post2008*SM, and 
Post2008*SM are included. The first variable is an interaction of the risk disclosure variable and 
Post2008, an indicator variable set to 1 if the year is greater than 2008 and 0 otherwise55. 
{Risk}it-1*SM and {Risk}it-1* Post2008*SM are interactions of SM and the other variables. SM is 
an indicator variable set to 1 if a firm is a smaller reporting company and 0 otherwise. 
Post2008*SM is an interaction between Post2008and SM. As before, the year fixed effects, ϕ, 
automatically obviate the need for a standalone Post2008 variable as ϕ is a linear combination of 
Post2008. 
Table 4.5 shows that for all the risks, mandatory risk disclosure results in less innovation 
as evidenced by the coefficient of {Risk}it-1, with similar directions for systematic and other risk; 
                                                 
55 The results are similar if Post2008 is >=2008 rather than >2008. 
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however, this is the baseline effect of risk on innovation and each additional interaction builds 
upon or reduces this effect.  
To understand the effect of treatment, we examine the interaction coefficient for {Risk}it-
1* Post2008*SM (equivalent to treatment*after). This interaction coefficient is significantly 
positive for Fnpats and TCW for nearly all types of risk—smaller reporting companies produce 
more and better patents after the requirement for a distinct risk disclosure section is lifted. This 
provides further evidence the risk disclosure is affecting innovation—these smaller reporting 
companies are not making forced to disclose risks in their 10-Ks after 2008 and, hence there is 
less pressure to reduce innovation. Interestingly, there is no significant effect on the amount of 
R&D in this case, so mandatory disclosure doesn’t seem to reduce the investment in R&D, but 
simply the amount of innovation outputted by the firm. 
The increase in innovation output is simply not the result of an unobservable effect. 
Untreated firms (regular companies) after 2008 ({Risk}it-1* Post2008) experienced a decline in 
innovation output, which is the opposite effect of what smaller reporting companies experienced. 
Furthermore, it is not due to a different impact of risk on smaller firms.  The interaction of 
{Risk}it-1*SM shows a negative effect for Fnpats and TCW before 2008. That is smaller firms 
exposed to risk should experience lower innovation than regular firms—the exact opposite effect 
of the {Risk}it-1* Post2008*SM variable. When combined with the results from Tables 4, the 
results support that it is the mandatory disclosure of risk that contributes to the decline in 
innovation output. 
Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) 
The SEC’s removal of the risk disclosure requirement for smaller reporting companies 
provides an opportunity for a regression discontinuity design (RDD) similar to Chava & Roberts 
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2008 and Iliev 2010 to test Hypothesis 2. Smaller reporting companies, proxied by firms with 
<$50 million in revenue, are exempt from including a risk disclosure section. Firms just above 
and below $50 million in revenues will be remarkably similar to one another; however, once the 
$50 million revenue threshold is exceeded, the firm must include a risk-disclosure section. 
Consequently, the only major difference between these firms will be whether a risk disclosure 
section was mandated by the SEC.  
The regressions set up for this RDD are noted below.  
RDit = α + β1 {Risk}it-1+ β2 {Risk}it-1 * SMit + ρ SMit + γ RDit-1 + δ Xit-1  
+ ϕ Year FE+ ϖ Ind FE + ε  (4) 
Fnpatsit = α + β1 {Risk}it-1+ β2 {Risk}it-1 * SMit + ρ SMit + γ RDit + δ Xit-1  
+ ϕ Year FE+ ϖ Ind FE + ε  (5) 
TCWit = α + β1 {Risk}it-1+ β2 {Risk}it-1 * SMit + ρ SMit + γ RDit + δ Xit-1  
+ ϕ Year FE+ ϖ Ind FE + ε  (6) 
As noted in the regression equations 4-6 above, the regressions are similar to Table 4.5 
except that the sample is limited to only firms that are near the discontinuity ($15.0 – $85.0 
million in sales56) to ensure that the results are focused on the discontinuity and not other trends 
in the whole sample. Furthermore, as this smaller reporting company exemption is only available 
after 2008 and patent data is only available until 2010, the sample is limited to only firm-years in 
2008, 2009, or 2010. Consequently, no interaction with Post2008 is needed in the regression.  
Table 4.6 shows further evidence that how risk is disclosed affects firm innovation. First, 
firms that are exempted from including a risk disclosure section in their 10-K filings ({Risk}*SM 
interaction) experience greater innovation in terms of both number of patents filed and citation-
weighted value of those patents regardless if they are facing higher aggregate, systematic, and 
                                                 
56 The results are robust to firms with sales between $17.5 – $82.5 million and $12.5 – $87.5 million. 
 98 
 
other risk (columns 2-3, 5-6, and 8-9)—this is particularly impressive as the RDD sample size is 
less than 4.5% of the full sample. Second, it is not a simple size effect as SM is statistically 
indistinguishable from 0 in all the regressions. Thus, it is not that small firms are inherently more 
or less productive in research. Interestingly, the interaction between risk and SM shows that 
R&D scaled by assets is lower among exempt firms in columns 1 and 7. However, this makes the 
results from columns 2-3 and 8-9 even more impressive as lower R&D should result in fewer 
filed patents and citation-weighted value of patents, showing that the effect of disclosure can 
even overcome the effect of lower R&D. 
The RDD provides further evidence that inclusion of mandatory risk disclosure has a 
negative impact on firm innovation. 
 
4.8.3 Channel 
To identify the channel that is causing this decline in innovation, we run the baseline 
regressions (2) to (3) with one modification. In addition to the standard variables, we include an 
interaction of risk disclosure and various proxies for financial constraint, {Risk}*{Financial 
Constraint}. These financial constraints include ATLo, an indicator variable set to 1 if a firm is in 
the bottom tercile of total assets—size has been shown to be related to external financing 
constraints (Hadlock and Pierce 2010) —and WWHi, an indicator variable set to 1 if a firm is in 
the top tercile of Whited-Wu scores (Whited and Wu 2006). Furthermore, Recession, an 
indicator variable set to 1 if the US economy is in recession as defined by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER), is also included as firms are less likely to tap equity and debt 
markets during recessions, placing an external financial constraint on firms (Covas and Haan 
2012; Aghion et al. 2012; Dawling & Haan 2011) and consequently reducing innovation. Finally, 
as total assets are used to calculate the WW index and ATLo, the variables, by construction, will 
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be related to RD, which is R&D scaled by assets. Consequently, we do not run the regressions 
with RD. 
Table 4.7 shows the results of the financial constraint interactions. Panel A shows that the 
interaction of WWHi with aggregate and systematic risk is negative. For all three types of risk, 
aggregate, systemic, and other risk, the coefficient on the interaction term between WWHi and 
our proxy for risk disclosure is negative and typically significant. That is financially constrained 
firms are associated with even less innovation when reporting higher risk.  
Panels B and C also support the Whited-Wu index results. Panel B shows the interaction 
of firm size and risk. Smaller firms (ATLo) exposed to levels of aggregate risk experience even 
greater declines in innovation than other firms. Panel C shows that during recessions, the 
negative impact of all forms of reported risks on innovation are even more pronounced than in 
normal economic periods. Table 4.7 thus suggests that financial constraint is a possible channel 
for risk disclosure to negatively affect future innovation activities.  
The results are not due to risk disclosure reducing information asymmetry. We use the 
average bid-ask spread over the firm’s past year as a proxy for information asymmetry and then 
interact the results with an indicator variable, SpreadHi, that equals 1 if the firm is above median 
bid-ask spread. Panel A of Table 4.8 shows firms with high information asymmetry seem to 
experience a decline in R&D—a reduction in information asymmetry should help firms to raise 
capital and fund innovative projects, not reduce innovation. Furthermore, these high asymmetry 
firms do not seem to suffer a significantly different decline in Fnpats or TCW than low 
asymmetry firms. Consequently, information asymmetry does not seem to be the channel for the 
relationship between innovation and risk disclosure. 
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To show that the results are not due to price-investment sensitivity, we ran a two stage 
analysis. First we regressed capital expenditures scaled by assets (CAPXA)57 against Q, inverse 
total assets, and cash flow. We then used the coefficient for Q as a proxy for the firm’s 
investment sensitivity and divided firms into above median and below median sensitivity 
(Q_CAPXAHi). This variable was then interacted with risk to identify if firms with higher 
investment sensitivity reacted differently to risk disclosure. As shown in Panel B of Table 4.8, 
the results show that investment sensitivity has no statistically measurable effect on the 
relationship between risk and innovation and increased risk continues to be associated with 
decreased innovation. Consequently, we can rule out investment sensitive firms being the cause 
of this change in innovation. 
Furthermore, a similar test was run to test the effect of managerial learning. In 
untabulated results, we estimated managerial learning and then interacted it with the risk 
disclosure scores and found no effect. It does not appear that the results are driven by 
information asymmetry, investment sensitivity, or managerial learning. 
 
4.8.4 Robustness 
Beta and Idiosyncratic Volatility 
One counterargument to the hypotheses is that firm managers or investors are reacting to 
traditional risk metrics rather than the risk in the filings. Thus, it is a possibility that firm 
managers are actually adjusting their innovation output due to increased exposure to systemic 
risk (as proxied by Beta) and idiosyncratic risk (as proxied by idiosyncratic volatility {IVOL}) as 
opposed to the text-based risk measures. 
                                                 
57 R&D expenditures were excluded as including them would create a mechanical relationship between investment 
sensitivity and RD.  
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There are two main reasons Beta and IVOL differ slightly from the text-based risk 
measures.  First, both Beta and IVOL are backward looking measures of risk, while the text-
based risks captures managers forward looking views of risks. Thus, the risk in 10-Ks captures 
risks that the insiders may be aware of, but the market does not (Myers and Majluf 1984). 
Second, both Beta and IVOL are clearly apparent to the market as any investor can calculate 
them. In contrast, the risk in the 10-Ks is not always apparent to the market. Prior to 2005, there 
was no mandatory risk disclosure section requirement so the risks were not included or were 
hidden within the 10-K. On the other hand, Beta and IVOL are easily visible to the firm’s 
managers and investors so any effect of risk will remain constant over the sample period. 
Regardless of these differences, we test whether traditional risk measures actually 
influence innovation in several regressions. In addition to the variables in the baseline regression, 
Beta and IVOL, are used as additional controls to allow for a “horse-race” between the text-based 
risk measures and the traditional risk measures.  
We first look at the control variables, IVOL and Beta. Similar to past research on 
volatility (Mazzucato and Tancioni 2012), IVOL shows a negative relationship with RD and a 
positive relationship with patent output in Table 4.9. Furthermore, though Beta has a positive 
relationship with RD, it has no statistical relationship with patent output. These results are in 
contrast to the results in Tables 4.3 to 4.5 wherein higher risk disclosure is associated with 
decreased patent output. Consequently, it is unlikely that the text based risk measures are picking 
up the same effects as IVOL or Beta. 
Furthermore, even after including Beta and IVOL, the coefficients and significance for 
Avgrisk, Syst, and Othrisk are similar to what was seen in Table 4.4. For example, the disclosed 
risks and post2005 interaction are negatively associated with Fnpats, TCW, and RD, which is 
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similar to Table 4.4. Thus, these risk disclosure variables continue to be negatively associated 
with innovation inputs and outputs. We can conclude that the text-based risk measures provide 
additional information that is not contained within Beta and IVOL. 
Text Analysis Robustness 
To ensure that the software is correctly identifying risk in the text, we performed two 
robustness checks on the data. First, we did a manual check of 10 sentences each for the 50 top 
risk words identified in the sample and found that 84.4% of the time the software correctly 
identified risk. In addition to this manual check, we ran a more strict textual analysis that only 
counted a risk word if it was in the Campbell et al. 2014 dictionary and the sentence contained an 
uncertainty related word from Kravet and Muslu 2013, such as “can/cannot,” “could,” “may,” 
“might,” “risk,” “uncertain,” etc. Consequently, this more strict definition decreases Type II 
error of the textual analysis (fewer non-risk words categorized as risk) while increasing Type I 
error (failing to categorize words that are truly risk related). 
Table 4.10 replicates the results from Table 4.4 except it uses the more strict definition of 
risk words noted above. As can be seen, the results for aggregate risk disclosure (Avgrisk), 
systematic risk (Syst) and other risk (Othrisk) remain somewhat similar to Table 4.4 showing that 
even with more strict textual analysis the results remain similar to before. While some of the 
results have lost significance, this is almost certainly due to the increased Type I error wherein 
true risk words are not categorized as risk. 
Orthogonalized Risk Disclosure 
Campbell et al. (2014) note a variety of factors that are associated with increased risk 
disclosure in 10-K filings. To ensure that the results are not driven by one of these variables, we 
run a 2-stage regression analysis where we first regress the risk factors (Avgrisk, Syst, and 
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Othrisk) against these factors and then use the residuals from the 1st regression to predict 
innovation rates in the 2nd regression. This will orthogonalize the risk results to the risk factors 
described in Campbell et al. and ensure only the unexplained portion of the risk disclosure is 
used to explain innovation inputs and outputs. 
As can be seen in Table 4.11 panel A, most of the variables noted in Campbell et al. 
(2014) are significantly associated with the aggregate, systematic, or other risk scores. 
Nevertheless, even after the residuals are used in Panel B, the negative association between risk 
and innovation largely remains—Fnpats and TCW are negatively associated with risk in nearly 
all the specifications. This shows that it is not the determinants of risk noted by Campbell et al. 
(2014) and that the results are not driven by one of those unobserved variables. 
Capitalized R&D and Future Patents 
One concern is that innovation is a multi-period projects and that one year of disclosure 
of risk will not greatly impact a firm’s innovation strategy. Consequently, this paper examines 
two alternative specifications to address these concerns.  
In the first test, R&D is capitalized (RDC) according to Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique 
(2004) where the R&D from the past 5 years (t-4 to t) is totaled with a constant depreciation rate. 
The RDC variable is then used in lieu of the standard control of RD in the main regressions.58 As 
can be seen in Table 4.12 panel A, even with the inclusion of the RDC variable the results are 
similar to Table 4.4, though with less significance due to a smaller sample size. Furthermore, in 
untabulated tests, the results with RDC are qualitatively similar for Tables 4.3 and 4.5 even with 
a slightly smaller sample size. 
In the second test, the total number of patents from period t to t+2 are summed together to 
detect the effect of risk disclosure on innovation in the next few years. Fnpats_3 and TCW_3 
                                                 
58 Note that RDt was excluded as a dependent as RDC incorporates RD from year t. 
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sum together the number of patents filed and citation-weighted value of those patents from years 
t to t+259. Table 4.12 panel B shows that the results for these longer term dependents is similar to 
what was seen in Table 4.4—the increase in risk disclosure is associated with a corresponding 
decrease in future innovation over a longer term period. In untabulated results, the usage of 
Fnpats_3 and TCW_3 are similar to those in Tables 3 and 5, showing that the main results are 
robust to the usage of longer time periods for both patents and R&D capitalization. 
Missing R&D 
Another potential concern is that firms missing R&D values are not similar to firms with 
0 R&D as firms may make a conscious choice not to report R&D in their 10-K filings (Koh & 
Reeb 2015). To control for this possibility, we included two modifications to the regressions run 
in Table 4.3. First, an indicator variable RDMiss is included as a control—RDMiss is set to 1 if a 
firm is missing R&D data and 0 otherwise. Secondly, if research and development is missing, 
rather than being set to 0, RD is set to the industry average RD (using 2-digit SIC codes).  
In untabulated tests, the effect of aggregate, systematic, and other risk were all similar to 
the results in Table 4.3. Consequently, the results are not being driven by a difference between 
missing R&D and 0 R&D reporting firms. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
In conclusion, these results show that mandating disclosure of risk in regulatory filings is 
associated with lower innovation. Furthermore, by using the natural experiment from SEC 
regulatory changes in 2005 and 2008, we are able to identify the effect of this mandate on 
innovation. In addition, these results seem to be exacerbated in firms facing financial constraints 
                                                 
59 This time period was chosen so that there would be at least 1 year of data following the 2008 exemption of 
smaller reporting companies from the item 1a requirement. 
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as these firms are associated with even larger reductions in innovation than firms without those 
constraints. 
These findings extend the research on information disclosure. First, mandating increased 
disclosure may not have uniformly positive effects for firms and investors. Increased risk 
disclosure reduces firm innovation as managers may not be able to disclose benefits of 
innovation adequately and may result in riskier projects, such as innovation, getting “crowded 
out” as investment is redirected to less risky projects. 
This research also provides further evidence that firms with less market scrutiny are 
better able to innovate. Being public, increased analyst coverage, and more democratic corporate 
governance are all associated with less innovation and our paper adds to this literature by 
showing that mandatory risk disclosures are associated with lower innovation rates. Thus, 
enhanced disclosure rules may not be uniformly good for all classes of firms. 
This research will be also useful for regulators, such as the SEC. In the past, regulators 
have focused on reducing information asymmetry as much as possible by increasing disclosure. 
However, this new research shows that increased disclosure may affect firm performance of 
some firms. Consequently, regulators may want to weigh future disclosure changes against 
possible negative side-effects. 
 
 
 
  
 106 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Total Sample Statistics 
Variable n MEAN STD MIN p25 median p75 MAX 
RD  44,048  11.5 22.0 0.0 0.0 3.9 13.5 286.4 
Fnpats0  44,182  11.0 90.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 5052.0 
TCW0  44,182  26.2 218.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8 10161.7 
Avgrisk  44,182  0.027 0.030 0.000 0.007 0.018 0.035 0.304 
Syst  44,182  0.050 0.071 -0.004 0.004 0.026 0.068 1.144 
Othrisk  44,182  0.012 0.013 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.017 0.133 
Idio  44,182  0.078 0.109 0.000 0.013 0.044 0.092 1.358 
AT  44,136  3371.6 14170.5 0.3 47.8 190.0 1022.4 203318.2 
LogAT  44,136  5.5 2.2 -0.6 3.9 5.2 6.9 12.2 
BM  44,035  0.5 1.0 -34.9 0.2 0.4 0.7 7.1 
DA  43,964  18.7 22.7 0.0 0.4 12.6 29.4 318.4 
Firmage  44,182  18.2 14.9 0.0 7.0 13.0 25.0 63.0 
HHI  44,182  0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.7 
HHI2  44,182  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 
LogAnalyst  44,182  1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 1.1 1.9 3.5 
IO  44,095  38.9 33.5 0.0 2.5 35.2 69.5 100.0 
CAPXA  43,505  6.1 9.3 0.0 1.7 3.6 7.0 178.3 
Tang  43,965  23.3 22.8 0.0 7.4 16.5 31.8 247.4 
ROA  44,019  -11.1 58.2 -1290.0 -11.3 2.7 8.5 72.7 
Beta  42,602  0.9 0.6 -1.3 0.4 0.9 1.3 3.5 
IVOL  42,602  60.3 37.6 10.1 32.9 51.1 77.5 257.8 
LogLength  44,182  9.7 0.8 6.9 9.2 9.8 10.2 13.0 
Unique Firms 7,166        
 
Panel B: Mean Sample Statistics by Year 
Fyear n RD Fnpats0 Tcw0 Avgrisk Syst Othrisk Idio 
1994 533 5.717 17.989 40.861 0.008 0.017 0.004 0.018 
1995 1818 7.870 9.985 23.829 0.009 0.017 0.005 0.026 
1996 3118 15.591 7.055 17.290 0.017 0.026 0.008 0.054 
1997 3157 12.630 7.126 17.453 0.022 0.034 0.009 0.071 
1998 3066 11.555 9.090 22.217 0.031 0.052 0.011 0.107 
1999 3028 15.998 9.773 23.917 0.031 0.060 0.011 0.103 
2000 3016 16.800 10.219 25.030 0.034 0.072 0.012 0.104 
2001 2848 9.424 11.752 28.967 0.035 0.068 0.013 0.111 
2002 2614 9.203 12.967 31.651 0.035 0.064 0.014 0.111 
2003 2412 9.757 14.427 35.022 0.038 0.072 0.015 0.116 
2004 2373 10.616 13.521 32.342 0.038 0.066 0.017 0.117 
2005 2369 9.951 14.191 32.821 0.024 0.044 0.011 0.068 
2006 2323 11.271 17.143 39.185 0.020 0.037 0.011 0.052 
2007 2291 11.723 14.326 33.231 0.021 0.038 0.012 0.051 
2008 2089 9.807 16.380 37.053 0.024 0.056 0.012 0.054 
2009 2031 9.139 17.721 39.413 0.024 0.054 0.013 0.054 
2010 1997 10.037 18.731 41.620 0.024 0.048 0.013 0.055 
This table reports the summary statistics of the sample. The variables are defined in Appendix 
C.1 All variables are winsorized at the 1%/99% level each financial year except for Firmage. The 
sample period is from 1994 to 2010 and only includes firms that have both patent and risk data. 
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Table 4.2 Risk Disclosure and Innovation Correlations 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Variable Fnpats0 TCW0 RD Avgrisk Syst Othrisk Idio 
Fnpats0 1       
TCW0 0.983 1      
RD -0.015 -0.012 1     
Avgrisk -0.017 -0.013 0.028 1    
Syst  -0.008 -0.008 -0.080 0.792 1   
Othrisk  -0.016 -0.015 0.002 0.867 0.584 1  
Idio  -0.017 -0.012 0.106 0.911 0.543 0.703 1 
This table reports the correlations of the main variables in the sample. All variables are winsorized at the 1%/99% 
level each year except Firmage. Variables are defined in Appendix C.1 Avgrisk, Idio, Syst, and Othrisk are from 
year t-1. Bold indicates significant at 5% level. 
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Table 4.3 Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -23.822*** -3.236*** -4.218***       
(-3.43) (-2.74) (-3.00)       
Syst    -5.060*** -0.527* -0.652**    
   (-3.62) (-1.95) (-2.03)    
Othrisk       -16.758* -3.423*** -4.723*** 
      (-1.75) (-3.03) (-3.35) 
Idio 12.479*** 1.012*** 1.467*** 8.133*** 0.362** 0.607*** 7.774*** 0.476*** 0.792*** 
(5.46) (2.93) (3.43) (6.11) (2.24) (2.91) (5.82) (2.82) (3.55) 
RDt/RDt-1 0.001 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.001 0.010*** 0.014*** 0.001 0.010*** 0.014*** 
(1.10) (8.75) (8.99) (1.10) (8.77) (9.01) (1.10) (8.77) (9.01) 
BM -0.355 -0.057*** -0.076*** -0.354 -0.057*** -0.076*** -0.360 -0.058*** -0.077*** 
(-1.47) (-2.65) (-2.65) (-1.47) (-2.66) (-2.66) (-1.49) (-2.68) (-2.68) 
LogAT -1.205*** 0.283*** 0.339*** -1.207*** 0.282*** 0.338*** -1.213*** 0.282*** 0.338*** 
(-7.79) (11.95) (12.02) (-7.79) (11.87) (11.92) (-7.82) (11.98) (12.04) 
Firmage -0.008 0.008*** 0.007*** -0.008 0.008*** 0.007*** -0.008 0.008*** 0.007*** 
(-0.83) (4.18) (3.20) (-0.83) (4.16) (3.18) (-0.87) (4.15) (3.17) 
DA -0.030*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.030*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.030*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
(-2.92) (-3.25) (-3.61) (-2.93) (-3.31) (-3.68) (-2.95) (-3.28) (-3.64) 
HHI 7.406 -0.297 -0.309 7.498 -0.301 -0.317 7.146 -0.333 -0.355 
(1.44) (-0.45) (-0.37) (1.46) (-0.46) (-0.38) (1.39) (-0.50) (-0.43) 
HHI2 -15.456** 0.637 0.678 -15.589** 0.642 0.689 -15.097* 0.688 0.743 
(-1.99) (0.62) (0.53) (-2.00) (0.63) (0.54) (-1.95) (0.67) (0.58) 
LogAnalyst 1.866*** 0.155*** 0.205*** 1.877*** 0.156*** 0.207*** 1.871*** 0.154*** 0.204*** 
(8.81) (4.91) (5.30) (8.85) (4.97) (5.37) (8.84) (4.88) (5.26) 
IO -0.006 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.006 -0.004*** -0.004*** 
(-1.03) (-4.38) (-4.20) (-1.07) (-4.43) (-4.27) (-1.04) (-4.34) (-4.16) 
CAPXA 0.257*** 0.003* 0.007*** 0.258*** 0.004* 0.007*** 0.258*** 0.003* 0.007*** 
(8.48) (1.76) (2.81) (8.49) (1.81) (2.87) (8.48) (1.77) (2.83) 
TANG -0.066*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.066*** -0.003*** -0.005*** -0.067*** -0.003*** -0.005*** 
(-7.65) (-2.73) (-3.43) (-7.63) (-2.77) (-3.49) (-7.70) (-2.81) (-3.52) 
ROA -0.186*** 0.000 0.001 -0.186*** 0.000 0.001 -0.186*** 0.000 0.001 
(-12.95) (1.05) (1.24) (-12.93) (1.00) (1.19) (-12.97) (1.04) (1.23) 
LogLength 0.958*** 0.015 0.043 0.946*** 0.012 0.039 0.938*** 0.013 0.041 
(4.50) (0.57) (1.35) (4.46) (0.45) (1.21) (4.44) (0.51) (1.30) 
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Table 4.3  Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions (continued) 
 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 43127 39004 39004 43127 39004 39004 43127 39004 39004 
R2 0.5050 0.3535 0.3339 0.5050 0.3532 0.3334 0.5049 0.3533 0.3336 
This table reports multivariate regressions of innovation and risk. The dependents are RD, Fnpats, or TCW. When RD is the dependent, RDt-1 is used as 
an independent in the regression instead of RDt. HHI, HHI2, logAnalyst, IO, CAPXA, TANG, ROA, logLength are all at time t, all other independent 
variables are set at time t-1 unless otherwise specified. Variables are defined in Appendix C.1 Intercept removed for brevity. Standard errors are 
clustered by firm and year. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4.4 Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions, Interaction with 2005 Risk Disclosure 
Requirement 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -18.352** -2.527** -3.458**       
(-2.56) (-2.15) (-2.43)       
Avgrisk* Post2005 -17.041** -2.679*** -2.879***       
(-1.97) (-3.68) (-3.29)       
Syst    -3.903** -0.291 -0.425    
   (-2.30) (-1.02) (-1.24)    
Syst* Post2005    -4.141* -0.879*** -0.855***    
   (-1.85) (-3.48) (-2.82)    
Othrisk       -4.891 -2.077* -3.188** 
      (-0.49) (-1.85) (-2.20) 
Othrisk* Post2005       -40.024** -5.359*** -6.062*** 
      (-2.12) (-4.07) (-3.63) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 43127 39004 39004 43127 39004 39004 43127 39004 39004 
R2 0.5049 0.3541 0.3335 0.5049 0.3538 0.3331 0.5048 0.3539 0.3334 
This table reports multivariate regressions of innovation and risk. The dependents are RD or Fnpats, or TCW. When RD is the dependent, 
RDt-1 is used as an independent in the regression instead of RDt. {Risk}*Post2005 is an interaction between the risk and an indicator 
variable set to 1 if the financial year is >2005 and 0 otherwise. Controls are the same as Table 4.3. Variables are defined in Appendix C.1 
Intercept removed for brevity. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** 
significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4.5 Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions, Interaction with  2008 Risk Disclosure Removal 
for Smaller Reporting Companies 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -23.850*** -2.634** -3.496** 
(-3.35) (-2.04) (-2.28) 
Avgrisk* 
Post2008 -4.807 -2.467*** -2.627** 
(-0.79) (-2.72) (-2.49) 
Avgrisk*SM 10.745 -1.946*** -2.792*** 
(1.18) (-3.37) (-3.71) 
Avgrisk*  25.440 3.722** 4.034** 
Post2008*SM (0.35) (2.25) (2.02) 
Syst -4.363*** -0.432 -0.574 
(-2.83) (-1.33) (-1.50) 
Syst*Post2008 0.915 -0.541 -0.423 
(0.55) (-1.31) (-0.86) 
Syst*SM -6.621 -0.498 -0.683 
(-1.42) (-1.49) (-1.61) 
Syst*   -23.976 1.386* 1.602  
Post2008*SM (-1.48) (1.72) (1.45) 
Othrisk -27.048*** -1.493 -2.169 
(-3.05) (-1.10) (-1.32) 
Othrisk* -3.016 -6.018*** -7.039*** 
Post2008 (-0.25) (-5.64) (-5.60) 
Othrisk*SM 50.871** -3.043** -4.405*** 
(2.48) (-2.34) (-2.59) 
Othrisk*   -5.378 10.924*** 12.148*** 
Post2008*SM (-0.05) (3.38) (3.06) 
SM 0.117 0.271*** 0.306*** 0.721 0.234*** 0.251*** -0.174 0.249*** 0.275*** 
(0.17) (3.45) (3.23) (1.05) (3.07) (2.70) (-0.25) (3.26) (3.00) 
Post2008*SM 2.560* 0.158 0.227 3.672*** 0.206 0.287 3.070** 0.133 0.197 
(1.66) (1.07) (1.33) (3.18) (1.33) (1.61) (2.26) (0.94) (1.22) 
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Table 4.5 Risk and Innovation Multivariate Regressions, Interaction with 2008 Risk Disclosure Removal for 
Smaller Reporting Companies (continued) 
 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 43390 39196 39196 43390 39196 39196 43390 39196 39196 
R2 0.5025 0.3614 0.3409 0.5027 0.3607 0.3400 0.5025 0.3609 0.3404 
This table reports multivariate regressions of innovation and risk with an interaction after the elimination of the risk disclosures for smaller reporting companies in 
2008. The dependents are RD, Fnpats, or TCW. Avgrisk*2008*SM, Syst*2008*SM, OthRisk*2008*SM are interactions with an indicator variable post2008 that is 
equal to 1 if the year is > 2008 and 0 otherwise and an indicator variable SM that is equal to 1 if the firm meets the smaller company reporting requirements 
(Revenues less than $50 million). When RD is the dependent, RDt-1 is used as an independent in the regression instead of RDt. Intercept removed for brevity. 
Variables are defined in Appendix C.1. Controls are the same as Table 4.3. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. * significant at 10% level, ** significant 
at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4.6 Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regression Discontinuity Design 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk 0.778 -6.661*** -10.358*** 
(0.01) (-4.35) (-4.76) 
Avgrisk*SM -48.116* 2.054*** 3.862*** 
(-1.89) (5.22) (6.33) 
Syst -3.875 -1.841*** -2.437*** 
(-0.35) (-4.18) (-4.21) 
Syst*SM -6.917 0.843** 1.296* 
(-1.09) (2.02) (1.93) 
Othrisk 51.387 -5.979*** -11.743*** 
(0.84) (-4.41) (-5.36) 
Othrisk*SM -90.648** 3.704*** 7.684*** 
(-2.28) (5.22) (6.47) 
SM 0.342 0.024 0.045 0.080 0.034 0.064 0.355 0.019 0.034 
(0.22) (0.56) (0.69) (0.05) (0.71) (0.89) (0.23) (0.48) (0.59) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 1875 1737 1737 1875 1737 1737 1875 1737 1737 
R2 0.4491 0.1919 0.1892 0.4488 0.1923 0.1881 0.4491 0.1896 0.1877 
This table examine the effect of the discontinuity of $50 million in revenues (below this threshold, firms are exempt from having to include a risk 
disclosure section in their 10-K filings) on risk and innovation. The discontinuity sample only includes firms with revenues between $15 and $85 
million and only for years 2008 and after (when the exemption is allowed). The dependents are Fnpats, TCW, or RD. SM is an indicator variable 
that is equal to 1 if the firm meets the smaller company reporting requirements (revenues less than $50 million). When RD is the dependent, RDt-
1 is used as an independent in the regression instead of RDt. Intercept removed for brevity. Variables are defined in Appendix C.1. Controls are 
the same as Table 4.3. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% 
level. 
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Table 4.7 Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions, Interaction 
with Financial Constraints 
 
Panel A: Financial Constraint Proxied by WWHi 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Fnpats TCW Fnpats TCW Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -3.041*** -3.962***     
(-2.59) (-2.84)     
Avgrisk*WWHi -1.502*** -1.989***     
(-3.27) (-3.37)     
Syst   -0.445 -0.558*   
  (-1.63) (-1.73)   
Syst*WWHi   -0.660*** -0.762***   
  (-2.95) (-2.60)   
Othrisk     -2.992** -4.051*** 
    (-2.49) (-2.72) 
Othrisk*WWHi     -1.592 -2.533* 
    (-1.47) (-1.89) 
WWHi 0.171*** 0.208*** 0.160*** 0.188*** 0.149*** 0.183*** 
(7.44) (7.30) (7.12) (6.58) (6.20) (6.13) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 39004 39004 39004 39004 39004 39004 
R2 0.3553 0.3355 0.3549 0.3349 0.3549 0.3351 
 
Panel B: Financial Constraint Proxied by ATLo 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Fnpats TCW Fnpats TCW Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -3.353*** -4.234***     
(-2.80) (-2.98)     
Avgrisk* ATLo -1.520*** -2.321***     
(-2.85) (-3.25)     
Syst   -0.567* -0.675**   
  (-1.95) (-1.97)   
Syst* ATLo   -0.160 -0.311   
  (-0.48) (-0.73)   
Othrisk     -3.309*** -4.390*** 
    (-2.73) (-2.97) 
Othrisk* ATLo     -1.613 -2.566 
    (-1.24) (-1.49) 
ATLo 0.302*** 0.311*** 0.266*** 0.258*** 0.276*** 0.274*** 
(6.53) (5.69) (5.77) (4.72) (5.62) (4.72) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 39004 39004 39004 39004 39004 39004 
R2 0.3576 0.3364 0.3570 0.3356 0.3571 0.3359 
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Table 4.7  Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions, Interaction with 
Financial Constraints (continued) 
Panel C: Financial Constraint Proxied by Recession 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Fnpats TCW Fnpats TCW Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -3.097*** -4.041***     
(-2.71) (-2.94)     
Avgrisk*Recession -1.395*** -1.775***     
(-2.61) (-3.78)     
Syst   -0.460* -0.576*   
  (-1.78) (-1.87)   
Syst*Recession   -0.634*** -0.707***   
  (-3.24) (-4.31)   
Othrisk     -3.220*** -4.480*** 
    (-2.88) (-3.17) 
Othrisk*Recession     -2.026** -2.423*** 
    (-2.31) (-2.95) 
Recession -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.009 -0.017 -0.023** 
(-0.04) (-0.19) (-0.40) (-0.44) (-1.46) (-2.17) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 39004 39004 39004 39004 39004 39004 
R2 0.3537 0.3340 0.3534 0.3336 0.3533 0.3337 
This table reports multivariate regressions of innovation and risk with interactions with financial 
constraint metrics. The dependents are Fnpats or TCW.  WWHi/ATLo is an indicator variable set 
to 1 if the firm is in the top/bottom tercile of Whited-Wu score/total assets and 0 otherwise. 
Recession is set to 1 if the time period falls during an NBER recognized recession and 0 
otherwise. Controls are the same as Table 4.3. Variables are defined in Appendix C.1 Intercept 
removed for brevity. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. * significant at 10% level, ** 
significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4.8 Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions with Interaction with Information Asymmetry 
and Investment Sensitivity  
Panel A: Investment Sensitivity 
Avgriskt-1 Systt-1 Othriskt-1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -8.720 -3.407*** -4.650*** 
(-1.15) (-2.63) (-2.91) 
Avgrisk* SpreadHi -9.267* 0.447 0.967 
(-1.74) (0.64) (1.08) 
Syst -3.742* -0.427 -0.544* 
(-1.75) (-1.64) (-1.65) 
Syst* SpreadHi 0.865 -0.123 -0.109 
(0.37) (-0.42) (-0.30) 
Othrisk 7.228 -3.308*** -4.889*** 
(0.61) (-2.61) (-2.95) 
Othrisk* SpreadHi -32.916*** -0.001 0.624 
(-2.71) (0.00) (0.33) 
SpreadHi 2.318*** -0.025 1.447*** 2.018*** -0.005 0.589*** 2.467*** -0.011 0.776*** 
(5.21) (-0.85) (3.24) (4.60) (-0.20) (2.75) (5.46) (-0.38) (3.43) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 37161 37225 37225 37161 37225 37225 37161 37225 37225 
R2 0.5419 0.3558 0.3357 0.5418 0.3555 0.3352 0.5419 0.3556 0.3354 
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Table 4.8  Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions with Interaction with Information Asymmetry and 
Investment Sensitivity (continued) 
Panel B: Investment Sensitivity 
Avgriskt-1 Systt-1 Othriskt-1 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -14.975* -3.544*** -4.584***       
(-1.68) (-2.90) (-3.12)       
Avgrisk* Q_CAPXHi -15.267 0.481 0.579       
(-1.53) (0.71) (0.69)       
Syst    -4.773** -0.550 -0.674    
   (-2.44) (-1.48) (-1.51)    
Syst* Q_CAPXHi    -0.674 0.034 0.034    
   (-0.26) (0.10) (0.08)    
Othrisk       0.966 -3.400** -4.623*** 
      (0.06) (-2.56) (-2.68) 
Othrisk* Q_CAPXHi       -30.287 -0.067 -0.199 
      (-1.51) (-0.04) (-0.10) 
Q_CAPXHi -0.258 -0.042 -0.044 -0.628* -0.030 -0.030 -0.306 -0.028 -0.026 
(-0.59) (-1.13) (-0.99) (-1.71) (-0.88) (-0.71) (-0.75) (-0.74) (-0.57) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 43118 38998 38998 43118 38998 38998 43118 38998 38998 
R2 0.5052 0.3537 0.3340 0.5050 0.3534 0.3336 0.5050 0.3534 0.3338 
This table reports multivariate regressions of innovation and risk with interactions with spread and investment sensitivity. The dependents are 
RD, Fnpats or TCW. Panel A reports regressions with interactions with SpreadHi, an indicator variable set to 1 if a firm’s average bid-ask spread 
over the past year is above median and 0 otherwise. Panel B reports regressions with interactions with Q_CAPXHi; Q_CAPXHi is an indicator 
variable set to 1 if a firm has historically displayed above median investment sensitivity and 0 otherwise. Q_CAPX is the coefficient from a 
regression of Tobin’s Q on capital expenditures. Controls are the same as Table 4.3. Variables are defined in Appendix C.1 Intercept removed for 
brevity. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4.9 Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions, with Beta and Idiosyncratic Volatility as Controls 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -7.879 -2.446** -3.250** 
(-1.11) (-2.04) (-2.25) 
Avgrisk* 
Post2005 -18.295*** -2.796*** -3.057***       
 (-2.63) (-3.66) (-3.29)       
Syst -2.126 -0.270 -0.372 
(-1.25) (-0.93) (-1.06) 
Syst* 
Post2005    -3.978** -0.946*** -0.975***    
    (-2.00) (-3.62) (-3.05)    
Othrisk 4.288 -1.939* -2.898** 
(0.44) (-1.74) (-2.02) 
Othrisk* 
Post2005       -38.069** -5.496*** -6.307*** 
       (-2.57) (-4.09) (-3.69) 
Beta 1.697*** 0.000 0.054 1.703*** 0.003 0.058 1.706*** 0.001 0.056 
(4.60) (0.00) (1.28) (4.63) (0.09) (1.36) (4.62) (0.03) (1.31) 
IVOL -0.039*** 0.001** 0.001** -0.039*** 0.001** 0.001** -0.039*** 0.001** 0.001** 
  (-6.73) (2.38) (2.07) (-6.69) (2.46) (2.14) (-6.75) (2.35) (2.05) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 37514 37601 37601 37514 37601 37601 37514 37601 37601 
R2 0.5491 0.3564 0.3357 0.5491 0.3561 0.3353 0.5491 0.3561 0.3355 
This table reports multivariate regressions of innovation with traditional measures of risk as controls. The dependents are RD, Fnpats, or TCW. 
When RD is the dependent, RDt-1 is used as an independent in the regression instead of RDt. Beta is calculated by using daily firm return data 
over the past financial year regressed against the market return in excess of the risk-free rate. IVOL is the residual from the regression of the 
firm’s daily returns over the past financial year against the Fama-French 3 factors. Controls are the same as Table 4.4. Variables are defined in 
Appendix C.1 Intercept removed for brevity. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, 
*** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4.10 Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions, Using Stricter Risk Textual Analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk 2.549 -2.289* -3.310** 
(0.30) (-1.89) (-2.30) 
Avgrisk * 
Post2005 -40.216*** -0.566 -0.536       
 (-5.47) (-0.67) (-0.48)       
Syst 3.028 0.039 -0.080 
(1.27) (0.12) (-0.20) 
Syst * 
Post2005    -10.831*** -1.059*** -1.048***    
    (-3.96) (-3.36) (-2.69)    
Othrisk 5.097 -2.496** -3.973*** 
(0.47) (-2.15) (-2.81) 
Othrisk * 
Post2005       -60.450*** -1.987* -1.647 
       (-4.31) (-1.67) (-1.11) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 43034 38915 38915 43034 38915 38915 43034 38915 38915 
R2 0.5042 0.3534 0.3339 0.5037 0.3535 0.3337 0.5040 0.3537 0.3342 
This table reports multivariate regressions of innovation and risk disclosure using the more strict textual risk analysis described in the text. The 
dependents are RD, Fnpats, or TCW. When RD is the dependent, RDt-1 is used as an independent in the regression instead of RDt. Controls are 
the same as Table 4.4. Variables are defined in Appendix C.1 Intercept removed for brevity. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. * 
significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4.11 Orthogonalized Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate 
Regressions 
 
Panel A: 1st Stage Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  AvgRisk Syst OthRisk 
BM 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.000*** 
(4.34) (5.19) (3.43) 
LogAT 0.000 0.003*** 0.000*** 
(0.73) (11.21) (4.81) 
Ret0_12 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.99) (-1.14) (-0.79) 
DA 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 
(-6.50) (0.13) (-1.62) 
Ivol 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
(7.87) (6.54) (6.61) 
Beta 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.001*** 
(16.30) (7.51) (10.75) 
Skew_Ret 0.000** 0.000 0.000 
(-2.46) (-0.66) (-1.62) 
Turn 0.001*** 0.001 0.000*** 
(4.42) (1.46) (2.74) 
BigN 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.002*** 
(9.21) (4.62) (9.85) 
DNI 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.33) (1.16) (-0.38) 
LogAnalyst 0.001** 0.000 0.000*** 
(2.53) (0.63) (-3.43) 
IO 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
(-0.65) (0.07) (4.38) 
        
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
n 40507 40507 40507 
R2 0.1234 0.1555 0.0823 
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Table 4.11 Orthogonalized Risk Disclosure and Innovation Multivariate Regressions (continued) 
 
Panel B: Residual Risk Regressions 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW RD Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -9.167 -3.360*** -5.158*** 
(-1.08) (-2.95) (-3.86) 
Avgrisk * 
Post2005 -9.020 -2.732** -2.772**       
 (-1.29) (-2.37) (-2.01)       
Syst -2.400 -0.376 -0.604* 
(-1.33) (-1.24) (-1.68) 
Syst * Post2005    -2.314 -1.262*** -1.321***    
    (-1.14) (-3.14) (-2.73)    
Othrisk -2.986 -2.935** -4.799*** 
(-0.28) (-2.28) (-2.96) 
Othrisk * 
Post2005       -15.531 -3.524** -3.416 
             (-1.19) (-2.06) (-1.62) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 34839 34839 34839 34839 34839 34839 34839 34839 34839 
R2 0.3639 0.3639 0.3639 0.3639 0.3639 0.3639 0.3639 0.3639 0.3639 
This table reports regressions of innovation and risk orthogonalized to known predictors of risk disclosure. Panel A shows the 1st stage 
regression results of predictors of risk against the risk scores. Panel B shows the results of the regressions using the residuals from the 1st stage 
regression in Panel A.  The dependents are fnpats, TCW, or RD. When RD is the dependent, RDt-1 is used as an independent in the regression 
instead of RDt. Controls are the same as Table 4.3.  Variables are defined in Appendix C.1 Intercept removed for brevity. Standard errors in 
Panel B are clustered by firm and year. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table 4.12 Capitalized R&D (t-4 to t) and Sum of Future Patents  (t to t+2) 
Panel A: Capitalized R&D (RDC) (t-4 to t) as Control 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Fnpats TCW Fnpats TCW Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -2.796** -3.771** 
(-2.25) (-2.57) 
Avgrisk * Post2005 -1.704 -1.711     
 (-1.50) (-1.28)     
Syst -0.294 -0.446 
(-1.00) (-1.28) 
Syst * Post2005   -0.779*** -0.709**   
   (-2.78) (-2.10)   
Othrisk -2.131* -3.302** 
(-1.74) (-2.17) 
Othrisk * Post2005     -3.824** -4.102* 
     (-2.09) (-1.85) 
RDC 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 
  (10.09) (10.22) (10.24) (10.37) (10.06) (10.18) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 33789 33789 33789 33789 33789 33789 
R2 0.3690 0.3542 0.3689 0.3539 0.3687 0.3539 
 
Panel B: Sum of Future Fnpats & TCW (t to t+2) as Dependent 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  Fnpats TCW Fnpats TCW Fnpats TCW 
Avgrisk -9.784** -13.228*** 
(-2.57) (-2.94) 
Avgrisk * Post2005 -5.623 -6.177     
 (-1.55) (-1.48)     
Syst -1.021 -1.524 
(-1.11) (-1.40) 
Syst * Post2005   -2.258** -2.126**   
   (-2.50) (-2.01)   
Othrisk -9.775** -14.368*** 
(-2.53) (-2.97) 
Othrisk * Post2005     -11.157* -12.148* 
         (-1.88) (-1.74) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
n 32770 32770 32770 32770 32770 32770 
R2 0.4092 0.4026 0.4086 0.4018 0.4089 0.4024 
This table reports regressions of innovation and risk disclosure with capitalized R&D (RDC) or 
cumulative patents. Panel A shows the regressions using t-4 to t capitalized R&D (Eberhart, Maxwell, and 
Siddique 2004) as a control. Panel B shows the results of the regressions cumulative future patents 
(Fnpats_3 or TCW_3) from years t to t+2.  Other controls are the same as Table 4.3.  Variables are 
defined in Appendix C.1 Intercept removed for brevity. Standard errors are clustered by firm and year. * 
significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5% level, *** significant at 1% level. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
In conclusion, this dissertation examines several intangibles and identifies their effects on 
firms. Chapter 2 examines the effect of employee flexibility on future firm performance. I create 
a novel measure of employee flexibility using text analysis of online job reviews. The results 
show that firms with more flexible employees earn higher returns than other firms, particularly 
when the firm is exposed to systematic risk. Chapter 3 shows that the SEC’s enforcement deters 
future financial misconduct and that punishment of the company has a larger deterrence effect 
than punishment of an officer or other entity. Finally, Chapter 4 shows risk disclosed in firm 
filings is associated with lower innovation and that mandating additional disclosure of risk 
results in even lower innovation. 
These results bring up a variety of implications for researchers. Chapter 2 shows that how 
firm employees are organized has an impact on firm performance—future research can examine 
other ways that firms are organized and their impact on firm outcomes. Chapter 3 is important as 
it lays the ground work for investigating other methods to reduce future financial misconduct. 
Chapter 4 is valuable as it gives fuel to the debate about increasing mandatory disclosure—more 
disclosure is not always best for the firms and investors. 
These results are also critical for practitioners. The second chapter is important for firm 
executives as it shows to them that how they structure their employees can have a large impact 
on firm value—more flexible employees can aid their firm during times of risk or uncertainty. 
The third chapter is important for regulators as it shows that their efforts are valuable at reducing 
future financial misconduct. Furthermore, given tight budgets for regulatory agencies, the 
research shows that targeting a company will be more effective at deterring future misconduct in 
both the company’s industry and MSA. Finally, regulators have focused on increasing disclosure 
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as the best way to improve market outcomes. With the results from the fourth chapter, regulators 
may want to rethink this orthodoxy and examine the trade-off between increased disclosure 
against possible negative side-effects. 
Altogether, this dissertation adds to the mounting evidence of the importance of 
intangibles and looks at 3 specific ways that intangibles such as employee flexibility, integrity, 
disclosure and innovation, can have on firms. Furthermore, it shows how text analysis can be 
used to provide a measure of intangibles that can be used in academic research. Finally, it 
provides future paths for research to examine other intangibles that may affect firms.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A.1 Case Study: Airlines 
When oil prices unexpectedly plunged in mid-2014 and again in 2015, most U.S. airlines 
posted record earnings, yet over the same period, the stock of Southwest Airlines (LUV, a firm 
with a flex score of 1.88) outperformed that of United Airlines (UAL, with a flex score of 
1.51).60 Such a pattern in stock prices is consistent with our interpretation that in the event of 
exogenous shocks, Southwest’s employee flexibility allowed the firm to react more timely and 
adequately to changing circumstances. Southwest’s operating flexibility (e.g., servicing shorter 
routes and flying a single type of aircraft) may explain part of the outperformance, but so does its 
employee flexibility, which is an integral part of Southwest’s culture.  
For example, a Southwest pilot who decided to hold a plane to wait for a customer 
rushing to a dying relative received praise from management. 61 Employee flexibility is also 
embodied by a 2010 story where the pilot of a re-routed flight stuck on tarmac ordered pizza for 
all passengers, or by the flight crew who abandoned take-off and rerouted free of charge a 
passenger who had just learned that her son was in a coma.62,63 These anecdotes are not isolated 
in a company with a strong empowerment culture. In the words of Southwest’s CMO: “[our 
culture is to] empower employees to make decisions. We [the management] let them use their 
judgment and act on situations where they can improve customer experience.” 64 In contrast, 
                                                 
60 United enters our sample in 2016; we therefore use the 2016 flex score as a proxy for United’s true score in 2014 
and 2015, a reasonable assumption given both Southwest’s and United’s relatively stable positions in Airline 
Quality Ratings during 2014-2016 (Bowen and Headley 2017). The sample median flex score in 2014 is 1.55. 
61 Tenney, M., Why empowering employees to be compassionate is great for business, Huffington Post, 9/6/2016.  
62  Mainz, C., A pizza party on Southwest Airlines, Southwest Airlines’ Community blog, 5/25/2010, 
https://www.southwestaircommunity.com/t5/Southwest-Stories/A-Pizza-Party-on-Southwest-Airlines/ba-p/28951. 
63 Pemberton, B., Southwest Airlines turns plane around at last minute and provides free flight home after passenger 
learns her son is in a coma, Daily Mail, 5/26/2015, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/travel/travel_news/article-
3097690/Southwest-Airlines-turns-plane-minute-provides-free-flight-home-passenger-learns-son-coma.html. 
64  Kevin Krone, CMO of Southwest Airlines, quoted in SiegelGale.com, 1/29/2016, 
https://www.siegelgale.com/kevin-krone-cmo-of-southwest-airlines-on-conquering-complexity-for-employees-and-
customers/.  
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referring to a highly publicized 2017 incident involving the violent removal of a passenger from 
an overbooked flight, United’s CEO Oscar Muñoz said that rule-following was the root cause of 
the incident: “Our policies got in the way of our values and procedures interfered in doing what’s 
right.”65 
The collective weight of these anecdotes amounts to significant stock performance 
differences between firms with high and low employee flexibility. Considering the airlines 
industry, we form two portfolios by splitting publicly traded airlines along their median flex 
score. The following figure plots the cumulative value-weighted returns of the high- and low-flex 
portfolios, and shows that as oil prices plummeted (starting in the second half of 2014, 
highlighted), high-flex airlines significantly outperformed low-flex ones.66  
 
 
  
                                                 
65 Fotsch, B. and Case, J., Is your company like United Airlines? Forbes, 5/2/2017. 
66 Portfolios are formed at the end of June 2011, rebalanced in June of each year, and held to December 2016. The 
starting value of each portfolio is normalized to be 100. 
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Appendix A.2 Parsing the Reviews 
 
We provide here a detailed description of the parsing method applied to reviews. We 
retrieve reviews from a career insight website and convert the reviews into raw text. We use a 
text parsing software to convert all characters into lowercase characters and contractions into 
full-form expressions (for example, “don’t” into “do not”). We remove punctuation and stop 
words, using Python’s Natural Language Tool Kit’s list of stop words.67 We keep negation words 
(no, not, neither, none, nobody, nowhere, nor, never) in the text, to make adjustments for 
semantical negation possible. To account for the grammatical declinations of words, we 
lemmatize words in the remaining text with Python’s Natural Language Tool Kit’s English 
Lemmatizer algorithm.  
We follow Tetlock (2007) and compute the frequency of the lexical fields’ words in the 
parsed reviews, net of the frequencies of the negated form of each word. Appendix A.6 lists the 
words included in our lexical field. Finally, in Appendix A.7 we report the top 5 firms that have 
the highest Flex scores each year in our sample.  
 
  
                                                 
67 The list of stop words that I used contains the following words: through, itself, any, to, our, and, theirs, because, 
few, some, of, how, have, same, on, above, who, or, were, only, my, more, while, from, such, up, was, whom, 
having, each, at, me, they, yourself, these, about, again, against, should, down, them, then, myself, those, do, you, 
out, all, the, does, during, your, an, am, him, into, ourselves, where, own, by, his, as, what, very, we, there, but, their, 
them, did, doing, can, just, being, its, yours, herself, has, is, than, below, are, if, why, hers, had, in, s, himself, before, 
this, she, will, been, it, once, I, yourselves, for, a, her, both, further, when, under, now, over, between, with, that, 
until, after, be, so. 
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Appendix A.3 Sample Reviews 
 
This figure shows three examples of reviews retrieved from the career intelligence website we 
use. Each review includes a title (bolded), details about the reviewer (pale grey), and a free-form 
review (black text, not bolded). The upper left corner of each reviews has a drop-down menu 
(not shown) with the detailed ratings on the following categories: job/work life balance, 
compensation benefits, job satisfaction, management, and job culture. Finally, the right column 
has firm-level statistics of overall employee satisfaction and satisfaction for the categories of 
job/work life balance, compensation benefits, job satisfaction, management, and job culture.  
 
Panel A: Apple 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: United Airlines 
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Appendix A.3 (Continued). Sample Reviews 
 
Panel C: Google (Alphabet) 
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Appendix A.4 Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Age Age of firm calculated as the current year less the first year the firm appears in 
Compustat. 
AT Total assets at end of fiscal year. 
BC Indicator variable that is equal to 1 if the firm is on the “100 Best Companies to Work 
for” list in year t, and zero otherwise. 
Beta CAPM beta estimated by regressing monthly firm returns over a 60-month rolling 
window. 
BM Ratio of book equity / market capitalization, measured at the end of financial year. 
Cash Cash and short-term investments scaled by previous year total assets. 
CEOtenure The number of years the CEO has been CEO of the company. 
DA Ratio of short and long-term debt to total assets. 
Ex_ret Excess stock returns over risk free rate. 
Flex The average Flex_rev for each firm over the past 12 months. 
Flex_net Similar to Flex, but the number of flexibility words is reduced by 1 each time a 
flexibility word in the review is in the vicinity (within 3 words) of a negation word.  
Flex_rev The review level flexibility score, calculated as follows. Each online company review 
is textually analyzed to get a count of the “flexibility” words that are in the flexibility 
lexical field. The “flexibility” word count is scaled by the total length of the review 
(len_review) to get a flex ratio of the review (flex_rev).  
GP Gross Profit (Sale – COGS / AT t-1), in percentages. 
HiFlex Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s Flex is above the median Flex for that year. 
HiETKLD Indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm’s employee treatment score in year t is above 
the full-sample median. Calculated as per Bae, Kang, Wang (2011) except the 
retirement benefits and employee health and safety indicators were discontinued before 
the sample period begins. Firms with all missing ratings were assigned a rating of 0. 
HiUncert An indicator variable that equals 1 if the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index of Baker, 
Bloom and Davis (2016) is above the 10-year rolling median. 
Len_review Length of a job review in words. 
MEfyr Market capitalization of the firm at the end of the financial year. 
MEjun Market capitalization of the firm at the end of June. 
Mkt_rf Excess market return over risk-free rate. 
OK Organizational capital, calculated following Eisfeldt and Papanikolaou (2013) except 
that it includes financial firms and firms with any financial year-end. 
Return -x, -y Cumulative return from month t-x to month t-y. 
RDA R&D expenditures scaled by assets 
Star rating Mean of 5 numerical ratings (job, work, life balance; compensation/benefits; job 
security; management; job culture) in each review. Each individual rating is out of 5, 
with 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest. 
UnionMemb Percentage of unionized employees in the firm’s state (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003) 
UnionReviews Firm-level average frequency of union-related words (union, unionized, unionization, 
etc.) in employee reviews 
Appendix A.5 The FlexJobs’ List of Most Flexible and Popular Companies, 2016   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Flex Score 
Above 
Median 
Flex 
 
 
 
 
 
Flex Score 
Above 
Median 
Flex 
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Company Name 
(%) (Yes=1) 
Company Name 
(%) (Yes=1) 
Google 3.9 1 Dell * * 
Salesforce * * McKinsey & Co * * 
Facebook 2.8 1 Deloitte * * 
Apple 1.7 1 Box * * 
Amazon 1.7 1 McKesson * * 
Uber * * Goldman Sachs 1.6 0 
Microsoft 2.1 1 JLL 1.9 1 
Tesla * * Edelman * * 
Twitter * * Estee Lauder 1.9 1 
Airbnb * * Starbucks 2.1 1 
Netflix 1.2 0 Splink * * 
Stryker 2.7 1 Viacom 2.3 1 
Visa 1.2 0 Live Nation 1.8 1 
Adobe 2.6 1 HBO * * 
Workday * * Leidos * * 
Pandora * * Fox * * 
Under Armour 2.1 1 Cisco 1.9 1 
Tableau * * Yelp  * * 
Coca-Cola 2.2 1 Morgan Stanley 1.9 1 
Epsilon * *   
      
The ranking of job flexibility is based on job popularity data from LinkedIn and FlexJobs’ 
own database on flexible job options. The list is available at: 
 https://www.flexjobs.com/blog/post/flexible-popular-companies-job-seekers/.  
This table shows that approximately 84% of firms on the FlexJobs list of most flexible 
firms where data is available are above the median flex score (1.63%) in our 2016 sample.  
* indicates the firm is private, is not an S&P1500 firm, or has incomplete data in our 
sample. 
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Appendix A.6 Lexical Field 
acclimate, acclimatize, accommodate, adapt, adjust, begin, bring, catalyze, change, create, 
correct, cultivate, develop, discontinue, dream, educate, elaborate, encourage, engender, 
entrepreneur, envision, establish, experiment, fantasy, fashion, father, flexible, foster, freedom, 
future, generate, give, grow, idea, inaugurate, induce, initiation, innovation, institute, 
intellectual, introduce, invoke, launch, learn, make, new, nourish, nurture, oriented, original, 
pioneer, pioneer, prediction, produce, promote, prompt, radical, risk, see, spawn, start, tailor, 
thought, trend, unafraid, venture, vision. 
 
This table presents the non-stemmed lexical fields used to compute employee flexibility (flex 
scores) by matching these fields to the lemmatized reviews. The initial lexical field is from 
Fiordelisi and Ricci (2014) and is extended using WordNet’s thesaurus.  
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Appendix A.7 Firms with the Highest Employee Flexibility Scores Each Year 
Year Flex (%) Company Name 
2016 6.9 CIMAREX ENERGY CO 
2016 5.9 OFG BANCORP 
2016 5.4 VERIFONE SYSTEMS INC 
2016 5.3 SIGNATURE BANK/NY 
2016 5.1 INTL FCSTONE INC 
 
2015 7.3 UNITED INSURANCE HOLDINGS CO 
2015 5.4 STRATASYS LTD 
2015 5.2 CADENCE DESIGN SYSTEMS INC 
2015 4.8 TELEDYNE TECHNOLOGIES INC 
2015 4.7 BANC OF CALIFORNIA INC 
 
2014 7.2 FEDERATED INVESTORS INC 
2014 7.2 LIFEPOINT HEALTH INC 
2014 5.8 EW SCRIPPS  
2014 5.4 AKAMAI TECHNOLOGIES INC 
2014 5.2 MERCURY GENERAL CORP 
 
2013 6.5 HOLOGIC INC 
2013 6.2 INTERSIL CORP  
2013 5.6 TIVO CORP 
2013 5.5 NEWFIELD EXPLORATION CO 
2013 5.5 PIONEER NATURAL RESOURCES CO 
 
2012 6.4 SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES INC 
2012 6.2 BASIC ENERGY SERVICES INC 
2012 5.7 SCIENTIFIC GAMES CORP 
2012 5.2 EQUITY RESIDENTIAL 
2012 5.0 AMERICAN ELECTRIC POWER CO 
 
2011 2.0 DIRECTV 
2011 1.7 MCDONALD'S CORP 
2011 1.7 AT&T INC 
2011 1.5 VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS INC 
2011 1.4 WAL-MART STORES INC 
This table shows the top 5 firms by the flex score each year at the end of June with more than 5 
reviews in total. Flex is defined in Appendix A.4. (We do not show firms with the lowest flex 
scores because there are quite many firms with zero or close to zero flex scores.) 
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Appendix C.1 Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Post2005 Indicator variable set to 1 if the year is > 2005. 0 otherwise 
Post2008 Indicator variable set to 1 if the year is > 2008. 0 otherwise 
AT Total assets (AT) in millions 
ATLo 
 
ATLo is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm’s total assets (AT) is in the 
bottom tercile for that year. It is set to 0 otherwise. 
Avgrisk 
Aggregate mean of all risk disclosure scores as measured using the word 
dictionary from Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014). Risk disclosure 
scores are scaled by the total number of words in the 10-K. 
Beta Beta measured over the financial year using daily data.  
BigN An indicator variable if a firm uses a Big 4/5 auditor. 
BM Book equity (CEQ) to market equity (PRCC_F * CSHO) ratio 
CAPXA The capital expenditures (CAPX) of a firm as a percentage of total assets (AT) 
DA Debt (DLTT + DLC) as a percentage of total assets (AT) 
DNI Net income before extraordinary items scaled by market capitalization (t-1) 
Firmage Number of years the firm has been in Compustat 
Fnpats0 Number of patents filed that calendar year 
Fnpats Log ( number of patents filed that calendar year +1) 
Fnpats_3 Cumulative Fnpats from years t to t+2 
Fyear Financial year 
HHI The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index calculated using firm sales of Compustat firms 
in the same 2-digit SIC industries 
HHI2 The square of the HHI index to account for any nonlinearities 
Idio 
Idiosyncratic risk disclosure score as measured using the word dictionary from 
Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014). Risk disclosure scores are 
scaled by the total number of words in the 10-K. 
IO The percentage of shares owned by institutional investors. Set to 100% maximum. 
IVOL Idiosyncratic volatility measured over the financial year using daily data and the FF3 factors. 
KZHi KZHi is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm’s Kaplan-Zingales score is greater 
than the sample median for that year. It is set to 0 otherwise. 
LogAT Log of total assets (AT) 
LogAnalyst Log of the number of analysts covering the firm at the end of the financial year 
LogLength The log of the number of words in the firm’s 10-K for the most recent fiscal year 
Othrisk 
Average of risk disclosure scores excluding idiosyncratic and systematic risks as 
measured using the word dictionary from Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and 
Steele (2014). These risks include legal, tax, and financial. Risk scores are scaled 
by the total number of disclosure words in the 10-K. 
Q (Market Capitalization – Book Value Common Equity + Book Total Assets) / 
Book Total Assets 
Q_CAPXAHi An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm’s investment sensitivity is greater than the 
median. Set to 0 if below the median 
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Recession An indicator variable set to 1 if the US is in recession as defined by the NBER and 
0 otherwise. 
Ret0_12 Cumulative stock return from month t-0 to t-12 
ROA Net income (NI) as a percentage of total assets (AT) 
RD R&D expenditures as a percentage of lagged total assets. If R&D expenditures are missing, the value is set to 0 
RDC R&D capitalized over years t-4 to t at the following rate (RDt + 0.8 RDt-1 + 0.6 RDt-2 + 0.4 RDt-3 + 0.2 RDt-4  (Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique 2004) 
RDMiss Indicator variable set to 1 if R&D value is missing 
Skew_Ret The skewness of stock returns over the past financial year using daily data 
SM Indicator variable set to 1 if the firm has less than $50 million in revenues 
SpreadHi An indicator variable set to 1 if the firm’s average bid-ask spread over the past year is above median. It is set to 0 otherwise. 
Syst 
Systematic risk disclosure score as measured using the word dictionary from 
Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014). Risk disclosure scores are 
scaled by the total number of words in the 10-K. 
TANG Property, Plant, and Equipment (PPENT) as a percentage of total assets (AT) 
TCW0 
Truncated and citation-weighted patent filings. Patents were truncation-adjusted 
and citation-weighted by the methodology described in Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru 
and Stoffman (2016) 
TCW Log (TCW0 +1).  
TCW_3 Cumulative TCW from t to t+2. 
Turn Mean daily share turnover over the past year. 
{risk} * Post2005 Interaction of {risk} variable with Post2005 
{risk} * Post2008 Interaction of {risk} variable with Post2008 
{risk} * SM Interaction of {risk} variable with SM 
{risk} *Post2008*SM Interaction of {risk} variable with Post2008 and SM 
WWHi WWHi is an indicator variable set to 1 if the firm’s Whited-Wu score is in the top 
tercile for that year. It is set to 0 otherwise. 
 
All variables are winsorized at the 1%/99% level except for FirmAge and indicator variables. 
 
 
 
